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SUMMARY
Man's search for meaning has involved him in political, social 
and religious area of life. In many cases his concern has been 
directed exclusively in one or other of these areas. Indeed, it 
can be said that man's perspective on reality, particularly throu^t- 
out this centuiy, has encouraged such compartmentilization of life. 
'Meaning' (fulfillment) has generally meant the commitment to one 
concern to the exclusion of another. As a result, conflict has 
developed with each discipline arguing for the ultimacy of its own 
claim. The church, for example, has found itself at odds, many 
times, with political activity for this reason. This thesis challenges 
the heart of such devisive thinking. Throughout, I argue for one 
reality in the question of meaning. Using the theology of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg for support, I present a perspective in which politics, 
society and religion are viewed as participants in the same reality, 
although with distinctive contributions.
More specifically, in dealing with the question of meaning, I 
approach the subject of the individual's relationship to the comm­
unity, This subject inevitably arises and is crucial to any serious 
contemplation of man's quest for fulfillment. Where and how does the 
individual look for satisfaction in his quest? To my knowledge no 
adequate response has been presented to this question. Politically, 
we are witnessing a struggle between those forces that claim ultimacy 
for the community and its meaning, and those forces which defend the 
rights of the individual above all systems and structures. The same 
struggle is present economically between defenders of socialism and
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defenders of capitalism. Theologically, a struggle is also in 
progress. There are proponents of a pietistic tradition vho 
argue for a transcendence of the individual above the world for 
true meaning. On the other hand, there are proponents of a 
position TÛ10 advocate a more worldly, secular theology which claims 
meaning as purely immanent in the world.
In this thesis I am treating the subject from the theological 
point of view. It is my conviction that man's search for meaning is 
dependent on where and how he sees his God, Every man in search of 
fulfillment is engaged in a religious exercise whether he recognizes 
it or not. Thus, no man can escape the question of God, This thesis 
deals specifically with this question and its suggestive perspective 
oh the relationship between the individual and the community. It 
is my contention that no conception of God, thus far presented, 
deals adequately with the matter at hand. Present concepts fall 
short of a comprehensive understanding. Either value (meaning) is 
divorced from fact, in which case the community of man loses its 
significance, or value is united with fact in such a way as to deny 
man the honor of freedom and openness. In either case, the require­
ments of personal existence, for which unity and freedom are necessary 
conditions, are not met, I suggest that theology can no longer pro­
claim a God with any degree of credibility unless it meets such con­
ditions. The challenge of atheism is mentioned, particularly its 
claim that present day conceptions of God deny man freedom with their 
deterministic implications.
The criticism I make is that protestant theology has been weak 
in meeting this challenge and is presenting a God incredulous to the
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modem mind for this reason. To substantiate this, I chose Emil 
Brunner, a theologian who wrestled seriously with man's ethical dilemma. 
He offered the protestant world a suggestion of the proper relation­
ship of the individual and the community in the question of meaning,
I believe that Brunner, althou^ distinctive in his expression, 
represents a general weakness of the protestant position in this cen­
tury, This weakness rests basically in the conception of God out­
lined by him. The suggestion I make is that Brunner's God implies 
a search for meaning 'above* the events of life. At the same time, 
there are deterministic implications in his understanding of the 
existence and actuality of God,
To counter this position I chose Wolfhart Pannenberg, whose 
theology is, I have argued, challenging and promising in relating 
theology positively to the quest for meaning in personal and comm­
unity life, Allan Galloway writes of Pannenberg*s promise and chall­
enge in this way; "I find in his doctrine of the Trinity more ethical 
power than in any exposition since Ritschl's, It invites us to par­
ticipate in the life of God by participating fully in the history of 
our own time. We are invited to do this in suol^  a way as to live 
towards the fulfillment of all history in the justice and love of 
God in the final resurrection of all flesh,"
The contribution of this thesis rests in the attempt made to 
draw out the ethical power and promise of Pannenberg and to show 
his relevance to the question at hand. There are residual problems
^Allan Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenberg (George Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1973), P* 113.
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left unsolved, but it is my conviction that unless theology moves 
in the direction Pannenberg points us we can no longer proclaim the 
Christian faith with much ethical cogency.
In the first chapter, Brunner's position with regard to the 
individual's place in the ccanmunity is presented. It is suggested 
that the establishment of meaning for the individual took place with­
out significant regard for the community. At the same time, Brunner's 
position is challenged for its deterministic implications, denying 
the individual his freedom.
The second chapter is devoted to an investigation of the foun­
dation of Brunner's ethical expression. It is argued that his con­
cept of God as an a-temporal, existing in pure actuality, more than 
anything else determined his perspective on community and its meaning. 
In the third chapter, Wolfhart Pannenberg's theology is examined. 
Specifically, his concept of God as Future is analysed, I draw out 
its promise and strength in holding together what are seemingly two 
exclusive understandings: the all-determining sovereignty of God 
and human freedom. It is argued that unless these understandings 
are inclusive of one another, the Christian faith will continue to 
appear irrational to the modem mind. Criticisms of Pannenberg's 
views are considered and important aspects of his thought, by this 
means, are elucidated.
The fourth chapter is devoted to the support structure claimed 
by both men for their respective positions. An attempt is made to 
clarify the Christological positions which enabled the two theologians 
to make the claims they have made. It is argued that much recent 
biblical scholarship lends support to Pannenberg's position,
- V -
Having defended the soundness of Pannenberg*s concept of Sod 
as Future, I then draw out its implications for the individual and 
community. The concept is commended for its promise in guaranteeing 
the right and significance of each. The reciprocity between the 
individual and the community essential for harmonious social life 
is presented as an important contribution of his reasoning. Meaning, 
it is suggested, is to be found not * above * the events of life but 
'in* them. And yet, final meaning is presented as something reserved 
for the future. Indeed, the argument presented is that the community 
of man is the Future present in an anticipatory manner. This directs 
the individual to his community for his destiny and meaning and yet 
frees him from it at the same time.
-vi-
INTRODUCTION
In choosing Emil Brunner and Wolfhart Pannenberg as the two 
principal theologians of this study, I am aware of the vast study 
and scholarship that has already been devoted to their work, 
Pannenberg, although relatively recent on the theological scene, 
has already attracted the attention of scholars who have favorably 
and unfavorably interpreted him. Although it would not be possible 
to do justice to all of this research, a good deal of attention was 
paid to this material,
I have not offered anything new in the outline of Brunner's 
social ethic. What I have done is to challenge the relevance of 
this ethic with respect to the meaning of the individual's life 
in community, I have done this by focusing on Brunner's concept 
of God, This, to my knowledge, has not been done although much 
has been written on both his social ethics and his understanding 
of God, Specifically, God's relationship with time has been in­
vestigated, The participation of God as the focus of meaning and 
value in fact, has been discussed. The long-standing philosophical 
debate about the relation of fact and value is relevant at this 
point. Some reference has been made to this. However, no attempt 
was made to give full coverage to the philosophical issue. Any 
such attempt would require a separate thesis. The position I have 
taken theologically, however, does suggest lines along which a 
philosophical argument mi^t proceed,
I have taken the main interpretations and expositions of 
Pannenberg into consideration. Various writers, such as Don 
Olive, Frank Tupper and Allan Galloway have attempted to clarify
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his position and ask questions for further research. The latter 
author has been particularly helpful to me on various points. This 
thesis has taken up some of the areas which Galloway has considered 
very promising in Pannenberg, I have used Pannenberg*s theology to 
work out a new understanding of the individual's social position.
The trinitarian relationship, particularly, is considered and I 
have used Pannenberg's understanding of the Trinity to shed li^t 
on a problem at the heart of our social existence. In this sense,
I have attempted not only to interpret Pannenberg but also to expand 
his conceptions in their wider application.
-viii-
CHAPTER ONE
HOW MEANING ARISES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL IN GOMMCNITY - BRUNNER
CHAPTER ONE
HOf/ MEANING ARISES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL IN COîÆMUIOTï - BRUNNER
(a ) The Question of Meaning
Throughout this thesis the word 'meaning* will be used for a 
particular purpose. The word itself has various intents, therefore, 
it is necessary to define it more precisely. It may be used in 
reference to an action which a person has undertaken, as expressed 
in the sentence, "I meant to take the first road". In other words, 
'meaning* may denote intention of action. 'Meaning* may also be a 
word referring to the proper use of language. In the sentence, "The 
rose is a happy rose", it would be proper to question the use of the 
word 'happy'. Is it meaningful to use 'happy' in this context? 
'Meaning', thus, may be a word that refers to the proper use or 
usage of words. In many philosophical circles today this is the case," 
The word 'meaning*, however, may be used with reference to life 
itself. This is the case not only in the expression, "Life is very 
meaningful for me" (positive value), but also, in the expression,
"What and where is the meaning of my life?" (significant value). The 
latter expression refers to the truth of life. In this context then, 
one is speaking not only of an analysis of words and their proper use.
I refer to the following: The Theory of Meaning ed, G. H. R, 
Parkinson (Oxford University Press, 1974), L. Jonathan Cohen, The 
Diversity of Meaning (Methuen & Go. Ltd., London, 1962), and Easays 
in Conceptual Analysis ed, Antony Flew (MacMillan, St. Martin’s Press, 
New ïork, I966). The distinction between usage and use that I make 
is in keeping with the distinction Antony Flew makes in his article, 
'Philosophy and Language* (Essays in Conceptual Analysis, pp. 1-21),
I shall be using meaning, truth and significance synonymously 
throughout this thesis.
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but of an analysis of human experience in order to elicit the
2
significance it contains.
It is in this context that the word ’meaning* is applied with 
much ethical and moral implication. This usage of the word will 
be employed throughout the thesis. In so doing, the intention is 
to pursue the matter as academically as possible, with the hope 
that the study may have relevance for the practical question of 
meaning in daily life. The main interest of the research will 
centre around the position of the individual and the community.
The question under investigation will be: How does meaning arise
for the individual in the community? The nature of the relation­
ship that exists between the two will be also the aim of this inquiry. 
In its pursuit other questions will receive consideration: Is
meaning to be found in the actual process of life itself? Is 
meaning something imposed upon reality either by ourselves or by 
a divine being? Such usage of the word ’meaning* involves, in turn, 
questions as to the nature of man, reality and experience, which will 
be dealt with directly and indirectly.
2It can be said that one of the usages of ’meaning* by G. E,
Moore is similar to the one we are employing in our study (cf,
Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, 1903) p. 33). There 
are, of course, many usages of the word by Moore (of. E. D. Klemke,
The Epiatemology of G. E. Moore (N, W, University Press, Evanston,
1969) )• Our usage of the word is clarified further by Langdon 
Gilkey: "We need,....what we are calling "meaning" if we are to live 
creatively and actively. Here the problem of meaning is existential, 
referent to life, rather than intellectual and semantic, referent to 
symbols and their usage. To have meaning in this existential usage is 
to have the sense that what we do, the life we live, the activities 
that make up our days, have or will in the future have some sort of value 
for us, for others, for the community, for the course of history, and 
so on," (The Renewal of God-Language (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc,,
New lork, 1969) p, 33&)*
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The question of meaning is to be discussed theologically. This 
is not to make the discussion exclusive of that which takes place 
in other disciplines of thought. The question receives the attention 
of the philosopher, as well. In approaching it theologically, no 
attempt is being made to disregard the philosophical contribution. 
This contribution is indeed valuable. The search for an answer is 
facilitated only by dialogue and openness of thought.
There is some doubt, however, as to whether philosophy is 
relevant to the intention of this thesis; that is, whether *meaning* 
(truth and significance of life) is an appropriate subject for 
philosophy,^ Important as this is to philosophy itself, it will not 
be pursued in the main body of this work.
See an article by Kai Nielsen, ’Linguistic Philosophy and 
Beliefs* (philosophy Today, No. 2, ed, Jerry H, Gill (The MacMillan 
Company, London, I969) pp, 52-72), Kai Nielsen argues that meaning, 
in the sense referred to above, is not really apposite to philosophy, 
Nielsen says the real duty of the philosopher is, after Wittgenstein, 
to deal with conceptual confusion by trying to give "an accurate 
description of the function of our language" (p. 65), For Nielsen, 
linguistic analysis is the proper task of philosophy; it is the 
philosopher's job to deal with the logical grammar which must be 
employed if our conceptions are to be clarified. It is in the light 
of this conviction that he approvingly quotes Wittgenstein: "philosophy 
is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language," (p. 66),
It is highly questionable, however, whether Nielsen has escaped 
the usage of meaning which we are seeking to employ. Language is 
such an integral part of what it means to be human, in that it is our 
ability to speak that separates us from the animal world, that it is 
difficult to see how our understanding of language can be so absolutely 
divorced from human nature and reality. In the doctrine of ’logical 
grammar', for example, Nielsen is implying definite things about,the 
nature of words, Jonathan Cohen points out that the theory of meaning, 
within the doctrine of 'logical grammar* is atomistic. Words are seen 
to have meaning in themselves; that is, to be universal in scope, so that 
one word means one thing for all time. In other words, this theory sees 
the word as unalterable, unchanging and timeless in scope. All
(b ) Brunner and Pannenberg and Their Common Concern
The relationship between the individual and the community is a 
problem that rests at the heart of our social existence, today* This 
is the prime concern of this study. The nature of this problem has a 
great deal to do with the manner in which the ’meaning* of life is 
perceived.
(continued)
philosophical disagreements are, therefore, superficial as they arise 
out of a confusion of the proper meaning of a particular word, Cohen 
writes, "The thesis that there is a massive central core of human think­
ing which has no history is made true by definition," (The Diversity of 
Meaning, p. 85), "It is an irony of philosophical history that many of 
those who were keenest to reject the tneories of atomic facts at one 
time propounded by Russell and Wittgenstein fell unawares into an equally 
fallacious theory of atomic concepts. The rule-of-word-use philosophy, 
which largely under Wittgenstein's later influence was to replace the 
reductionist approach of an earlier generation, led through its doctrine 
of logical grammar to another kind of atomism that now stands in need of 
repudiation." (ibid., p. 87),
The thesis that Cohen convincingly suggests is that the word is 
a ’social institution*, (Ibid., p, 52ff.), It arises out of, and is 
changed by, the cultural situation in which it develops and grows 
(Cohen could find support in Antony Flew's distinction between use and 
usage). In reference to the philosopher Trier, Cohen writes: "Trier 
thinks that every such field, like the German vocabulary of mental 
comprehension which he himself has investigated so thoroughly, should 
be regarded as being contained within larger and larger fields until 
the totality of the language is reached, When one discovers that in 
1300 ’wisheit* no longer expressed the unity of intellectual, technical, 
courtly and religious knowledge that it did in 1200, nor has any other word 
taken its place, the change to be noted is an integral change in Middle 
High German, Not only that: it is also a change in the outlook and 
attitudes of the medieval German community. The history of a linguistic 
field embraces the history of several words mutually related in use, 
together with the story of their synonyms, antonyms and associations.
It is therefore, as Trier sees, a contribution to the history of ideas, 
albeit the ideas of a single speech-community, whereas the old history 
of word-meanings, as conceived by Saussure, belonged wholly on the verbal 
plane," (ibid., p, 37). In referring to Trier’s ideas with such approval, 
Cohen revokes any notion of a private language, such as Locke suggested 
(ibid., p. 60). He emphasises, instead, the complex network of associa­
tions which makes a word what it is. The historicity of a word or words 
is something to which Cohen refers repeatedly. He writes, ",,.there is 
nothing specially mysterious about the conceptual plane of semantics or 
the relation of the history of ideas to history in general," (Ibid., p. 56), 
Prom what we have said, it can be seen that the discussion now in 
linguistic philosophy is not so unrelated to the concern of this thesis.
The meaning of the self in relation to the community is not unlike the 
meaning of a word, its history and growth.
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In many theological and philosophical circles meaning is under­
stood as an imposition from above^, in the sense of divine pre­
destination or pre-established laws and regulations. Within this 
frame of reference there is ethical significance much different from 
the understanding of meaning from below, which is the position to be 
defended throughout this exposition. The consequences of these 
respective positions will also be dealt with as we proceed,
Emil Brunner was a theologian who wrestled seriously with the 
protestant ethic in this centuiy. He represents the ’above* ethical
5
position as we have stated it. The concern he expresses for the 
individual in the community is another reason for consideration of him. 
He has offered us one of the major understandings in Protestantism 
today as to how meaning arises for the individual in the larger 
community. At the same time, the major weaknesses of the protestant 
position can be revealed from an examination of his thought. The 
tendency toward individualism, which Tillich criticises,^ and the
The distinction indicated in the words * above* and ’below’ has 
immense significance. This will become evident when we come to the 
discussion on Christology with respect to the positions of Brunner 
and Pannenberg, Any system or thought which sees man as the product 
of another action, divine or historical, rather than an active 
participant, may be classified as meaning from ’above*. This could 
apply to H. Popper’s historical conception in philosophy as well as 
to Brunner’s historical thought in theology. The hazard in under­
standing meaning from ’above’ is a determinism that destroys man’s 
freedom. This will be elaborated later in the chapter,
Brunner is not the sole representative of the position criticised 
in this thesis. One could also turn to Barth, Bultmann, Thielicke, or 
Bonhoeffer, for ethical systems which lead to consequences considered 
unsatisfactory in the light of this dissertation. This is not meant to 
group these men together without recognition of the uniqueness of their 
respective positions. It could be shown, however, that they are joined 
in their similar conception of meaning from ’above’,
^Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Nisbet & Co., Ltd., London,
1931) p. 227.
presence of determinism, which has always been an issue in Calvinistio 
theology, are both present in his thought to a degree that requires 
serious consideration. The Divine Imperative'^ will be used for a deeper 
analysis of this criticism,
Wolfhart Pannenberg has been selected for research because his 
protestant position offers much promise in overcoming the weaknesses 
to which we have referred. This promise rests in his understanding 
of meaning from ’below*. From this perspective he relates the 
individual and the community in a manner that gives due recognition 
to the existence of each. The reciprocal relationship that is 
established between them, in his thought, offers a new challenge to 
the current discussions on man’s social existence.
For both Brunner and Pannenberg, meaning has universal reference; 
that is, it refers to the totality of all that is. Meaning is the 
truth of existence which man continually seeks but cannot wholly 
experience on earth. For both theologians, meaning in historical 
reality also has a negative aspect about it. Of course this is a 
statement which cannot be made without qualification, Pannenberg, 
for example, expresses the negative element in a way that attributes 
much social and ethical relevance to man, Brunner’s expression of 
the negative, on the other hand, leaves man with little ethical sig­
nificance in his social existence.
When Brunner writes that meaning is totality and wholeness,^ 
this writer has little quarrel with him. He expresses himself quite
1937).
^Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative (Lutterworth Press, London,
&
8Emil Brunner, Christianity and Civilization. Volume I (Nisbet 
Co, Ltd., London, 1947), p. 6o,
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in accord with the central motif of our thesis when he writes:
Just as one cannot be satisfied with the 
single meaningful word, but only by the 
meaningful connection of single meaning­
ful words through the spiritual unity of 
a speech as a whole, or a book as a whole, 
so the spirit in seeking for meaning demands 
the unity of man's life as a whole,^
Brunner continues: "Where this question of total meaning ceases to be 
asked, the spirit is in a state of disintegration, and human life is 
about to perish in a sub-human, animal existence.This same search 
for unity in life lies at the centre of Pannenberg's theological pro­
gramme, His effort is directed toward providing a theological under­
standing that will accomodate the sense of unity and innate desire 
for wholeness, evident in all of life. In Basic Questions in Theology, 
Pannenberg writes:
...it is unnecessary to dispute the fact that 
the need for an encompassing unity that makes 
it possible to experience even the multi­
farious as a positive wealth is so deeply rooted 
in human existence and in the structure of human 
reason that it inevitably brings up the question 
of the extent to which this religion or that can 
provide a basis for a universal unity in the 
experience of reality, which is very likely the 
criterion of its relevance and saving power - 
and thus, perhaps, of its truth, too,^^
An important difference between the two writers is the way in which 
the individual is related to the whole, Brunner saw this relationship 
in an immediate sense, in terms of one's relationship with God, to a 
degree that gave little significance to the historical process of life, 
Pannenberg views this wholeness as anticipation in a way that bestows 
significance on the reality of history. It may be said that meaning,
^Ibid., p. 62, 
^^Ibid., p, 62,
^^/olfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Volume II, 
trans, George H, Kehm (SCM Press, Ltd,, London, 1971), P# 82,
~3*“
for Brunner, comes to man from beyond history; man receives it. For
Pannenberg, on the other hand, man strives for meaning within history.
12He does not imply, however, that meaning is imposed solely by man. 
Rather, man is a participant in that meaning. The distinction between 
reception of meaning, in a passive sense, and participation in meaning, 
in an active sense, is a valid one in the light of our thesis.
The following quotations illustrate the diversity of the respective
positions of Brunner and Pannenberg:
...it is explicity affirmed that this temporal 
existence, taken by itself, is meaningless, 
even contrary to meaning. ...Historical life 
does not have meaning in itself. It acquires 
it from outside itself, and where this happens, 
there this earthly history comes to its end, 
there the new aeon begins, life eternal,^3
The historical process - and this means the one 
course of events with which historiographical 
inquiry has also to do - is essentially a pro­
cess of the transmission of tradition. All 
political events - in fact even natural events - 
that play into it gain their meaning and sig­
nificance only by virtue of their relation to 
the traditions in which the human society that 
is affected by them lives* To be sure, this 
happens for the most part in such a way that they 
call into question the previous forms of tradition 
and provide an impetus for their transformation 
and reconstruction.^
12There are men who represent this position; that is, who see 
man as the sole purveyor of meaning to history. One could mention, 
in this context, H. Popper, K, Nielsen and J, P, Sartre, It is 
difficult to see how the concept of moral responsibility can have any 
weight if this notion is maintained. If one simply receives meaning, 
as Brunner suggests, then responsibility is taken from man. On the 
other hand, if man alone gives meaning to history, to whom is he then 
responsible, or to what? Moral responsibility can be defended only if 
man is understood as both a receiver and provider of meaning. It is 
the latter position for which we shall be arguing,
13Brunner, Christianity and Civilization, Volume I, p, 72,
"^^olfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Volume I, 
trans. George H, Kehn (SCM Press Ltd., London, 1970), p. 90*
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Notwithstanding their differences, Brunner and Pannenberg are
united in their concern for the problem before society. Both men
focus attention on the relationship of the individual to the community,
15At the same time, they both stress the interdependence of the two.
In Justice and the Social Order, for example, Brunner writes of the
equality and the inequality of human living. He speaks of the freedom
of the individual, but also, of the rights of the community over the
individual. This can be exemplified by the following:
God has so created men that they must be
together, not only in marriage and the 
family, but in work too, in mutual give 
and take, in the co-operation of "each 
according to his kind." .Independence 
of the individual and membership of a whole, 
free assent and submission of the individual 
to the purpose of the community, the rights 
of the individual over the community and the 
rights of the community over the individual - 
these are the inevitable conclusions of 
reflection on the order of creation. One 
does not only need the other; from the stand­
point of the community, he has a right to 
what the other has and he lacks. From this 
standpoint, every purely individualistic 
attempt,,,.which takes the rights of the 
individual as its point of departure is 
demonstrably unjust, as unjust as the collect- 
ivistic standpoint, which reduces the indiv­
idual to an element without rights of an 
abstract, inclusive community. None should 
be strong for hijmself alone, none weak for
himself alone.
To illustrate this point in Pannenberg's writing, one could cite these 
words:
Men seek community. This shows that the
15See Brunner's The Divine Imperative, pp, 293 ff; Justice and the 
Social Order, trans. Mary"Huttinger (Lutterworth Press, London, 19Ï5)"» 
pp. 54-00, and Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon (Lutterworth Press,
London, 1939), pp, 278ff. See Pannenberg's Uhat is Man?, trans, Duane 
A, Priebe (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1970), pp. 82-95; and Theology 
and the Kingdom of God (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, I969), pp. 121ff,
^^Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p, 68,
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destiny of all men is the same. In one and
the same community many individuals seek
fulfillment of their individual striving*
The paths of the individuals are quite 
diverse in relation to one another, and 
their contributions and roles within their 
groups are diverse. Still, the goal for 
which they strive is very much common to 
all: the community that ties them together.
Even if each individual group is limited in 
number, it still stands in interconnections 
with other groups in a nation, and the nation 
in a community of nations. 7^
Both Pannenberg and Brunner are in agreement as well on the ever
present tension at the centre of our social existence. They recognize
the constant tendency in human affairs to relegate the individual to
a pinnacle of importance at the expense of the community, and vice
versa, the tendency to subvert the individual to the demands of the
community. They acknowledge the corruption of human life that can and
does take place when either one of these facets of existence is given
expression at the expense of the other, Brunner characterises the
18tension with the words, individualism and collectivism, Pannenberg, 
in recognition of the tension, writes, "The individuals separate them­
selves individualistically from the common tasks, or they use social 
arrangements only for their own purposes. Or else the existing 
society equates itself with man's destiny and, as a consequence,
imposes an absolute claim on the life of the individuals, disregarding
19their personality."  ^ These two scholars are significantly different 
in the way they seek to resolve our social dilemma. This project is, 
in essence, an examination of their proposed resolutions.
^^Pannenberg, What is Man?, p, 83,
^^See Chapter XI of Brunner's Justice and the Social Order, 
pp. 72-80, for a discussion of the problems that arise from this tension,
19Pannenberg, What is Man?, p, 94.
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lt should be stated from the outset that this writer is 
sympathetic to Brunner's analysis of our social problem. He 
attributes much of the social tension to a misunderstanding. The 
individual is thought of as an entity existing in self-sufficiency.
The community, on the other hand, is regarded as a separate reality 
which opposes it. He expresses the misconception by writing;
The whole of modern philosophy is a "Robinson 
Crusoe" affair, expressed in abstract terms; 
it is an attempt to interpret the individual 
human being solely in the light of his own 
personality, and society as the coalescence 
of such individuals. This attempt corresponds 
absolutely to the attempt made at the same 
time by science to explain the world of 
phenomena in terms of isolated atoms, and it 
is perhaps scarcely accidental that almost 
at the same time the eighteenth - and nine­
teenth-century theories of atomistic physics
broke down men began to reflect anew upon the
nature of the relation between the individual 
and the community.
In this light, relationship is then seen simply as a series of adjust­
ments to keep each reality in check. Depending on the circumstances,
whether they favour the individual or the community, one receives more 
recognition than the other, Brunner concludes that when such under­
standing exists in society, "No adjustment between the two is possible,
21for it is impossible to make one "Good" out of two kinds of sin."
The proper perspective, he suggests, rests in the Christian faith.
"In the Christian faith the individual is so defined that he cannot
be imagined apart from the community, and the community that it cannot
22be imagined without the individual." To support this, Brunner resorts 
to the personalistic philosophy of Buber and Ebner, The 'I* is
^^runner, The Divine Imperative, p, 294,
21
•^ Ibid,, p. 294.
pp
rbid., p. 2%.
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essentially related to a 'Thou* and the fundamental question is,
"....whether this Self, is from the very outset related to the
other (to the "Thou") apart from whom the "Thou" cannot even be
imagined, just as we cannot conceive of a suspension bridge which
is only suspended from one tower, whether from the very outset
freedom is regarded as relation with the "Thou","^^
It should be noted that Pannenberg expresses himself in similar
personalistic language. He, too, speaks of an encounter between an
'I' and a ' T h o u ' I t  is to Pannenberg's credit, however, that he
uses this personal language with much social relevance, Brunner, on
the other hand, divorces the 'I - Thou' encounter from historical
reality which accentuates the social tension. The reasons for this
will be set forth as we proceed. It will be shown that the 'I - Thou'
encounter, in Brunner, is not so much an observable reality on the
plane of history but a reality that transcends it. Thus, any talk
of community, which is basic to such language, leaves relatively
untouched the boundaries of man's social, political, cultural and
25economic community to which he is referred in his existence.
23Ibid., p. 636, Brunner's words are encouraging and helpful 
here in that they stress the interdependence of the self and the 
community. Unfortunately, his words cannot be accepted at face value; 
they do not contain the implication we might see in them on first 
reading.
^^annenberg. What is Man?, pp. 88ff.
25It is a common criticism of much of the personalistic thought 
that the 'Thou', is treated too subjectively. In turn, this gives 
the impression of having no extension in the facts of existence. See, 
for example, the criticism of H. D. Lewis, in 'The Elusive Self and 
the I - Thou Relation' (Talk of God (MacMillan and Co, Ltd., London, 
1969) pp. 168-184). Brunner must share some of this criticism because 
of his unwillingness to grant the person an objective reference. 
Person, thus, is thought of too subjectively. His suggestion of a 
direct encounter implies this. One of the aims of this thesis is to 
show the weakness of this notion. It is doubtful if the subjective - 
objective category can be avoided when one speaks of encounter, either 
with another person or God.
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(g ) Brunner*s Position
Brunner understands man*s position in community as one that is
26*placed*, An investigation of his understanding of man's meaning
must take this placement into consideration, Man is hem into
definite, fixed 'orders* which regulate and guide his existence. The
significance of such guidance will be referred to later in the chapter.
To gain a better understanding of what Brunner means by man's
'placed* existence in terms of 'orders', the idea of 'the calling*
is examined, "God", writes Brunner, "calls into His service this
particular person, in a particular set of circumstances, and at a
27particular time, that is, here and now," He suggests that this is 
one of the most important truths to be received by man. It is an 
idea which he traces back to Paul and Luther, He says it has little 
to do with the present connotation of calling in the modem world, 
'Calling* is not to be equated with a simple division of labour, as 
we have come to understand it, but rather, in its original use, 
denoted a liberating and religious experience,
Brunner says 'calling* represents the situation in which Gk>d 
has placed man in the world. He does not decide for or against it, 
but accepts it as his Sitz im Leben, Here, we find our nei^bour.
We meet him not with an uncertainty, but with a defined area of 
location, For Brunner, this 'location' has been predestined from 
the beginning of time. We are given our appointed place.
Brunner writes of this placement in this way, "Here what matters 
most is not the improvement of one particular place in the world, of 
conditions and circumstances - although such procedure has its own, 
secondary importance “ nor the search "for the right place for me," 
but the thankful acceptance of the place, at which I am now set, from 
the hands of Providence, as the sphere of my life, as the place in which, 
and according to the possibilities of which, I am to meet my neighbour in 
love." (The Divine Imperative, p, 203),
p. 199.
—iif—
It should be noted here that the appointed place of which he
28speaks is from the hands of God, the Creator, not God, the Redeemer,
The 'orders', in other words, have a different function to perform
on God's behalf, from the redemptive activity of God in Christ,
One must be cautious at this point, however, as this distinction,
vital to our thesis, is not always clear in Brunner, For example,
in another instance, he writes in a way that suggests a correlation
of God's creative and redemptive activities. The degree or method of
this correlation is not made clear, however. And in the absence of
such clarity, it is questionable whether a claim for it can be made.
Nevertheless, he writes;
A certain kind of Lutheranism holds the 
disastrous dogma that the various "orders" 
are not subject to the command of Jesus 
Christ, but only to the rule of reason.
This clever distinction is far too easy 
to bo true. It is true, of course, that 
the "orders", as the Lex in an imperfect 
and sinful world, can only perform their 
service if they are understood and used 
in their ov/n legal spirit; it is also 
true that it is nonsense to apply to them 
the Sermon on the Mount as an ideal law.
It is true that their characteristic leg­
ality can only be understood by means of 
reason. But it is totally false to draw 
the conclusion that in the sphere of the 
"orders" Christ "has nothing to s a y , "29
In the interpretation of one's calling, Brunner recognizes 
the validity of biological and anthropological studies in what they
28See Brunner's The Divine Imperative, pp. 122-131 and also The 
Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics Vol. II, trans, 
Olive Wyon (Lutter^rth Press, London, 1952), pp. 315ff#, for further 
clarification of this distinction. Consider the following statements 
from Brunner; "....the State will never, never be governed by the Word - 
in the sense of the Gospel - but exclusively by the word of the Law, 
quite simply by the Decalogue, which is not the actual "Word" of 
Christ." "Where the State or the Family are mentioned,,,,, the New 
Testament does not speak of Christ, as ruling through His Word of re­
conciliation, but simply of the "ordinances of God"," (The Christian 
Doctrine of Creation and Redemption. Dogmatics Vol. II, p, 318),
29Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p, 21?,
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reveal about man's natural situation in this world. It is his opinion 
that they must inform man about his calling, and that man must 
recognize knowledge, should it come from the natural sciences or from 
the fields of psychology and philosophy, A proper understanding of 
his situation depends on this. One does not find a negative attitude, 
on Brunner's part, toward the value of these particular disciplines 
of life. They are valuable in the information provided about the 
Creator's purpose, Brunner writes clearly about the value of such 
knowledge: ",,.,it is our duty to preserve and develop the life of
our neighbour, so far as this is possible to us, according to our 
knowledge of the processes which maintain and enhance life; and it is 
our duty to serve him "in his existence as a human being," and in his 
"growth as a human being" - according to our knowledge of the rules 
which govern this existence and the growth of human life,"^^ There 
is here no attempt to discredit the reasonable faculty of man in the 
discovery of the God-given aspects of our existence.
Our 'calling' or placement in life is determined, however, not 
only by the laws and rules that form man biologically and psycholog-
51ically. There are, as well, laws which Brunner calls 'created orders'. 
They unite man in a community. In other words, there are laws which 
govern man individually and laws which confront him collectively in 
community. In reference to the communal 'orders', Brunner writes.
Ibid,, p, 209* It is important to emphasise that Brunner 
gives reason a place in man's life. How vital it is in terms of 
the meaning of life remains to be seen,
p. 210.
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"By this we mean these existing facts of human corporate life which
lie at the root of all historical life as unalterable presuppositions,
which, although their historical forms may vary, are unalterable in
their fundamental structure, and, at the same time, relate and unite
32men to one another in a definite way." Brunner gives a summary of
these 'orders* in several places throughout his writings.It is not
necessary to give a detailed description of these different orders, here#
However, for the purpose of this study, some reference must be made to
the significance they hold for the individual,
Brunner writes of the order of marriage as the first institution
in which man is placed. Marriage, in other words, is not something
man chooses to create for himself; he must realize it as the will of
the Creator. The relationship between two people in marriage makes
this institution, for Brunner, closest to the personal ethical sphere.
It should be noted, however, that Brunner is not prepared to call this
institution, or any of the institutions to be mentioned, 'personal*.
He writes on this subject: "Both man and woman, as man and woman -
not as persons - are dependent members of a whole which stands above
them,"^ This important point will receive further attention later.
Closely related to the order of marriage is the order of the
family. In some places, he groups marriage and the family together
35in one order of the sexes. In any case, Brunner refers to these
p. 210.
33See The Divine Imperative, pp. 33Cff, and also. Justice and 
the Social Qrdar, pp. Q+ff,
^^runner. Justice and the Social Order, p. 64* The emphasis 
is mine.
In The Divine Imperative he groups them together (of, p, 333). 
In Justice and the Social Order, however, he mentions them as separate, 
distinctive communities (cf, p, 66),
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forms of community as the 'primal' or 'plastic* forms and what he
means by this qualification is uncertain.Perhaps the suggestion
he is making is that they are orders outside which man cannot
function, in the sense that they are the most natural laws of his
existence. However, when he speaks of the next form of community,
that of labour, he considers it veiy basic and natural, as well.
He writes, "Man is so made that he must live by drawing his
37sustenance from the earth." The word 'primal', in reference to 
the sexes, might be simply an expression of recognition of its 
priority in creation as told in the biblical account of Genesis.
As well as the orders of marriage, family and labour, Brunner
discusses the state. In considering this form of community, he
adopts a position which may be regarded as betwixt that of Calvin
and Luther, In keeping with Calvin, he considers the state to be
a natural order, ordained by God as part of creation. It is seen
as necessary to man's basic nature. The state is regarded, thus,
not as an instrument solely to keep sin in check, but as an order
in its own right. On the other hand, Brunner is prepared to
recognize, with Luther, the essential part played by the state in
the control of sin. In his writings, Brunner has a stronger
tendency toward the latter persuasion. He writes:
,,,,in every actual state, ,,,we have 
to distinguish three elements: the 
realization of community, in accoidanca 
with the divine creative purpose; a 
disciplinary order, which creates a kind 
of community by forcible means, and forms 
the necessary basis and the harsh frame­
work of civilized life; and an illegiti­
mate, unjust, merely factual selfish, 
grasping, almost daemonic exercise of power.
^^runner. Justice and the Social Order, p, 67, 
p. 67.
p. 446.
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Culture and the church are listed as the other forms of community.
Unlike the others, which are purely natural in their origination
(except the state in a certain sense), these forms of community are
intellectual and intentional in their formation. What Brunner is
suggesting here, is that they are orders which develop with man, rather
than orders which precede him. Nevertheless, they are not simply of
man's imagination; this is not an implication Brunner would endorse.
Rather, they exist, as with the other orders, because of something
innate in man which make them necessary; that is, because of the
59'psycho-physical nature of man*
When Brunner lists the church among the orders, he is referring 
to the visible church, the church as a sociological fact in the world. 
It has nothing to do with faith, but with man's need for organization. 
In this sense, the church can be said to be a natural order because 
it meets the demands of the psycho-physical powers within him,^^
One has little quarrel with the forms of community Brunner 
has identified for us. With him, we recognize the structures that 
involve us as individuals in the world. There can also be agreement 
on the human needs these communities fulfil.
The question Brunner makes central, which must concern us now, 
is: What relation do these community structures have with 'meaning*?
In his own words the question is: "What should be faith's attitude
towards these forms of social life?"^^ He continues to write.
p. 335. 
^°Ibid., p. 334. 
^tbid., p. 335.
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" the most important task of a Christian ethic of society ia
that of throwing light upon the relation between the natural 
existence and understanding of the existing forms of community, 
and the Divine Will, perceived by f a i t h , I t  is assumed here 
that Brunner's word 'faith* and our discussion of 'meaning* are 
closely related. Throughout his writing, he speaks of faith and 
hope as inseparable, in the sense that the hope of man (his quest 
for truth and meaning), is the content of faith.^^ Thus, when 
Brunner asks the question of faith's relation to the structures 
of community, the whole issue of 'meaning' is brought forth. Tiie 
answer he presents for our consideration is the important point 
for us, not merely the description of the structures of community 
themselves. Since the various structures of community are 
observable facts of history, it is natural that Brunner should
p. 336.
^^Sea Brunner, Eternal Hope, trans, Harold Knight (Lutterworth 
Press, London, 1954), P* 2Ô. Brunner uses the word person to convey 
our idea of 'meaning', as well. Personal existence is one in 
relation to the 'Truth' of life. Throughout The Divine Imperative 
he seems to use person, faith and love interchangeably in our sense 
of 'meaning*.
The question Brunner poses for us at this point is one that 
has received attention throughout the corpus of his writings. It 
is one that has occupied the attention of many other theologians as 
well. It centres around the question of correlation. It has been 
considered in the discussion of the relation between: question and 
answer, form and content, and fact and faith. Such questions have 
been central to Karl Barth, Rudolph Bultmann, Gerhard Ebling, Paul 
Tillich and, of course. Wolfhart Pannenberg, with whom we are 
especially concerned. As early as The Mediator, trans, Olive Wyon 
(Lutterworth Press, London, 1947), Brunner expressed a profound 
interest in this matter. However, he did not offer any convincing 
answer to the question. In speaking of the relation of Jesus Christ 
to history, he wrote, "One question which it is very hard to answer 
is that which inquires into the measure of the concern which faith 
has with the realm of fact at all,.," (ibid., p, 167),
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question their relation to faith. This is so because faith, for him, 
is not an historical fact attained through the understanding.
At first sight, it might appear that Brunner, in his ethical 
position, is close to that which G. E, Moore called the 'Natural­
istic Fallacy*,^ This arises, says Moore, from the claim to derive 
'goodness' from the natural facts of life. For Moore, fact and 
value are separated in the sense that 'goodness' is a non-natural 
property and cannot, therefore, be derived from a natural fact of 
history.  ^ Such criticism of Brunner is made by N. H, G, Robinson
'^\'or a good summary of this fallacy, as well as the current 
positions in moral philosophy, see G. J. V/arnock, Contemporary Moral 
Philosophy (MacMillan, St, Martin's Press, London,~1967). The 
naturalistic fallacy is defined by Moore himself in his book,
Principia Ethica, p. 10,
are introducing the subject of fact and value, which may 
appear foreign to theology. This, it may be said, is to raise an 
issue of much discussion in itself, that of the relationship between 
theology and philosophy, in which the fact/value discussion is current 
(see Pannenberg, The Idea of God and Human Freedom, trans, R. A, Wilson 
(The Westminster Press, Philadelpnia, 1973)> "pP• 116-145, where this 
debate is taken up with some very constructive suggestions). This writer 
shares Pannenberg*s opinion that because the two disciplines are referring 
to the same reality, that of history, there is much to be gained in 
dialogue. Philosophy can point to experiences which are essential for 
the relevance of theological statements. Theology, on the other hand, 
may offer some very helpful perspectives on reality in the light of the 
revelation of God in Jesus. Pannenberg writes, "Philosophical criticism 
can help theology to achieve an understanding of the conditions of a 
credible way of speaking of God, which makes more careful distinctions 
and is better adapted to man's experience of himself and his world in 
nature and history. It can also help theology to study in a more 
impartial way the relevance of the life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth
to mankind and to the whole of reality. Like all other statements which
are concerned with the totality of the meaning of existence, theological 
statements go beyond the antagonisms and absurdities of the world as it 
now exists, and beyond the fragmentary nature of reality. But the 
measure of their importance is the extent to which they show themselves
capable of taking into account the fragments of reality, and the whole­
ness to which these fragments point because they lack it. It must do 
so not merely as a theoretical fiction, but in rational confidence of a 
future success, a confidence inspiring the attitude of the present moment," 
(The Idea of God and Human Freedom, pp. 138-139).
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(^^ continued)
For this reason, the discussion that is current in moral philosophy 
about fact-valuG is very relevant to this thesis. This is so especially 
as it can be shown that Brunner's theological position leaves us with 
a fact-value separation in history. This would give man little moral 
and ethical initiative. Similar consequences arise from the philoso­
phical position that maintains a separation between fact and value 
(see the criticism G, J, Warnock makes in his book, Contemporary Moral 
Philosophy, with regard to Moore's position and those who follow him)T 
philosophically speaking, if existence and value are separated, then 
little room for moral and ethical argument remains. Without a reason­
able basis for our ethical statements, or facts upon which to base 
them, they are in danger of becoming purely emotive in character. This, 
in turn, may lead to the abdication of ethics itself (see N. H, G. 
Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics (Collins, St. James Place, 
London, 197ÏÏ, particularly chapter three, where he convincingly argues 
that the positions of Professor Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic and 
Professor R, M. Hare in The Language of Morals results in the abdication 
of ethics). When goodness is not seen as a possibility in 'fact*, 
ethics become a "human and subjective phenomenon" (The Groundwork of 
Christian Ethics, p. 59). It is merely emotive, expressing approval and 
disapproval of conduct, or, it is prescriptive, that is, it simply offers 
advice. In either case, ethics become subjective evaluation without an 
objective basis to which the terms true and false would apply. Ethics 
would then have significance only in terms of personal like and dislike, 
only in terms of its strength to persuade another to a point of view 
without the possibility of justification. The incentive for ethical and 
moral growth, thus, would be absent,
Moore's position, of course, cannot be called emotive or prescriptive 
but 'intuitive'. He is not denying the existence of the good, rather, 
he is saying one cannot derive it from facts. It is not a natural 
property, Nevertheless, it can be argued that with such a separation 
of value from fact, Moore weakens man's ethical position and is subject 
to the criticisms stated above. Although Brunner arrives at a separ­
ation of fact and value in life, differently from Moore, the ethical 
consequences are much the same. Little room is left for Moral argument 
in Brunner and many of his ethical statements tend to be more assertive 
than rational, N. H, G. Robinson, in his earlier book. Faith and Duty 
(Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1950) states that much of Brunner's 
ethical position, with regard to man's situation in the world, is 
determined by this separation of fact and value and that an argument 
philosophical^/ or theologically that shows that this is not the case, 
would severely weaken the strength of his argument, (ibid., pp. 38-39).
Helen Oppenheimer, in an article 'Christian Flourishing' (Religious 
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, December 19&9, pp. 163-171), writes, "...many 
philosophers since G. E. Moore have been so sensitive about the dangers 
of drawing any 'ought' from any 'is' that they have neither looked 
themselves, nor urged theologians to look, for any more reliable 
connection between the nature of things and what one ought to do. Mean­
while many splendid pleas have been made for the autonomy of ethics." 
(ibid., p. 163) Oppenheimer'3 article is suggestive of the direction 
theology might go in working toward a solution to the problem. She 
argues that among the facts which are not valueless are those of the 
Christian Doctrine, In our understanding of these facts, we can reach 
a position that may help resolve the dilemma on the philosophical level. 
Using the concept of rewards, which she claims as present in the gospels, 
she defends her claim that it is possible to relate what ought to be the 
case with what is; reward, in terms of sanctions, are what the Lord 
Himself defended as recognition of what is valuable in life. While 
defending her claim tlxat fact and value are related, she is equally
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in The Groundwork of Christian Ethics:
...it seems a fair charge against him that, 
in spite of an extensive and often illumin­
ating treatment of the subject, he had not 
really grasped the unique character of the 
moral, the normative, that reality which 
constitutes a law for man in his freedom 
and sets the sphere of the distinctively 
human apart from, even if linked with, 
the natural. On the contrary, so far 
from appreciating and expressing the unique 
character of the moral, Brunner's ethical
( continued)
concerned that one not remain in this position, for this would deny 
one the necessary impulse for true flourishing. She writes, "The old 
otherworldliness said glibly that human miseries do not matter: the 
new this-worldliness appears to say that they are all that matters, 
that the Almighty ia only interested in squalor and social problems, 
that he is -not so much a god of the gaps as a god of the glooms, that 
since he is willing to be present in the evil we must not look for him 
mightily to prevail over it...It..may begin to foreshadow a Christian 
view of flourishing, which will need to be subtle in its linking and 
balancing of material and spiritual, this-worldly and other-worldly.
The plain earthly meaning of flourishing will not have to be repudiated 
but rather transmuted into a still empirical but more profound concept 
of blessedness, to which the key will be the idea of fulfillment,"
(Ibid., p. 170), Oppenheimer'3 suggestion, in the above, is that fact 
and value though related are, at the same time, separated, . Only this 
can do justice to all aspects of human existence,
A. D. Galloway (see 'Fact and Value in Theological Ethics'(Religious 
Studies, Vol. 5, No, 2, December I969, pp. 172-178)) makes a similar 
point when he states that the problem of moral life really does not 
centre around the union of fact and value* We are actually bom into 
situations which already have moral implications. The moral problem is 
in separating them. How does man get from under the natural union of 
fact and value in which he finds himself in life? He claims that there 
is a secondary sense of ought which enthrals us morally in a situation, 
either by birth or otherwise, and a primary sense of ought which breaks 
that enthralment and gives a basis for reform, change and growth, 
Galloway, thus, is advocating a position of both-and with respect to 
the fact-value question. To separate the two absolutely, would subject 
one to a position, theologically or philosophically, that gives the 
individual little room for ethical argument. On the other hand, to 
relate the two completely, even if this relationship be understood, 
theologically, in God (Galloway's position), would be to opt for a 
position which offers little incentive for renewal and change. The 
position defended in this thesis, by examination of the fundamental 
■facts of our faith, is one that strives for a happy medium between the 
two extremes. Our argument will be that both identity and separation 
are needed and defensible in terms of our faith. This, of course, will 
involve a new understanding of God.
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thought was pervaded by the naturalistic 
fallacy, the error of deriving 'ouglit* 
from 'is', the moral from the natural, 
the mistake of subordinating the former 
to the latter instead of affirming its 
supremacy as the true supernatural.
This characteristic of Brunner's 
ethical thought is apparent in his 
treatment of the various orders, as 
when he attempted to derive the ideal 
of marriage as a life long relation­
ship between one man and one woman 
from the bare natural facts that every 
child is the offspring of one man and
one woman and that two people in love ^
resent the intrusion of a third party.
It can be stated that Robinson's charge against Brunner is unfair,
'Naturalistic Fallacy*, in my understanding, speaks of the 'good'
as something definable; that is, it is a property of some act or
thing. It is analytical. This is opposed to Moore's definition of
the 'good' in his Principia Ethica. Moore was contesting the possibility
of deriving 'good' from the natural facts of our existence. In his
opinion, it is impossible to defend a statement about goodness by an
appeal to natural and historical realities, Brunner similarly states
that goodness, in the sense of what ought to be the case in life, is
not a possibility from the world; it cannot be understood or perceived
by looking at the natural world, "The fact", he writes, "that a terrible
gulf yawns between that which is and that which ought to be, that the
relation between them is not merely that of the imperfect to the perfect,
but that they are actually in opposition to one another, was not always
so - it is the result of that original perversion of truth,,,
^^Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, p. 234»
^^Brunner. The. Divine Imperative, p. 114. There is a difference 
between Moore and Brunner that should be noted, Moore does not deny the 
existence of good in the world. He says there is an 'intrinsic good*. 
Brunner denies this, Moore says only that such goodness is indefinable; 
it cannot be analysed or read from the natural facts of existence. This is 
the point on which Brunner and Moore would be in agreement; goodness is not 
an analytical quality. It cannot be supported outside itself, Brunner says, 
with respect to God, that God alone ia good. The Goodness of God is not 
capable of verification or analysis.
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Robinson does present the argument, "But for sin, Brunner would have 
represented the Christian ethic in exclusively descriptive terms,
Whether this is the case or not is debatable. It remains for Brunner, 
nevertheless, that no possibility exists of deriving an ought from 
an is or value from fact. The facts of community, therefore, which 
are observable to the common man apart from faith, are not essentially 
related to the good, or the 'ought* of life. There is no 'Naturalistic 
Fallacy* here on Brunner's part.
Robinson's first criticism of Brunner, above, is modified later
in the same work in a way that concurs with our criticism. In comparing
Brunner with Bonhoeffer he writes;
By Brunner too the orders and their laws 
were apprehended under the categories of 
preservation and preparation; but Brunner 
assigned to them a third significance, a 
significance for faith and for the Christian 
life, as providing guidance. It is import­
ant at this point, however, not to jump to 
conclusions nor to magnify this concession, 
for it did not take Brunner much further 
than Bonhoeffer and it did not qualify the 
negative attitude to natural morality. The 
reason is that, as Brunner himself made 
clear, this guidance does not contain any 
ethical sentiment but has rather 'a more 
technical function: that of giving the right 
direction', Time and again Brunner described 
the orders as providing no more than a frame­
work for the Christian life and as 'based 
upon a standard of law which is totally , g
different from that which is known by faith*,
^^Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, p. 235.
^^Ibid,, pp, 196-197» One would be remiss here if some comment 
were not offered on the content of Robinson's very helpful book* He is 
dealing with, and working toward a solution for, the same problem that 
concerns us in this thesis. He writes of the problem in this way:
"The truth,,,,oan be distorted in one or other of two opposite directions, 
for faith may be represented either as an existence or a life other than, 
and unrelated to, the various possibilities of human historical existence, 
or else, contrariwise, it may be set forth as something wholly explic­
able in human and historical terms. Accordingly, to the dilemmas already
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(^^continued)
recognized in which modern Protestantism is deeply involved - those 
between formalism and naturalism, between a system of divine determinism 
and one that gives a central place to human decision, and between a 
heteronomous account and an autonomous one - there must be added the 
dilemma between a representation of the Christian ethic which finds 
the heart of the matter in a mythological waiTare beyond history and 
one which is severely this-worldly." (Ibid., p. 255). Throughout his 
book, he examined, in some detail, the various ethical expressions of 
men such as Barth, Brunner, Cox, Robinson and Lehmann and found them 
wanting in areas relevant to this thesis. His efforts are directed 
toward bridging the impasse that has developed in protestant ethical 
thought in this century, Robinson's analysis of the problem and his 
concern to relate the Christian more significantly to the world are 
important to our dissertation. He endeavors to relate throughout his 
work, the Christian faith to natural morality in a way that may pre­
serve the one claim aspect of morality (Ibid,, p. 266),
The method of Robinson's correlation, however, is unclear. In 
spite of his severe criticism of other theologians, his removal from 
them is not significantly distant. He is concerned that one be 
related to the historical world of our existence for the sake of content, 
"For the Christian it is in and through the choices and decisions which 
there confront him - not in some mythological 'beyond' or no-man's 
land - that he must work out his own salvation. The Christian can no 
more abstract from this context than can the non-Christian, To do so 
would be to empty his life of all content," (Ibid,, p, 264). He is 
prepared, as the last statement reveals, to give decisive significance 
to historical reality in tenns of the content of one's existence. He 
makes this point again when he writes, "Ultimately and in origin the 
moral order is personal. It is not just an impersonal realm or reality 
to which it is the distinctive merit of persons to give peculiar 
attention,,.,Ab initio it is itself personal;(ibid., p, 278).
While saying all of this, the impression one receives in other 
parts of his book is that the truly decisive aspect of life is something 
added to historical reality. It is, in a sense, supra-historical 
reality, although Robinson does not use that term. He does, however, 
use language that implicates him in this direction. He can speak, for 
example, in these terms, "....the Christian must be alive and alert 
to the in-breaking of God's Kingdom at this point or that, the advent 
of the personal realm in the fullness of its substance,,,." (ibid., p, 276). 
He leads one to believe that without this 'in-breaking' man's sin 
devalues historical reality. He writes, "...when the Christian finds 
his endeavor frustrated and obstructed by the complexities of the 
historical situation and by the resistance of the world, he is bound, 
in solidarity with that world, to confess his own unworthiness, and so 
to acknowledge what Professor Reinhold Niebuhr has called 'the relevance 
of an impossible ethical ideal',,," (ibid., p. 281), Also, one has 
the strong impression that, although the non-Christian is involved 
in historical life along with the Christian, the Christian is really 
occupied with a different placement in that historical realm. He is 
between the times, "between,,.the time of God's fulfillment of time 
itself and history," (ibid., p, 272), In the final analysis, Robinson 
does not clearly state how historical existence and the Christian faith 
are correlated.
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Robinson, in this quotation, has singled out Brunner's basic position 
with regard to the orders and the significance given to them.
In his chapter, 'The Threefold Meaning of the Law', Brunner 
describes the functions of the orders with the words, discipline, 
repentance and guidance. The word 'law' and 'order* can be used 
synonymously in our argument as Brunner himself writes: "Tfe describe
the sum-total of all these forms of connexion between human beings, 
in so far as they are also - on the one hand - subject to the control 
of the will, and - on the other hand - primarily simply effective as 
present forces for the maintenance of order, by an artificial word:
Lex;
Preservation and discipline are the primary functions of the
orders, in Brunner's opinion, "As orders", he writes, ",,,they are
always a means by which sinful humanity keeps the final consequences
of sin at bay: that is, disorganization and chaos. Further, since we
must accept humanity as it is, in the actual situation of the moment,
these orders are also the only means by which those final consequences
of sin can be kept at bay. By this very fact they prove that they are
51the gift of the Preserver of the world." In the role of preservation, 
Brunner states that the orders have no connection, or association with 
faith; that is, they have nothing to do with the actual truth of life. 
As preserving orders, therefore, they do not convey any element of 
meaning to the individual's life. Again, let us refer to Brunner 
for a clearer understanding of this point.
^%runner. The Divine Imperative, p. 141*
^hbid., p. 223.
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Por although these orders are necessary 
for the sake of love, most decidedly the 
behaviour they require is not the kind 
which we would expect to mete out to our 
fellow-man in love, if we were dealing 
simply with two individuals. Our "official 
duty" is "harsh", objectively technical: 
the human relation which it requires to 
men is external; its method is that of the 
forcible control of the masses, indeed it 
seems to be wholly opposed to love. To 
carry it through it needs the use of force, 
possibly of physical force, even to the point 
of taking human life,52
The second role of the orders is repentance, Brunner's intention 
in listing this function is quite clear. All he wants to convey is that 
man needs something to make him aware of his sinfulness in the sight of 
God, before he will repent, Man must first realize the condition or 
state of his degradation before he can actually turn from it. The
153'Lex', in this sense, is the 'schoolmaster'^ that leads us to Christ, 
Brunner's reasoning in this respect could be expressed like this,
Man, as he lives within the orders, will gradually be brought to a 
point of realizing his distance from the meaning and fulfillment 
life. This is an experience, says Brunner, that every human being 
will eventually reach. Despondency will result.
Before continuing, the following comment could be made. If 
Brunner were saying that all human beings were confronted with a 'limit' 
in life, then one could agree. Recognition of a 'limit' in life is 
familiar to us. We all feel a sense of incompleteness. In the light
p. 225.
53Ibid,, p. 143» One could ask Brunner here if man's turn to 
the good must always come by way of one's sense of corruption. Might 
it not come as a positive awareness or expectation of greater things?
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54of this, Brunner's statement, "I can do no more.",^ is justified,
Gordon Kaufman writes about man's experience in this way;
All that we ever experience directly are 
particular events of suffering, death (of 
others),joy, peace, etc. It is only in 
reflection upon these and the attempt to 
understand ourselves in the light of these 
happenings that we become aware of our 
limitedness on all sides. Along with this 
awareness of our being hemmed in, powerful 
emotions of terror, despair, re\mlsion, 
anxiety, and the like, are often - perhaps 
always - generated, and this total intell­
ectual - emotional complex may then be 
called the "experience of finitude",,,or 
something of the sort. But it must be 
observed that this "experience" of radical 
contingency is not an immediate awareness 
of restriction, as when one butts one's 
head directly against a stone wall; it 
depends rather upon a generalization from 
such occasional immediate experiences of 
limitation to the total situation of the
self,55
Langdon Gilkey writes in a similar way about man's limiting 
experience, "We are all deeply if dimly aware", he writes, "that we 
do not finally control our own being, that all too easily something 
or some force can snatch our life, and the forms of security on which 
it depends, away from us. As the reality of our finite being was felt 
from the inside as strength and as vital joy, so here the contingency 
of our finite being is felt from the inside as anxiety. In this 
experience we "know" that our existence is given to us and not created 
by us;
^This is Brunner's expression to describe man's absolute despair.
It could also be an expression describing the 'limit' to v/hich other 
writers refer (see Gordon Kaufman, 'On the Meaning of "God"; Transcendence 
Without Mythology' (New Theology, No, 4, ed, Martin Marty and Dean Peerman, 
(Macmillan Col, New York, I967, pp. 69-98), pp, 69ff., and Langdon Gilkey,
The Renewal of God-Language (The Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, I96/), PP* 313ff*)
^Kaufman, 'On the Meaning of "God"; Transcendence Without Mythology*
(New Theology, No, 4), p. 81,
^^Gilkey, The Renewal of God-Language, p, 319.
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This has some similarity to Brunner's expression, Vfhen
Brunner speaks of despair he refers to a state in which man dwells.
Man realizes that he is falling short of the true, fulfilling
experience of life. He tries to live by the commandment of love but
finds himself repeatedly thwarted by his efforts to do so. At times
57he even Tiorks against that which love demands. For Brunner, this
awareness of our situation makes us turn to God for true meaning.
Speaking in a negative way about this experience is not
peculiar to Brunner, Gilkey, for example, refers to the 'Void' that
58can be experienced in life. However, Brunner, in contrast, sees
the negative always as impersonal or unloving. In other words,
Brunner does not see anything within this particular experience of
life that might have positive value. This is the significance of
his thought when he says that duty and goodness have nothing to do 
59with each other. A sense of duty has nothing to do with the love
of God, Rather, it reveals that we are living outside the love of 
God, Any sense of ought, obligation, or limit to our present state, 
means we are not in the love of God, "The sense of "ought" shows 
me the Good at an infinite, impassable distance frcm my will,"^^
The implication one receives, on the other hand, from the writings 
of Kaufman and Gilkey, is that such limitation to existence, rather than 
being negative with respect to the personal, is of the nature of the
57Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 227*
58Gilkey, The Renewal of God-Language, pp, 319ff.
59Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p, 74.
5^;T3id., p. 74.
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personal itself. In consequence, one may say that the experience of 
'limit' in life is of the love of God rather than the 'wrath' of God, 
as Brunner would have us believe. As such, it may show us the true
nature of God Himself. This suggestion will be developed further
. 6l as we proceed.
Enough has been said here to show that there are ways of unde3> 
standing the 'limit' in life, as expressed in the Brunnerian phrase,
"I can do no more", than as evidence of our radical opposition to the 
good. It can be shown that the orders themselves, which Brunner 
regards as impersonal, may be understood in terms of love. They can 
be given much more personal value than he attributes to them. It is 
possible, it can be argued, to maintain the supremacy of the personal, 
as Brunner wishes to do, without separating it so radically from life 
and its functions.
^or many writers, limitation is a fundamental experience of the 
personal in life. This is the point Kaufman makes when he writes,
.selves,..experience the external personal limitation of other selves 
engaged in activities and programmes running counter to their own - i.e., 
the clash of will, decisions, and purposes - but precisely because matters 
of volition and intention are subjective, this experience is neither 
simply internal nor external but is interpersonal and social;..." ('On the 
Meaning of "God": Transcendence Without Mythology' (New Theology, No. 4), 
p. 84). Gilkey, even more vividly, refers to the personal value of the 
'limit* of life when he writes : "Out of this ontological situation,
of course, arises the possibility of the peculiarly human characteristics 
of our contingent being. We are aware that we are; we are aware that we 
are in a world, and that we are moving into a future; we can communicate 
with others; we can think, conceive, make symbols, create projections, 
and ask questions. And this awareness subsists both on the level of mood 
or state of mind, and on the level of symbolic, conceptual, explicit 
consciousness or thought. We are or exist in terms of our awareness, our 
decisions, our self-creation; our essence is in this sense our "existence". 
Thus our environment becomes a world, a temporal passage, a unity which we 
see as a whole and about which we can and must wonder, think, and ultimately 
master cognitively, and so into which we inevitably inquire. In our under­
standing of our world, furthermore, we are involved in the inescapable 
search for unity and coherence; correspondingly, our self becomes penetrated 
by self-awareness, by freedom, and by our projects into the future. Thus 
we are our projects, what we decide for the future,,," (The Renewal of 
God-Language, p. 333)#
-31-
It seems that Brunner moves in this direction in his reference 
to the third function of the orders, that of guidance. Brunner says 
the law, even for faith, does not lose its significance. It serves 
the purpose of being a God-given exposition of what it means to he 
"in Christ". To be "in Christ" is, for Brunner, the only true good 
of life. He writes, "Where is man when he is in his right place?"
He follows the question with the answer; "True being" means being 
"in Christ"; for "Christ is my righteousness", God's Being in 
Christ, however - once again not as a quality but as act - is His 
being in love."^^ Brunner is even prepared to modify an earlier 
statement that there is no determination of the good 'beforehand* 
by saying, "The claim to know the Good beforehand, to be able to 
"deduce" it from the principle of love, which primarily and in 
principle we must condemn as a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
Good, is not to be totally condemned,..This "deduction" of the Good 
which can be Icnown beforehand and defined in terms of casuistry is 
not, it is true, the Genuine Good, but it has a place in the definition 
of the true Good."^^
The question we must ask ourselves at this point is: What extension
is Brunner willing to give to the law or the orders in the definition 
of the true Good? There is no clear answer to this question in his 
writings. The best insight, however, can be gained by examining the 
'conflict of duties' situation mentioned in his chapter 'The Calling'.
As this question is so important to this whole chapter, indeed to the 
whole thesis, a few pages must be devoted to its investigation.
runner. The Divine Imperative, p. I64.
p. 149.
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Firstly, it should be noted that in the matter of the 'conflict 
of duties', Brunner has some contradictory statements. On the one 
hand, he says that a 'conflict of duties' cannot be avoided in life,
"To be a Christian,,.does not mean something static, but it means 
grace and decision. Only through the painful pressure of the apparent 
conflict of duties - and indeed of a conflict of duties which is 
unceasing and constantly repeated - do we reach the perception of the 
Divine Command, and in so doing joyfulness and confidence in action.
On the other hand, he says that a 'conflict of duties' should not arise 
for faith, as in faith, the conflict ends. There can be no conflict 
in faith. It "...is the chronic disease which afflicts every system 
of legalistic morality."
However, it is the former statement above, that Brunner emphasises 
as the actual position of the Christian. For instance, Brunner does 
not maintain that the law and the orders are perfect. They are 
imperfect. Question of appropriate action in a situation may therefore 
arise. Brunner is not being Kantian in his ethics at this point. 
According to Kant's ethical system, any law which claims justification 
in one situation must be claimed as true for all situations. Laws 
are universal and absolute to him. With this thought, obvious problems 
arise. For example, there are situations in which one might have to 
do wrong to bring forth good. Telling a lie in order to preserve 
human life is a case in point. If to tell the truth and to preserve 
human life are both inviolable obligations, as with Kant, then there 
is an irreconcilable problem in this illustration. Two absolute claims 
are in conflict. With Brunner, however, this problem does not arise.
p. 204. 
hbid., p. 204.
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H© recognizes the various laws as imperfect. Thus, conflict is a 
possibility. Ethical decision arises in the situation at hand.
In stating Brunner's position, one might say there are tendencies 
in every orlsr which point the person in the direction of a certain 
duty. The family, the state and all the orders, have duties that are 
peculiar to them, which warrant recognition. They are God-given
commands in which one's calling is found,
Brunner makes an important distinction here in the discussion 
of duty. He speaks of a 'schedule of duties', in the sense that there 
are various duties which command recognition in life. At the same 
time, he spmks of man's 'real' duty arising within a situation when 
these various duties come into conflict. In some situations, a duty 
may be clear and straight forward. To tell the truth, for example, 
may be self-evident, like giving the proper time when asked. In other 
situations, this duty (telling the truth) may come into conflict with
a duty of amther order. In the case of war, when allegiance to one's
state oomma^ is us, it is proper to inquire as to the 'real' duty.
One moral decision must be made in this ethical situation. One could 
imagine, as well, a conflict developing between the marriage order and 
the order of the state. For the sake of life's preservation, the state 
might oommai'd activity of the woman and the man contraiy to the nature 
of marriage» How does the individual decide in this situation? What 
determines his course of action? How is goodness found? "In a 
situation of this kind", writes Brunner, "I must proceed as follows: 
with the help of my "schedule of duties" and in the light of the various 
claims which clamour for my attention and constantly overlap - all of 
them apparently justifiable and necessary - in the spirit of faith 
(and this means, too, in view of the actual situation) I must listen
-34-
to the Divins Command in order that I may be able to do what I am
really bidden to do, that is, my real duty,"^^
Brunner's distinction between one Divine Command and many
divine commands is important here. The one Divine Command,or
the 'one* Good, is the important thing in any ethical situation*
The claim he is making is that the schedule of duties (the many
divine commands), in terms of the laws and the orders, can help us
see the one Gommand in a given situation. At one point, he is very
explicit in this matter. The laws and orders, he states, "....can
prepare the decision of the individual as carefully as a conscientious
legal adviser prepares the decision of the judge by the most careful
68consideration of all possibilities,"
The use of this analogy is encouraging. Its implications are 
far-reaching. A judge arrives at his decision after much deliberation 
of thought. Only then does he offer his judgment. This is not done, 
however, wiüiout an awareness of the heavy responsibility involved.
The possibility exists that he may be wrong in his judgment. There­
fore, a judge must proceed cautiously in eveiy judicial decision. In 
spite of this, in retrospect, decisions have been wrong; a sense of 
tragedy follcws which accentuates his personal responsibility. Justice 
sometimes may also involve the exclusion of one good for another. The 
question of tJie 'tragic' arises once again.
In using this analogy, it seems that Brunner must endorse these 
implications as well. In other words, the right decision in a situation 
must be responsible and rational. The possibility of tragedy must 
accompany it, making the person liable for blame. At the same time, 
it is this liability for blame that constitutes the basis of freedom
p, 204. 
^^Ibid., p. 135. 
^®Ibid., p. 139.
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for the judge. His decision is neither dictated nor compelled. If 
human responsibility is to be maintained in each situation, liability
69for blame and praise must exist.
It is precisely these implications, however, that Brunner evades
in man's ethical situation. In the end, he leaves us with the mere
assertion of a correlation between the schedule of duties and the
good. He does not go on to show the method of the correlation.
Without a clear correlation, the implications of the judicial analogy
cannot be applied, Brunner's lack of clarification on this point
is unsatisfactory. He writes about the dilemma of decision in this
way, "...it is not I^who have to decide..., but the point is that,
in faith, in this situation in which I have to decide, I am to hear
the concrete Command of God Himself
From the above, it seems that Brunner's position involves the
following consequences; responsibility in an ethical situation is
God's responsibility; goodness, rather than a quality one deliberates
upon (using the judicial analogy) or a quality perceived by man, is
71something determined for him in a particular situation. Brunner's
expression points in this direction when he writes, "The Good consists
72
in always doing what God wills at any particular moment," Further
69Sir Isaiah Berlin has done a good job in pointing out the 
necessary connection between human responsibility and praise and blame 
in a situation (see 'Historical Inevitability* (The Philosophy of History, 
ed. Patrick Gardiner (Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 161-186)}% 
Further reference will be made to this.
runner, The Divine Imperative, p, 229.
^  am using 'seems' as a cautionary measure. Further examination 
of Brunner's thought will reveal that the above impression of Brunner 
needs much qualification. It will be argued that a timeless quality exists 
in Brunner's God. This exempts even God from ethical responsibility in 
the world,
^^ rbid,, p. 83.
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support for this understanding of him can he seen in the following:
"Christian ethics is the science of human conduct as it is deter-
75mined hy Divine conduct. " H o w  the schedule of duties helps in 
the situation is very difficult, if not impossible, to see, God, 
alone, is the determinant of good, rather than man or something in 
his situation. Ethics, it seems, has become what Brunner calls, 
'human conduct determined by divine conduct'. Further evidence of 
this impression can be found in the following remark: ..the law
which guides...no longer contains an ethical sentiment - the ethical 
sentiment,....resides in faith - but a more technical function: that 
of giving the right direction," In the foregoing, the orders and
laws of man's existence, and thus his community, receive little 
importance in terms of 'meaning*. There is nothing 'good' in the 
orders. They have little or no extension in the determination of 
the good. Confirmation of this can be seen in Brunner's thoughts 
on change, reform and justice. This will be developed later in this 
chapter.
Certain problems arise from Brunner's expression thus far. The 
danger of individualism is present. If there is no determination 
of content in relation to the 'good*; that is, if there are no 
standards by which one can judge the goodness of an act, then judg­
ment is left with the individual alone. Value has become purely 
subjective. The danger in this kind of ethical thinking, in terms 
of the social ills it has and can produce, are too obvious to
p. 86.
p. 150.
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75mention.'^ With this, anything could he claimed as good hy any 
individual in any situation.
In spite of the dangers, it can he argued strongly that such 
subjectivism is not actually applicable to Brunner, Individualism 
would imply man's determination of the good apart from the community, 
Brunner is not claiming this. Goodness is not something any indiv­
idual can attain with or without community. It is rather a gift from 
God, Responsibility with respect to the good is taken away from the 
individual in all situations, God alone is good. Rather than 
individualism, therefore, a strong case for determinism in Brunner 
can be made,
N. H, G, Robinson sees this determinism as one of the central 
problems of Brunner's whole ethical expression. He comments on
75In an article entitles, 'Martin Buber's Ethics and the Problem 
of Norms' (Religious Studies, Vol. 5, No, 2, December I969 (Cambridge 
University Press)", pp. 181-194), Charles Kegley criticises Buber for 
the same kind of epistemological confusion that we see evident in 
Brunner, He is of the opinion that Brunner and Buber have much in conunon.
He writes, "For him revelation is an event, a happening, a living, 
dynamic meeting (shades of Emil Brunner's, The Encounter) with the Eternal 
Thou, as in the case of Abraham." (p. I85). He goes on to write, "With 
this view of revelation, of a highly personal encounter of man with God, 
what emerges is, on the surface, a clearly situational ethics rather 
than an ethics of principles. On this issue Buber would appear to have 
made his position entirely clear: 'I know no system', *I oppose "situation" 
to "principles", the "unclean" reality to the "pure abstraction",' 
Astonishingly he wrote, ',,,there is not the slightest assurance that our 
decision is right except in a personal way'," (p, I85). To a statement 
by Buber that a situation furnishes its own interpretation, Kegley writes, 
"Now, how a situation furnishes its own interpretation, Buber never, to 
my knowledge, makes clear, nor can I imagine hov/ it could, or even, if 
it seemed to or claimed to, guarantee to us that its interpretation was 
correct. This sounds like subjectivism of a very dangerous sort," (p. 193) 
"What is at issue,,.,is the problem of criteria. So here: what are 
the criteria for assessing contradictory claims to being 'knowledge of 
God', 'Will of God', God's action in the World'? In the absence of 
clear criteria,...the poetical and paradoxical reign," (p, 193).
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Brunner'3 statement "....ethics is...human conduct as it is determined
"by Divine conduct" in this way:
....when he had offered this definition it 
seems preposterous that Brunner should have 
claimed that 'here the antithesis between 
freedom and necessity is removed'. It is 
removed only in the sense that one side, 
freedom, has been totally overshadowed and 
destroyed. It is certainly true, as Brunner 
claimed, that the Gospel is 'concerned with 
the release of man from bondage*; but while 
it is important to preserve the sense that 
the state from which man is rescued by 
divine grace is one in which he cannot 
possibly help himself nor contribute in any 
way to his own salvation, it is no less 
important to safeguard the insight that the 
being thus released from bondage is man, a 
self-determining being who is responsible 
for his plight, and that this is no merely 
interesting additional fact about him but 
stands in the closest possible relation to 
the affirmation of his redemption*"7°
Is Robinson correct in implicating Brunner in such a deterministic
position? To this question, we give an affirmative reply. Further
analysis shows that Brunner has removed from his expression one of
the main sources of indeterminancy in ethics, that of human respons- 
77ibility. This can be shown by returning to a thought alluded to
^^Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, p. 176,
^ I^ am not implying here that 'determinacy' cannot, in any sense, 
be equated with freedom and human responsibility. There is always a 
determined aspect to life, Yfe shall be dealing with this further in 
the thesis. Strict determinacy, however, in the sense that no 
contingency is possible, denies man his freedom and thus responsibility. 
To my knowledge, at least, there are no convincing arguments which hold 
responsibility and strict determinism as compatible concepts, Ernest 
Nagel in his article 'Determinism in History' (The Philosophy of History, 
pp. 184-217), makes a good criticism of Berlin that is relevant here, 
Berlin in denouncing determinism completely leaves unexplained the 
existence of the self, Nagel writes, ,,he appears to have an 
irresolvable puzzle on his hands of how to identify the human self - 
a puzzle that arises from his so construing’ the nature of that self, 
that any trait or action which stands in relations of causal dependence 
to anything whatever, is automatically cut off from being a genuine phase 
of the self," ( p, 210). This identity of the self is something we shall 
be arguing for in our thesis.
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above with regard to praise and blame. It is logical that respons­
ibility involves the liability to praise or blame. To be responsible 
one must be liable for the consequences, good or bad, that follow 
from an action. Determinism, on the other hand, in taking away man's 
responsibility, removes him from any liability for an action under­
taken, Isaiah Berlin, wrote about the situation in this way;
If the history of the world is due to 
the operation of identifiable forces 
other than, and little affected by, 
free human wills and free choices 
(whether these occur or not), then 
the proper explanation of what happens 
must be given in terms of the evol­
ution of such forces. And there is 
then a tendency to say that not in­
dividuals, but these larger entities, 
are ultimately 'responsible*, I live 
at a particular moment of time in the 
spiritual and social and economic 
circumstances into which I have been 
cast; how then can I help choosing and 
acting as I do? The values in terms of 
which I conduct my life are the values 
of my class, or race, or church, or 
civilization, or are part and parcel 
of my 'station* - my position in the 
'social structure'. Nobody denies that 
it would be stupid as well as cruel to 
blame me for not being taller than I am, 
or to regard the colour of my hair or 
the qualities of my intellect or heart 
as being due principally to my own free ■ 
choice; these attributes are as they are 
through no decision of mine. If I extend 
this category without limit, then what­
ever is, is necessary and inevitable.
This unlimited extension of necessity, on 
any of the views described above, becomes 
intrinsic to the explanation of every­
thing, To blame and praise, consider 
possible alternative courses of action, 
accuse or defend historical figures for 
acting as they do or did, becomes an 
absurd activity.78
"^ B^erlin, 'Historical Inevitability' (The Philosophy of History),
p. 171.
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It is difficult to deny that, in certain respects, an individual 
is what he is psychologically and biologically. Because of his 
inheritance, there are certain propensities in every man for which 
blame or praise would not be applicable. One can say this without 
giving way to a rigid theory of determinism such as behaviourism 
would have us accept, A theory such as the latter, to re-echo Berlin's 
words, would make praise and blame absolutely absurd. Another agent, 
either in the form of a divine deity dr latent force in the universe, 
would then be held answerable for all consequences, good or bad.
In the light of this, one reads Brunner with criticism. He 
exonerates the individual in all ethical situations. As a later 
chapter will show, with such exoneration, the depth of personal exist­
ence vanishes.
At this point, an important clarification must be made. In
mentioning Berlin, we are not equating Brunner with the former's
account of determinism, Berlin's argument is that an agent, divine
or otherwise, determines everything in history. In this way, he
leaves man without responsibility for the events of life, Brunner
is saying something quite different. It is important in our analysis
of him that his distinctive position be made clear, Brunner does
not say that God determines every act of man, although on oursoiy
79reading, this could be a possible interpretation of him. Some 
of the statements we have already examined bear this out. On the 
contrary, the case will be made in the next chapter that Brunner allows 
God no such penetration of and extension in reality, Brunner's position 
is that God as Good (God alone is Good) comes to man a-temporally in
^^Refer back to footnote (70) of this chapter.
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faith. Faith has little or no relation to fact, but, at the same 
time, constitutes the good. Faith is not an effort on the part 
of man, not something man does, but a gift from God, It comes to 
man by the Spirit, says Brunner,
Regardless of the contrast of Brunner from Berlin, the danger 
to man's freedom remains unchanged. Praise or blame still cannot 
be attributed to man. Goodness is still not something man decides 
for in relation to the world, God removes praise and blame from man, 
and thus, his freedom and responsibility. He does so not by directly 
deciding or determining everything that happens on earth, as with 
Berlin, He does so by removing the Good from man's time scheme and 
determining it elsewhere. This is equally a determinism that destroys 
man's responsibility for the meaning of his life.
Some clarification of this point can be seen by examining the 
concept of 'conflict of duties' at further length. As stated earlier, 
in a conflicting situation one might be confronted with the existence 
of two possibilities for good, A decision might involve the exclusion 
of one good for the other. How is one to react to this situation?
If one were to turn to W, D. Ross, for example, whose position has 
man similarities to that of Brunner,one would see an expression of
82compunction toward the unfulfilled duties in every ethical situation.
^%@e Brunner's The Christian Doctrine of God. Dogmatics Vol. I, 
trans, Olive Wyon, (Lutterworth Press, London, , p. 29.
^^See Dale E, Burrington's article, 'The Command and the Orders in 
Brunner's Ethic*(Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 20, 19&7, pp. 149-164) 
This article was particularly helpful in drawing out the similarities 
of the theological and philosophical positions, or more specifically, 
the positions of Brunner and the moral 'intuitionists* such as Ross 
and Pritchard, Burrington makes the following statements that are 
helpful to the reader in understanding the comparison suggested above.
He writes, "The doctrine of Divine Command.,..makes Brunner's ethic 
have some striking similarities to some secular intuitionistic moral 
theories, particularly to the theories of 'perceptual intuitionists* 
in morals," (p. 153). "However, the reader will note that the Command 
ethic contains a reference to God's will in the determination of par­
ticular duties; therein lies a major difference between Brunner's
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Brunner, in contrast, says that any suoh feeling is only an 
indication that the Divine Command has not been heard.
For further understanding let us turn to a concrete example. 
Suppose in the birth of a child a decision had to be made between 
the life of the child and the life of the mother. Let us suppose 
the decision went in favour of the child, either by the will of the 
doctor or the self-sacrificing attitude of the mother. One would 
naturally feel, in that decisive situation, that a tragic element 
was involved. This is so because of the presence of a 'lesser of 
two evils* situation, or more positively, the acceptance of only 
one good to the exclusion of another. Either way one is aware of 
a calamatous element. This makes for a very dramatic ethical moment. 
Such moments are not uncommon to the experience of man. He daily 
finds himself confronted by feelings of pain, hurt, loss and thus, 
tragedy, Man is tragic in these situation only when he realizes 
the human responsibility that is involved. This falls in line with 
W, D, Ross.
Brunner, on the other hand, denies the validity of such feelings.
8l( continued) Command ethic and secular intuitionistic moral 
theories. According to Brunner, it is God's Command which makes a 
particular course of action obligatory, and not some intrinsic 
characteristic of the situation itself; Brunner says that no thing 
or situation is good in and of itself,,,,Because Brunner's intuition­
istic language differs in this way from the language of the more 
common secular moral intuitionism, one might well call Brunner's 
Command ethic 'auditory intuitionism*, and the secular version 'visual 
intuitionism®, Brunner's own use of auditory language in describing 
moral experience seems to be dictated by the theological nature of 
his ethic and its biblical background." (pp. 153-154), I would stress, 
against Burrington, that in Brunner's thought, no historical situation 
may be called 'Good*.
D, Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford University Press,
1955), p. 28,
83It is possible, of course, to recognise the tragic element in 
life and still not see it fully in relation to man's responsibility.
“43-
Paith for the person removes blame or praise.Brunner writes 
clearly on this point in the following way; "In any case the 
Christian must never become "tragic" about it; he may appear so 
to others - as, for instance, a statesman, who out of responsibility 
for his people must take a step which will expose him to the reproach 
of disregarding moral obligations - but he himself knows that this
Oc
neglect is only apparent. How can it be "tragic" to obey God?"
The implication that one gains from this is that, as long as one 
has faith or the intention of love in an act, one is absolved of
( continued) I think here of such a writer as Alfred Whitehead 
who, in his book Adventures of Ideas (University Press, Cambridge,
1933), looks upon tragedy.as part of the 'Creative Advance* and thus 
not really something that one should feel compunction for but welcome 
as evidence of Man's progression. One gains this impression in the 
following words: "Decay, Transition, Loss, Displacement belong to the 
essence of the Creative Advance,...The enduring Societies with their 
rise, culmination and decay, are devices to combine the necessities of 
Harmony and Freshness, There is a deep underlying Harmony of Nature, 
as it were a fluid, flexible support; and on its surface the ripples 
of social efforts, harmonizing and clashing in their aims at ways of 
satisfaction. The lower types of physical objects can have a vast 
endurance of inorganic life. The higher types, involving animal life 
and the dominance of a personality primarily mental, preserve their 
zest by the quick succession of stages from birth, culmination, to 
death. As soon as high consciousness is reached, the enjoyment of 
existence is entwined with pain, frustration, loss, tragedy. Amid the 
passing of so much beauty, so much heroism, so much daring. Peace is 
then the intuition of permanence. It keeps vivid the sensitiveness to 
the tragedy; and it sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the 
world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact.
Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal - What might have been, and 
was not: What can be. The tragedy was not in vain," (pp. 368-369).
Similar views are expressed by Teilhard de Chardin (see Ernst Benz's 
book Evolution and Christian Hope (Doubleday & Co. Inc., New York, I968) 
p. 2^ 3jl
runner does mention in The Christian Doctrine of God that natural 
knowledge leaves man without excuse in this world. He makes no attempt to 
explain what he means. What he intends is certainly not obvious (p. 121),
®5brunner. The Divine Imperative, p, 205,
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praise and blame by God, In the end, although Brunner may have taken 
a different path than that outlined by Berlin, man remains locked 
into meaning for existence that is determined for him. He is removed 
from the responsible freedom which we normally associate with personal 
existence, Berlin again writes in a manner helpful to us: ",,..any 
assertion that they should have acted thus or thus, might have avoided 
this or that, and deserve.praise or blame, approval or condemnation, 
rests upon the presupposition that some area, at any rate, of their 
lives is not totally determined by laws, whether metaphysical or 
theological or expressing the generalized probabilities of the 
s c i e n c e s , I  would add here to Berlin the presupposition, as well, 
that goodness have some location in historical reality. It is this 
presupposition that is missing in Brunner^
Let us now return to the question with which we began this chapter. 
How does meaning arise for the individual in community? The answer, 
in the light of Brunner, can now be seen. Meaning is that which man 
passively receives apart from and above the orders and structures of 
the community that envelops him. From our investigation of the functions 
of community, even to the function of guidance, a mere technical purpose 
was all Brunner granted. Instead of a frame of reference in which the 
individual and the community meet in recognition of a common good, 
one finds a viewpoint that holds them essentially apart. The role 
of the community is given little significance in the determination 
of the individual's meaning. It is very difficult, in the light of 
this, to see how respect and honor can be paid to the community. It 
lacks essential importance.
^^erlin, 'Historical Inevitability* (The Philosophy of History), 
p. 167.
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Such a perspective can only feed the indifference of man to the
conditions of his existence. It would leave him, at the end of the
day, with little incentive for justice and reformi. It may even increase
the dangers of violence in society. Too little respect is accorded
the past and the traditions upon which society is built. Relegating
the structures of life to a mere technical function, as Brunner is
doing, would weaken their significance for man’s being. The violent
revolutionary’s conviction that meaning resides on the other side
of the past and present facts of life would thus gain support.
The insignificance of community in Brunner can be seen further
if we look at his attitude to justice, reform and change. One suspects
that unless the community and its structures are given an essential
relation to an individual’s life then the need for justice and reform
87will not be seen as urgent. This sense of urgency is missing from 
Brunner's OTUi writings.
It would involve another chapter to detail Brunner's thoughts 
on justice. He has written a book dealing specifically with the 
topic,For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to summarize 
his convictions in this direction. A good place to begin would be
87Jurgen Koltmann makes a comment in his book, Hope and Planning, 
trans, Margaret Clarkson (SCM Press Ltd., London, I971}, which' is worth 
repeating here. He writes, "The theology of ordinances, which seeks 
standards for the shaping of the historical stream of events, is 
manifestly always in danger of suspending the eschatological theme 
of this shaping. The application of the eschatology of the 'longed- 
for Last Day’ leads to the justification of the opposite to that which 
is expected here in history. Thus in the stabilization of the 'two 
kingdoms', any crossing over of the dividing line is regarded as 
'chiliasm' - even in the allegedly eschatological justification which 
the South African Reformed Church has given for the policy of apartheid; 
any communion of the races in Christ is rejected as utopia and 
chiliasm," (p. 128),
runner. Justice and the Social Order,
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with Brunner's statement in his chapter, 'Static and Dynamic Justice';
The Scriptures understand life, not as 
unchanging being, but as a drama, with 
beginning, middle and end. It is true 
that this history is not primarily re­
lated to earthly life as such. This 
history, which moves forward to its goal, 
is the specific history of the salvation 
of man, and not history in general. Nor 
does the fact of existence of itself imply 
participation in this history. That par­
ticipation is won by faith. Hence it 
would be exceedingly misleading to transfer 
the dynamics of the history of salvation 
in toto to general history, as Hegel did.
Those dynamics are not of the kind that 
can find expression in the sphere of 
mundane justice.^
Brumier's separation of justice from the essential salvation
of man (the truth and meaning of man) can be seen here. It is
difficult to see how Brunner can continue to talk about dynamic
justice in any significant sense in the light of this separation.
The differentiation that he makes between static justice (absolute
justice set by the orders) and dynamic justice (relative justice
made possible because of sin) does not, in the case of the latter,
make justice any more powerful or essential to the individual's life.
It is true that Brunner speaks of justice with reference to
systems and institutions,^^ We must strive, he says, to improve
them whenever we can and wherever necessary. However, the separation
of such improvement from the core of personal existence (justice is
not concerned with the person)cannot help but weaken the thrust
of the arm of justice, Brunner confirms this assessment when writing
htid., pp. 91-92. 
p. 25. 
p. 25.
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the following:
Anyone who really cares for justice must 
suffer deeply from the enforced acqui­
escence in a great deal of injustice 
because it forms part of a system which, 
even with its great weaknesses and im­
perfections, is nevertheless better than 
the disorder which arises when men attempt 
to improve an imperfect system with in­
adequate means. Hence the attitude of the 
Christian faith to justice and reality is 
essentially a conservative one, because 
the scope of fruitful individual inter­
ference in a given system is relatively 
narrow in comparison with the vast dis­
tance between the individual and the
system.52
Unless Brunner can relate justice in some manner to the field
of meaning, in a way that is true of Hegel, whom he rejects, there
can be little room for dynamic justice at all, Man's activity,
politically, socially and economically remains restricted without
the correlation to be suggested in this thesis, Without the
essential relation of man's activity and the events of his life
with 'meaning', concern for justice would be negated, Man's position
would be, thus, as Brunner states it:
Faith is completely successful because it 
is the work of God; not as our own act, 
but as the act of the Holy Spirit, This 
is what God desires from us; that we should 
withdraw to this "innermost line of defence", 
that we should "flee for refuge" to Himself,
Once this has been done, the Good has been 
achieved - whatever else may have been 
achieved. Thus God wills that we should 
see the futility of our own action, and. 
expect success from Him alone, that we should 
despair of our own action, in order that we 
may put our whole confidence in His act alone.
^hbid., p. 97.
Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 2%..
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All of this, of course, has much relevance to our understanding
of the self, Brunner's expression to this point leaves the self
and its meaning very much without context, at least the context
of reality as we experience it. Meaning is acquired above the
historical events of life, not in them.
Without this firm foundation in our eternal 
Origin, and without the firm goal in the 
eternity at the end of the ages, man literally 
lives "for the day"; he is like a mayfly which 
lives for a day, and then disappears; his life 
is played out on the surface of the finite.
Only through his relation to eternity does he 
acquire depth; the "surface" is the finite, the 
temporal, eternity alone is "depth". And this 
dimension of "depth" is the same as the dimen­
sion of "meaning". Either life has an eternal 
meaning or it has no meaning at all. For what 
is meaning, if it can be finally swallowed up 
in meaninglessness, and annihilated? And what 
sort of "meaning" would there be without an 
eternal foundation?54
runner. The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol, I, p, 304^
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CHAPTER TWO 
BRUNNER'S CONGEFTION OP GOD
(a ) The Basis of Brunner's Ethical Position
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to provide a 
foundation for Brunner's ethical position. This is important as 
the weaknesses of the position can be overcome only if we understand 
the rationale from which it develops. This thesis will present a 
challenge to this rationale. Questions of an ontological nature will 
arise and be dealt with. As much as Brunner might be opposed to 
questions of ontology, in relation to the Christian faith, it will be 
argued that his Christian foundation for the individual's placement in 
life centres around a particular understanding of God. This, in itself, 
raises questions as to the nature of time and reality. These are 
specific ontological questions. In what follows, an attempt will be 
made to develop this.
In the closing pages of the last chapter, an effort was made to 
explain Brunner's understanding of 'meaning' for the individual in 
the community. It was suggested that his understanding would weaken 
man's community and, at the same time, threaten the essential freedom 
of the individual. It was seen that Brunner's thought, when followed 
through to its conclusion, implied a determinism. 'Meaning' is 
imposed upon the individual in a situation. This is so, not apart 
from the community in the strict sense, but with little regard for the 
community's demands and structures.
If Brunner's understanding were taken seriously, social ethics^  
consequentially, would remain static. The danger of individualism 
would arise as well. Social ethics would remain static because of 
the basic, mechanical function the community is said to perform in the 
situation of life. To function merely as a preserver of life does not
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suggest much promise for change and reform. The strong danger of 
individualism exists because the individual is left in his ethical 
decision without the wisdom of thoughtful consideration of one's 
situation, or the judgment that may arise from reflection. This is 
so, in spite of Brunner's repeated statements on the guiding pur­
pose of the community orders and laws. This thought, we found, 
did not lead the individual in the direction of serious community 
involvement. In the end, however, we suggested that the tendency 
toward individualism was arrested by the presence of determinism. 
Individualism, in the sense of the self's free choice in a situation, 
is really exclusive of strict determinism, Brunner, thus, escapes 
such criticism. However, when an individual is put in a community 
situation that has no relation to the determination of the good 
then the danger of individualism with all of its social destruct­
iveness threatens.
Decisiveness, for Brunner, in the determination of the good, 
has very little to do with the community. He maintains a negative 
attitude in this matter throughout his writings. This is in keeping.
1
Brunner, at times, makes a distinction in his discussion of 
the good. He is prepared to recognize the existence of pagan virtue, 
with Luther, and state that for all men there is some awareness of 
what is right and what is wrong. He writes, "Y/ithin Original Sin 
the distinction between 'good' and 'evil' has not been obliterated.
The fact that we are 'all sinners* does not mean that we can do 
nothing good - in the usual ethical sense of the word - that we can 
only do evil,..It is perfectly possible to combine being a sinner 
with being 'good' in the ethical sense; indeed, in the last resort 
the fact of being or not being a sinner has nothing to do with the 
difference between the morally 'good' and the morally 'evil';..,"
(Man in Revolt, pp. 155-154). The good to which Brunner refers here, 
however, does not end cannot, have any relation to the ultimate 'good', 
that is, the truth about human existence. Without this association, 
which Brunner refuses to make, the significance of natural morality 
is destroyed.
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of course, with Brunner's attitude to natural morality or general
ethics. It would be helpful to consider this attitude briefly.
It will serve to substantiate our findings in the first chapter
with respect to the 'meaning' of the self, and lead us into the
main topic of this chapter.
As with his statements on the significance of the community
in the determination of the good, Brunner's views on this matter
are difficult to pinpoint. One is faced again with statements
that lend themselves to wide interpretation and a certain measure
of inconsistency. In spite of this, however, his expression is
2
clear enough to establish a position for him.
At times, Brunner can speak of natural morality in a positive
way. He writes in the early pages of The Divine Imperative:
Thus it is true that man - although he 
does so reluctantly, and does not admit 
it - actually always gives a reply to 
the question: "What is the Good?" In 
the last resort, therefore, moral scep­
ticism, like all scepticism, is a flight 
from one's own reality and a form of self- 
deception, Every one who acts, every one 
who lives as man with a human consciousness, 
acts "ethically"; that is, he acts within 
the dimension determined by the ethical 
question,5
It would appear that Brunner is granting natural morality some
^or a critique of Brunner's position on the topic of natural 
morality and general ethics, see two books by N, H, G. Robinson: 
Faith and Duty (Gollancz, London, 1950), and The Groundwork of 
Christian Ethics. In the latter book, he gives a very sympathetic 
and yet critical review of Brunner's position,
^Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p, 18.
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significance in relation to the meaning and truth of life. Even 
to have an awareness of the 'Good' as Brunner seems to be suggesting 
in the above, should provide man with the positive value of hope.
Life, in the final analysis, is not devoid of all meaning and empti­
ness. That there is such a thing as 'Good* or 'meaning' should 
have the effsct, at least, of offering man incentive for life. Even 
if there wera no possibility of its achievement now, it should provide 
strength to endure. Is this not a positive value? One must ask, at 
the 'same time, whether it is possible to have awareness of the 'Good* 
without contant? Is not Brunner, thus, giving the 'Good' placement 
in fact? This would really give morality positive value.
Encouraging as these speculations and questions evoked by 
Brunner's statement might be, enthusiasm is dampened when we analyse 
his thought more closely.
In the development of the self, says Brunner, one is faced with 
a graduated series toward higher and higher forms of existence. It 
begins at the level of immediacy and ends with the moral idea itself.
It is not, W  says, until man comes to the moral idea that he approaches 
the personal. Here, as was not the case with the other stages (custom, 
civilization, culture), one is confronted with personal decision, in 
the sense of 'Thou Shalt*,^ Brunner seems to be saying here that the 
self cannot be personal until this moral stage is reached. Until it 
exists by itself without the boundaries associated with the other 
stages the self is not existing as a 'person'. This, at least, is 
consistent with our findings so far. He sees the self arising apart
\bid,,„ p. 27
5
Brunner'3 understanding of the self will receive further treatment 
in the last chapter.
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from the community which envelops it. He is saying, in effect,
that it is in the moment of decision that the personal appears.
For this reason, he is prepared to say that the moral stage is
closest to the personal.
Having established this positive relation of morality with
the personal, he proceeds then to negate all correlation. The
moral, in fact, is the most distant stage from the truth of life,
that is, from the personal and 'Good*. He states that there is
a 'gradual loss of meaning and interest in life* until, with the
last 'rung of the ladder', the worst stage of all, that of the
moral, is reached,^
That Brunner is heaping confusion upon confusion here cannot
be denied. He is speaking in one breath of a positive and negative
value of the moral life. He makes no attempt to clarify his position
as he proceeds. He writes, for example, "The more profound the
forgetfulness of God, the more deeply does human existence sinlc dom
to the level of animal immediacy or natural life. On the other hand,
the highest stage, even when only within the sphere of separation
from God, means a very close approach to the truth of God, It is
characterized by the command "Thou Shalt", by the view of Good as
Law, This does not mean that in this legal view of the Good man
is somewhat nearer to the truth, but that he is nearer to the place
where the breach occurred, that is, that here man is both very near
7to the truth, and yet very remote from it,"
^Ibid,, pp. 64-65. 
^Ibid., p. 62}.,
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llobinson, in commenting on Brunner's statements in this respect,
says he has presented morality to us " as a pursuit of the Good
and as a flight from it. Consequently, the matter urgently demands 
a more careful statement. It is not a finally satisfactory answer 
to our question to say, as so far Brunner appears to have said, 
simply that the relation subsisting between Christian faith and 
natural morality is both positive and negative, A more precise 
formulation is plainly required,"^ Robinson’s criticism here is a 
valid one, Brunner's formulation of faith's relation to morality 
is unsatisfactory. The aim of this thesis is to state the case more 
precisely. Our argument will, at least, suggest lines along which 
such formulation can proceed. It will be suggested that morality 
must be related more essentially to God Himself, Only then can it
Q
be given its place, without making it absolute, at the same time.
In further comment of Brunner's position, let us state an 
important point. For Brunner, moral man is engaged in a hopeless 
task, Man is trying by means of reason to give a description of 
the good, so he may then follow it. This proposal is, in Brunnei’'s
^Robinson, Faith and Duty, pp. 40-41 •
9
The whole discussion of the relevance of natural morality is 
important to the task at hand. It bears directly on the question 
of the place of the individual in community. If morality is given 
no significance, then man’s quest for the truth is wrenched from 
his historical life and the structures that make up his life. The 
danger of individualism emerges once again, Robinson recognizes this 
when he says that Brunner does not sufficiently gu.ard himself against 
the charge of 'Antinomianism*, "Has the 'ought* of faith a definite 
and objective content? For antinomianism is a real danger for any 
theory which takes the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as covering almost 
the whole ground of Christian ethics and regards genuine goodness as 
belonging to men only as they are found within the activity of God." 
(Faith and Duty, p. 49)•
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mind, an absolute impossibility. What *is' the case in life and
what ’ought* to be the case, as we suggested in the last chapter,
are radically divided and separated. Any attempt to synthesise them
is doomed to failure. Natural morality, in terms of 'meaning*, is
presented in a completely negative fashion, Brunner expressed this
when he wrote, ",,,,the picture presented by natural ethics is that
10of a heap of ruins."
It is in the light of this 'is-ought' separation that Brunner 
makes his simple classification of morality into naturalism and 
idealism. Natural morality inevitably ends in one of two positions* 
"In the philosophical ethic as usual there are actually only two 
great systems which confront one another, which are related to the 
fundamental contradiction in philosophy as a whole: the Naturalistic 
view of ethics, which starts from the fact of existence, and the
1 1Idealistic view, with its sense of obligation or the Moral Idea,"
In Brunner's opinion, there are obvious defects in each form* 
Naturalism is wrong because it takes existence as it is. It 
becomes the sole criterion of what should be done. It operates in 
fact without a sense of obligation as it becomes simply utilitarian 
in principle, Whatever works, or whatever produces pleasure, is the 
thing one should do, Brunner complains that such a theory leaves 
the human race at a level of the pleasure and the desire only. It 
is void of a real sense of ought, "Ethics then means - according 
to its theoretical content - the natural causal explanation of the 
supposedly mysterious supernatural "morality", and in its practical
i 0Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 67, 
■’■’ibid., pp. 35-36.
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content it is simply Utilitarianism. The sense of obligation and 
the "moral laws" are abbreviated forms of the experience of humanity
4 2
in respect of that which I find useful and pleasant,"
Idealism, on the other hand, is wrong because it is void of any 
sense of content. It concentrates on the sense of duty in life with­
out giving man any clear indication of the content of that duty. For 
Brunner, Kant was the principal representative of this form of natural 
morality. Nothing in the sense of what is, that is, from observable 
phenomena, can tell us what ought to be. Thus, the sense of duty is 
the only thing valuable. Duty for duty's sake is the manner in which 
Brunner chooses to describe it.
It is ironic, that Brunner, at times, comes perilously close in 
his position to this very f o m  of Idealism, When he refers to the 
sense of obligation, which one feels in a particular situation as 
the awareness of the 'Good*, he comes close to emptying the ethical 
of any content. The similarity of Brunner to Idealism is revealed 
again when he writes, "The motive of conduct becomes our standard 
of success. We do not infer the goodness of the action from the
fact of success, but we deduce success from the goodness of the
1 3
motive (which is ultimately hidden from us)," Here, form with­
out content, for which he criticises Idealism, is present.
Nevertheless, vre can agree with Brunner's criticism of these 
two positions. Naturalism and Idealism when exercised, one to the 
exclusion of the other, are ruinous to human life,^^' The position
^^Ibid,, p, 35.
^^Ibid., p, 285.
"^ ^^ Any ethic that seeks a separation of what 'ought* to be from 
that which 'is* present at hand can be said, with Brunner, to be 
Idealistic, Platonic ethics could be used as an illustration of this
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position. With Plato, true reality existed in a form beyond that 
which is visible in the empirical world. Life, in which we exist 
and carry out our functions, is appearance only. It does not add 
or contribute to the 'real* above us. The aim of all life is to 
bring into realization, as much as possible, the idealized good, 
which we can only represent in a typological manner. In g m  
Republic, for example, Plato does not try to describe states. He 
describes what is essential or typical in them. In this manner 
he sought to construct an objective system of ethics that went 
beyond pure desire and whim. The good towards which man pointed 
his life was objectively real. It ought to be realized not because 
men desire it or wish it, but because it is the good. We have 
here a classic example of the separation of existence and value 
that leads to the idealism of which Brunner speaks, Pannenberg 
recognizes this separation in Plato, "Since Parmenides at the latest, 
and especially under the powerful Influence of Plato, the tendency to 
separate appearance and being has been dominant. The world of appear­
ance, of doxa, is considered a mixture of being and non-being, of a 
lesser order than the being which exists in itself. In Platonism 
this latter being is depicted as the being of the ideas, which is 
reflected only imperfectly in the appearances and which remains 
inaccessible to sense perception,,,.This being is held to exist in 
itself, eternally and unchangeably; the appearances in which it is 
reflected add nothing to it." (Theology and the K ingdom of God, p. 128), 
Pannenberg seas evidence in Plato that shows lie understood this 
separation as untenable, but was unable to break from it in thought.
It is difficult to find a writer who would endorse such strict 
separation today. As pointed out, Brunner does not guard himself 
sufficiently against this form of ethics. It would not be proper, 
however, to call him a Platonist. Brunner, in some parts of his 
writings, indicates that a correlation exists between the 'Good* and 
reality. He fails to provide the concepts, however, to make it under­
standable, Perhaps G, H, Dodd comes closer to Platonic idealism than 
Brunner by separating history from the absolute. The event plus meaning 
idea that is present in Dodd is indicative of this. History, for Dodd, 
has no meaning in itself; it is merely a mirror through which shines 
the absolute values of the eternal world. At one point he writes,
"Time is, as Plato said, the moving image of eternity"(The Apostolic 
Preaching and its Developments (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1936T7
pp. 87-88).
Naturaliam, as Brunner describes it, could be represented by Jeremy 
Bentham (of, Brunner's Glaube und Ethik (Vortrag, gehalten in der Kunst- 
gesellschaft, Thun, Krebsor & Go., 1945, pp. 7-50), p, 9, in which Brunner 
criticises Bentham*s ethic for its naturalism, Brunner says that Bentham 
seeks to remove the metaphysical foundation of Kantian ethics and base 
ethics on natural facts alone,). In Bentham, we see a morality which 
allows phenomenal reality absolute participation in the determination of 
the good. The greatest happiness of the greatest number becomes the yard­
stick of ethical and moral deliberation. In the publication, ^n Intro­
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Vf, Pickering, 
Lincoln's - Inn Fields, London, 1823, Chapter I, Section I, p, 1),
Bentham wrote, "Nature has placed manid.nd under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point 
out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On 
the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of 
causes and effects, are fastened to their throne," If the danger of
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in this thesis will be one in which Naturalism and Idealism, as 
exclusive ethical stances, will be ruled out. However, this will 
not be at the expense of the truth present in each system, A 
synthesis of the respective positions must be established if ethics 
is to remain human, Brunner's weakness rests in his failure to 
provide such a synthesis. Naturalism and Idealism are, and will 
always be, the inevitable consequences of man's moral effort. It 
is for this reason that Brunner's search for 'meaning' excludes 
moral and ethical argument.
With Brunner's criticism of Naturalism and Idealism, we can 
agree. Exception is taken to his intransigence with respect to their 
separation. His position rests on a premise which is seriously 
questioned in itself, A statement by Robinson pinpoints this under­
standing of Brunner:
If every theory, actual and possible, must be 
either naturalistic or idealistic, and if 
naturalism and idealism are, each in its own 
way, essentially defective, then nothing more 
need be said and Brunner seems to have proved 
his point. But this appearance of logical 
necessity is appearance only, for behind the 
classification into naturalism and idealism 
there lies the bare assumption that what is 
and what ought to be are absolutely separate.
It is from this that Brunner starts; and yet, 
clearly, it is not an opinion which can safely 
be taken for granted,15
( c^ontinued) Platonic ethics is the separation of existence and 
value, the danger in Bentham's theory is the inseparability of the two, 
One is then left with a position that provides little opportunity for 
critical reflection on the conditions and situations of life. If the 
'good' is seen absolutely in terms of what is, then man is left alone 
with himself, enthralled with his own situation.
^^Robinson, Faith and Duty, p. 58.
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Robinson's criticism of Brunner is valid because Brunner does 
work from the premise: what 'is* and what 'ought* to be are sep­
arated, Brunner writes of this premise himself;
If we try to remove the antithesis between
that which is and that which ought to be
(which is, indeed, the presupposition of all
ethics), into man himself, we are obliged to
split the Self of man into an intelligible
Self and an empirical 8elf.^°
I
V/hile agreeing with Robinson on the premise of Brunner's position,
one questions whether he is right in classifying it as a bare assumption,
This gives one the impression that there is no deeper foundation for 
the premise. It can be argued that this is not the case. Indeed, there 
are a number of reasons for his separation of 'is* and 'ought*, It is
important to search for the primary reason in order to challenge him
properly. Without such challenge, Protestantism, which he represents, 
will remain detached from the secular events of history in its search 
for 'meaning',
Robinson himself, in The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, searches
for the underlying thought behind Brunner's premise. It is no longer
a bare assumption. He singles out the doctrine of sin as the main 
source of the theologian's attack on secular ethics. In his opinion, 
this is the reason for Brunner's classification of secular ethics 
into naturalism and idealism. He writes, "Unless Brunner's view of 
sinful man can be accepted his treatment of general ethics cannot 
carry any conviction but must stand condemned,,,,In itself Brunner's 
drastic shortcut with ethics has nothing to be said for it; and its 
justification must be sought elsewhere in the interpretation and 
articulation of Christian truth and, in particular, of the doctrine of
 ^Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. h.6^  46,
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17sin," He goes on to give support for this assertion in some of the 
statements Brunner makes with reference to general ethics, Robinson's 
interpretation here could be strengthened, of course, by excerpts from 
The Divine Imperative, Brunner writes, for example; ",,,natural ethics 
is dominated by the principle of self-seeking and self-reference"/*^ 
that is, it is solely an attempt to become self-sufficient* Brunner, 
thus, can make the conclusive statement, ",,,in the last resort it is 
precisely morality which is evil;...the worst state of man is that in
which he has complete confidence in himself
At this point, it is not necessary to argue with Robinson on
the relevance of Brunner's doctrine of sin in connection with his
attitude to general ethics. It is a matter of little question that
Brunner sees man's life riddled by sin. With him, sin is not the
absence of something that will be in the future. It is the destruction
of a good that was. Man's natural existence, therefore, is seen as
20being in opposition to God, Thus, this is one reason why Brunner 
refuses to relate existence with the 'meaning' of that existence.
Value, in terms of the 'Good*, cannot be realized by man.
17Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, p, 50.
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^^runner's attitude on this matter can best be seen in Man 
Revolt (pp. 3.14ff), He writes, "All is good in him because it has 
been created by God, but all this good proceeds from God's creation, 
stands under a law of evil, or rather, sin. The order of the whole, 
the final motive, the final connexion, the unity, the fundamental 
direction, is not good because everything has been dislocated,.,.By 
sin the nature of man, not merely something in his nature, is changed 
and perverted." (p. 137) • "Existence is now turned in the opposite 
direction," (p, 156)*
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If one were to look at Brunner's polemical attack on Liberalism,
one would find the chief source of his criticism directed towards its
21
understanding of sin. Liberalism, especially that represented by 
Ritschl, was guilty in not taking sin with sufficient seriousness. Thus, 
it attempted, in Brunner's opinion, to build a Kingdom of God on moral 
grounds,
21
Liberalism is very difficult to define under one simple heading.
It covers a heterogeneous collection of ideas. The movement had wide 
influence in America and Europe, particularly Germany, It disclosed 
itself in a variety of ways and degrees. It was in Germany, however, 
that the school of thought was actually pioneered under the leading names 
of Ritschl, Hermann and Harnack, Langdon Gilkey in his book, The Renewal 
of God-Language makes an attempt to define it, "Liberalism was one of 
tne most courageous and momentous movements of theology in all of Christian 
history. First of all, let us note that it was 'secular' in two specific 
and important respects: (l) it accepted as normative criteria for theology 
the dominant scientific, philosophical, historical, and moral ideas of its 
culture; and (2) it regarded Christian faith as relevant and important 
solely because of its creative potentialities for the transformation of the 
common, historical life of mankind, that is, of the secular world of social 
history," (p. 76). He includes in the field such figures as Hegel, Sohleier- 
macher, Ritschl, Rauschenbusch, Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne,
22In The Mediator Brunner writes strongly against Liberalism, par- 
ticularly that of Ritschl, Brunner took exception to his thought on various 
points. He saw Liberalism as confidently rationalistic. In his opinion, 
it destroyed the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, It made the truth of Christian­
ity a-priori; that is, it is something existing before Christ vhich Christ 
served in his life on earth, Brunner writes, "The significant element in 
the event of Jesus is this, "that historically this Idea first received shape 
and form througli Christ," Obviously, this has nothing whatever to do with 
revelation in the Christian sense of the word." (p. 6o), Brunner criticised 
the Liberal position for erecting a standard of judgment by which Christ 
may be judged as Revelation, The criteria consisted of the ideas of God 
as 'love* and the Kingdom of God, Christ was valuable to human history as- 
someone who perfectly introduced these ideas. He, more than any other 
historical figure, suitably embodied the pre-arranged conditions of human 
fulfillment. With such an introduction, man could rationally proceed to 
build up the Kingdom of God on earth. The reason for such rationalistic 
confidence, in Brunner's opinion, was the superficial view of sin Ritschl 
entertained. Brunner claims that Ritschl did not look upon sin as radical 
opposition to God. Rather it was only ignorance, Bmnner writes, ",,, 
given Ritschl*s whole conception of the human situation before Christ 
came, to him sin cannot be anything else than ignorance," (p. 137). In 
Brunner's opinion, Liberalism saw sin not as alienation between God and 
man, but as subjective unawareness. It was not an actual separation of 
human life from God, but a state or feeling with no corresponding objective 
reality. Redemption then became, in this view, not the removal of but the
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Along with Brunner's concern for Liberalism's interpretation of
sin, however, one might suggest an epistemological challenge as well*
Ritschl, for example, frequently wrote in a manner Brunner would find
difficult to accept* "The idea of ethical perfection both in our action
as well as in the development of our own character is not necessary
simply in order to establish our imperfection, but rather has its value
for us in what we believe is our destiny in relationship to it. Unless
ethical perfection is held out as an attainable goal, the will cannot
23
be motivated to strive persistently toward it." What is stressed here 
is the possibility of ethical perfection. The value in religion for 
Ritschl rests in its power to bring this about. There is in Ritschl 
the idea that the value of something is known by its practical results
22
( continued) "...building up of something which does not yet 
exist," (p. 135)* This again, would suggest something disagreeable for 
Brunner, forgiveness, rather than a free gift of G-od, without which man 
would be hopeless, would be viewed as an earthly possibility. This would 
come from viewing sin as ignorance rather than rauical opposition to 
G-od (see pp. Z^ |.6ff.),
There is little question, in the light of the above, that sin was 
a dominant theme in Brunner's theological expression. It did much to 
shape his convictions about human existence and the possibility of ethic­
al activity in this life. Against Brunner's static view of sin, we 
find ourselves closer to Robinson's description in dynamic terms (see 
The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, pp. 2l6ff.). This would involve 
a different understanding of the self than the one found in Brunner,
If, for example, the 'self is understood less as substance and more as 
process then that which separates man from G-od (sin) must be seen in a 
similar light.
For a different interpretation of Ritschl's view of sin from that 
of Brunner's, we recommend David Mueller's book An Introduction to the 
Theology of Albrecht Ritschl (The Westminster Press, Pniladelphia, I569) 
ppo 65ff, Mueller's suggestion that Ritschl's view of sin is social in 
character, is more in line with this thesis, than Brunner's thought on 
the matter (p. 72)#
p. 137.
23Mueller, An Introduction to the Theology of Albrecht Ritschl,
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and effects on man and his world. Thus, goodness would be some­
thing judged in terms of the phenomenal reality of experience,
Brunner would be opposed to this. This is shown in the follow­
ing statement; "The Ritschlian conception of the Kingdom of G-od is
P5just as fully influenced by immanental ideas of History as of Reason;,,."'
Brunner writes of his contrasting position this way:
...we see the love of God in the fact that He 
does not desire to have His glory in anything 
other than in the coming of His Kingdom, in 
the perfect fellowship of men with Him, the 
Creator, and with one another. By this I 
mean nothing even remotely resembling the ideas
of practical reason, of a goal of culture and
humanity immanent in history, Tne Kingdom of 
God lies beyond the bounds of philosophy of his­
tory, all processes of culture, and all attempts 
to unite men with one another; it is the King­
dom which will be set up by means of Resurrec­
tion and Judgment,
The practical receives little attention in this assertion, 'Good'
27
in terms of the ultimate good (personal good) is divorced from any
Mueller writes, "Ritschl's concern is to accentuate the practical 
effects of man's justification and reconciliation, ï ïe  saw above that 
he could express this idea by speaking of man's dominion over the world. 
Hence even as Ritschl's definition of religion requires that man's 
attitude toward God have as its correlate his attitude toward the world, 
so man's justification through God's verdict carries with it - if properly 
understood - man's changed attitude toward the world," (ibid., p. llh).
25
Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 612,
^hbld., p. 192.
27
Let us keep in mind that Brunner can speak of good in a single sense 
(ultimate Good) and in a plural sense. The latter refers to the rational 
distinctions we make with reference to the moral quality of an act,
Brunner would not speak of Good in terms of its practicality, Ritschl, 
as we have mentioned, used this notion. If there is fault in Ritschl for 
overstressing the practical, Brunner fails in not associating it with the 
Good, It can be argued that to equate the two without qualification would 
be a fallacy. To keep them strictly apart, however, would make any dis­
cussion of the Good irrelevant to the concrete world in which we are living. 
It should be noted that there has been a great deal of discussion in this 
century on the definition of the good. In this connection, reference is 
made to Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 3.900 (Oxford University Press, London,
19S0).
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notion of practicality. In this attitude, one can see a Kantian
epistemological bias against knowledge of things eternal. Thus,
there are good reasons for saying that Brunner's persistent separation
of what 'is' from what 'ought* to be is because of this philosophical 
28influence.
28Brunner writes approvingly of Kant and critical philosophy in 
this manner: "It is no accident that Kant held fast to the thing-in- 
itself, in spite of the dubiousness of the concept. This concept denoted 
for him the insuperable barrier between us and the truth itself. If this 
dualism is set aside by the evolution of thought, v/e are forced, without 
realizing it, into Hegelian Monism"(from Paul Jewett, Emil Brunner's 
Concept of Revelation (James Clarke 8z Co. Ltd., LondonTTJbR JTT’*
Before Kant's time, faith and science were treated in a similar 
fashion; that is, there was no sharp bifurcation of knowledge, each with 
its own respective and exclusive sphere. This axiom was broken by Kant 
when he delineated the spheres of faith and knowledge so that one had no 
relationship with the other. For Kant, faith was distinguished from know­
ledge by its sphere and object. Knowledge had to do with sense perception. 
The knowing activity was restricted to the establishing of determinate 
relations between perceptions given under the forms of space and time.
Thus, in giving the cause of a phenomenal happening, knowledge gained by 
science was valid. In Kant's opinion, we can never know a thing as it 
is in itself. It only appears to us, We, too, shall be speaking of a 
reality that appears. Unlike Kant, it will not be spoken of in such a 
radical manner. For him, the phenomenal world, the world of sense per­
ception, had no relationship with the numeral world, the realm of faith 
and religion. Faith became the means by which we enter the numenal realm 
and scientific knowledge was not applicable, Man's experience was extremely 
limited or non-functional when it came to matters of faith.
It appears that Ritschl, in his theology, overcame some of this 
Kantian scepticism by suggesting that one is able to know things in the 
light of their effects, Brunner, on the other hand, held firm to the 
Kantian theory. Refer to Cornelius Van Til's book. The New Modernism 
(James Clarke & Co. Ltd., London, 1946), for a strong argument of this 
viewpoint. See also an article by George A. Schrader, 'Brunner's 
Conception of Philosophy* (The Theology of Emil Brunner, ed,, Charles 
Kegley (The Macmillan Company, London,*™Î9^27, pp. 111-133), where the 
author writes of Brunner's bias for critical philosophy in determination 
of the scope of reason. His point is well taken that Brunner is not 
depreciating man's use of reason, but that he errors in accepting critical 
philosophy as the sole criterion in such a matter.
It could be noted here that Ritschl, even with his departure from 
critical philosophy, still failed to take history seriously. Some writers 
claim that for him 'meaning* is imposed upon reality. Philip Hefner makes 
a good case for this in his book. Faith and the Vitalities of History 
(Harper 1 Row Publishers, New ïork, 1960^) » ne writes, "I am suggesting 
that Ritschl's theological vmrk is beset by incongruities which under­
mine his own intention to permit history to shape the content and strategy 
of that work. This incongruity arises from his inability to permit history 
to permeate his theological methodology as a factor which in its own in­
tegrity is 7/or-bhy to function normatively."(p. 98). He suggests that 
Pannehberg shows, of recent theologians, the most promise in this matter.
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Enough has been said to show that the premise of Brunner's 
ethical position could come from various sources, V/e have mentioned 
only two, the doctrine of sin and critical philosophy. Either source 
could be submitted as the possible groundwork for his position,
For our purposes, we will concentrate on another facet of Brunner's 
thought. Although not unrelated to the above suggestions, it is dis­
tinctive enough to warrant serious reflection on its own. It will be 
suggested that the weaknesses of Brunner's ethic (lack of 'meaningful* 
community and presence of determinism) can be attributed to the manner 
in which he conceives the God of faith. This can be a relevant area 
of discussion, not only because the question of God is a timely one 
in the theological scene, but, more importantly, it is in this area 
that Brunner looked for a solution to the ethical separation of 'is* 
and 'ought*. He thinlcs that it is in this area of theology, that is, 
in relation to our concept of God and how God is revealed in Jesus, 
that our social thinking is shaped. In speaidLng, for example, of the 
relationship between the Father and the Son, or more specifically, of 
the difference between them, he writes, "If we take this idea seriously, 
we find that this leads to conclusions which are of the greatest
practical significance, even for our attitude towards social and ethical 
29questions," While agreeing with Brunner in this statement, a critical
29Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatic Vol. I, p. 229.
It would be safe to say that the doctrine of God is fundamental to the 
ethical thinking of both Brunner and Pannenberg. Pannehberg writes of 
its relevance in this way: "Christian ethical failure is closely re­
lated to a misunderstanding of the doctrine of God." (Theology and the 
Kingdom of God, p. 112), One cannot deal with the doctrine of God in 
a general way within the limits and objectives of this thesis. It is 
necessary to confine the research to the two men in question. At the 
same time, it could be stated that both men represent two important 
trends present in theology, Brunner has much in common with Barth,
Bultmann and Bonhoeffor while Pannenberg shows some similarity to the 
thought of Teilhard do Chardin and V/hitehead, Thus, a detailed exam­
ination of these two men will encompass, by implication, a much wider 
field of thought.
While stating this, it is the conviction of the writer, that Pannenberg
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analysis will be made of the particular concept of God he presents.
In beginning the analysis, let us again state that for Brunner
there is a radical separation of value and existence on the plane
of history. Historical reality cannot offer man any areas of value
in terms of the 'meaning* of human existence. Natural morality is
rendered meaningless by its inevitable division into naturalism and
idealism. This is the lasting state of man's natural life as Bnmner
describes it for us. The question that is directed toward us now and
which must be explored throughout the rest of this dissertation is:
How do we escape from the state of alienation which rests at the heart 
30
of ethical life? In the response made by Brunner to this question
can be seen the source of his problem. In essence the response can be
seen in the following excerpt from The Divine Imperative:
If then it is impossible to solve the problem 
of ethics within the sphere of Ijnmanental ethics 
based on reason, because irreconcilable anti­
thesis are continually and inevitably re­
appearing, we may put the final question: Can 
religion solve the ethical problem?,.what we 
mean here is a real religion of revelation.
( continued) offers something very unique in his doctrine of 
God, With his understanding, he leads us into exciting and promising 
avenues of thought for the social and ethical life of man. It was this 
promise that determined our choice of him. While sharing the same 
ethical concern of Brunner, that of relating the individual to the 
community, he deals with the question in a manner that assures the 
recognition of both. In his conception of God, he offers us an onto­
logical basis with liberating and creative social ramifications.
The question of individuation and participation is taken up with the 
protection, limitation and justification of each, Brunner's under­
standing of God, on the other hand, has within it an ontology that 
leads to the criticisms directed toward him in the first chapter.
This will be elaborated as we proceed,
30In Pannenberg, the separation of 'is* and 'ought' is natural 
to existence apart from sin. There is, of course, an all important 
identity that he speaks of, as well. With Brunner, given his doctrine 
of God, there is difficulty in seeing how any identity can be claimed.
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in which God confronts the human "I" as 
"Thou", in which man does not dispose of 
the divine truth, but receives it in an 
act of self“Communication on the part of 
God, and in which this act of communica­
tion is not the same as the deepest act 
of self-reflection but an event, in which 
from beyond human possibilities God Him­
self discloses Himself to man.^ ^
Can we, Brunner is asking in the above, solve the ethical
question by removing the fact-value dilemma in God for the individual?
Can we obliterate the dilemma of *is-ought' for the individual, by
excluding it in the communication of God to man? In other words,
can it be excluded in God Himself, for God communicates nothing in
32his revelation but Himself? Brunner answers this question in the 
affirmative.
The Christian faith ought to give an answer 
to this question. If it is certain that in 
the revelation given to it it does possess 
the truth, not a truth, the truth which is 
given by God, and not merely a truth which 
has been discovered by man, through tiio 
processes of knowledge, that it possesses 
absolute and not relative truth, then surely 
this certainty includes an affirmative answer 
to that particular question.33
Thus, the antithesis Brunner sees at the centre of life is removed
in God, This is so, he says, in such a way that the individual is
taken seriously yet not at the cost of the community, and the community
is taken seriously yet not at the cost of the individual,'^ ^
31Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p, 50*
32
See Chapter four in Brunner's The Christian Doctrine of God,
Dogmatics Volume I.
■^^runner. The Divine Imperative, p, 51o 
^hbid., p. 51.
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This last claim of Brunner will be held in serious question
as the implications of his doctrine of God lead in another direction.
It was suggested in the opening chapter that Brunner's thought when
analysed does not protect the significance of the community. Rather,
its position becomes inconsequential to the personal 'meaning' of the
individual's life. It was seen, at the same time, that there is a
determinism in Brunner to a degree that destroys human freedom. This
is indicated by the statement, "The Good consists in always doing what 
35God wills..." Thus, in actual fact both the individual and the 
community fail to receive the necessary significance to guarantee 
personal existence. Our claim is that these things are so basically 
because of his understanding of God.
What are the consequences of Brunner's suggestion that the fact- 
value or is-ought dilemma is removed for the individual in God? What 
does this suggestion infer about the nature of God Himself? Let it 
be noted at this point, we did not say fact and value or is and ought 
are joined in God for the individual. This suggestion will be dealt 
with later as it is in opposition to our interpretation of Brunner.
It is important that clarity be established on this point.
Two things emerge from Brunner's proposed solution to our ethical 
dilemma. They are both related to his concept of God and directly 
effect the social and ethical position of man's life: (l) God is 
timeless and (2) God exists. Let us deal with these in turn as they 
are vitally important to what follows in the thesis.
^^Ibid., p. 229,
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(B) God as Timeless
It was suggested that Brunner granted little significance to 
the structures of community. In his search for meaning, man's par­
ticipation in the events of life was not stressed as vital or essential. 
In the discussion that is to follow, these observations have a great 
deal of Djsport.
Significant community exists for man only when it is given a 
degree of participation, high or low, in the essence of human life.
That is to say, only where the facts of life are accorded value in 
sufficient degree are we able to look upon community as important, 
Experientially, this is an aspect of everyday life. Fact and value 
are actually joined for man in society* That community has meaning 
is, thus, an accepted fact common to life. There are institutions, 
such as the family, which are regarded as institutional values. From 
them what ought to be the case can, to a degree, be derived. In this 
sense, fact and value are joined,The community structure has
^^John R. Searle in an article, 'How to Derive 'Ought' From 'Is*' 
(Philosophical Review, Vol. 73> 1964, pp. 43“38), points out that the 
Linguistic analyst fails to make note of the distinction between brute 
fact and institutional fact, 'Smith made a promise', for example, is 
a much different statement than 'James is six feet tali', The former 
is made within, and contains meaning and significance only within a 
certain institution, the institution of promise. The latter statement 
is made outside the context of an institution. Searle's purpose was 
to show that it is not illogical to derive an 'ought* from an 'is'.
The significance of his argument, however, is just as important for 
another implication. A great deal of life is lived out in a contextual 
atmosphere, without which the individual would not have any meaning, 
Searle was prepared to concede the existence of brute fact to a certain 
extent. It is higiily questionable, however, whether any statement of 
fact can be called 'brute' in any sense. Even tne statement 'James is 
six feet tali' is uttered with some purpose in mind.
A contribution of Hegel's thought is that he refused to accept the 
fact-value separation of Kant's system. This was so, says W. H. Walsh 
(Hegelian Ethics (St. Martin's Press, He?/ ïork, I969), p. 1-7), not on 
logical grounds but because it was morally intolerable. He was opposed 
to the Kantian outlook which made the morally valuable and the 'ever­
lasting ought to be' separate from the facts of life, Hegel's aim, he 
says, was to point out the interrelatedness of all existence. He did 
not deny that the individual exists, but he did deny tliat the individual 
was complete within himself. He sought to bridge the gap of fact and 
value by stressing tne social environment in which man lives and pointing 
out that morality is embodied in institutions (Seaide's suggestion above),
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meaning because value has location and extension in time, in the facts 
of ordinary experience. If such identity were absolute, then individ­
uality and contingency would be denied to life. If fact and value are 
inseparable, or are made to appear so, there can be no basis for indiv­
iduality as man is then determined in life simply by that which exists 
around him. He remains enthralled, as it were, by that which surrounds 
him. However, it is not our intention to give identity absolute place.
The only implication intended is that there is some sense in which 
fact and value are united in time. One might go on to say that this 
is a necessary condition if there is to be unity and duration of existence 
which we normally associate with community.
In theological ethics  ^this means that if community is to be given 
an essential place in life; that is, if the fact-value nexus is to be 
defended, then God must be thought of in such a manner as to commit 
man to this understanding. In other words, God must be thought of in 
essential relationship to the facts of existence or time. Only then can 
the 'Good' have a basis in fact. This means one thing is ruled out from 
the beginning, God must not be thought of as timeless.
It is necessary to deal with this point at some length, for it is 
vital to the rest of our argument. If God is timeless, then there follows 
the consequences for community indicated above. It is precisely this 
timelessness that is implied in Brunner's doctrine of God, It is
suggested in his proposed solution for man's ethical dilemma, Brunner
37at no point in his writings boldly states, as with Schleiermacher, 
that God is timeless. Nevertheless, it is implicit enough in his 
thought, for a case to be made against him.
^^Bee Nelson Pilce, God and Timelessness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1970), pp. 6ff,
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38In his hook, God and Timelossness, Nelson Pike says that 
the concept of God as timeless involves two basic thingsi' one, God 
has no duration in time, or no extension in temporality, and two,
God has no location in time. The two qualities, location and ex­
tension, imply each other in Pilce's estimation. For purposes of 
discussion, however, he has separated them. Clearly, Pike has given 
us the presuppositions for any talk of God in or out of time. When 
one applies his criteria to Brunner, the timclessness of his God 
concept is evident.
That Brunner grants God no location or extension in time can 
be verified in the following way. For his proposed solution to the
ethical dilemma of life, Brunner turns to religion. More specifically,
39man is removed from the dilemma in God who communicates. Himself.
To return to a point alluded to earlierit is significant that 
Brunner does not say fact and value are united for the individual 
in God. This is something to which Bi-unner would not concede. To 
say, unqualifiedly, that fact and value are united in God would 
suggest God is present as an existing being in time. Consequentially, 
this would give God duration in time. Nelson Pilce draws his reader's 
attention to this when he writes: "If at each moment between three 
o'clock and four o'clock one could say, truly, that God exists now 
(i.e., at this moment), it would then follow that God exists at each 
moment between three o'clock and four o'clock. This would entail
p. 7. 
39In his book, Christianity and Civilization, Vol. I, pp. 34ff 
Brunner again states his solution to man's ethical situation. He says 
the truth of God has nothing to do with either subject or object but is 
beyond both. In God, that is, subject and object or fact and value are 
removed for the individual, (p. 35). (Also see Bixinner, Truth as Encounter, 
trans, lunanduo V/. Loos (SCM Press Ltd., London, 1964), p. 857'.
^%efer to p. 68 of this theams,
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that the life of God has duration; for what is it to have duration 
if it is not to exist at each moment in a temporally extended interval?
Clearly, this is an understanding one would not draw from Brunner's
concept of God, He does not want to associate God, in any manner,
with the time process. In this connection, for example, Brunner writes,
"....God is not Himself involved in the Time p r oc e ss . He  continues
to write of the nature of God, "The question of the temporal or the
non-temporal cannot touch the divine Nature, The most we could say
would be to speak of God as above time...."^^ Thus, it is possible to
say that the nature of God is immutable for Brunner. God in his nature
cannot change. It follov/s if God is such that he cannot change, that
is, if he is immutable, then he cannot have any essential relation to
time. He can have neither extension nor location in time. Again I
turn to Pike for support of this reasoning.
Assume for the moment that if a given individual 
has location in time, it would at least be con­
sistent to say that that individual persists
for more than one moment. Further,..if it is 
consistent to say that a given individual per­
sists for more than one moment in time, it is 
consistent.....to say that that individual under­
goes change. Under these two assumptions, if a 
given individual is such that it is logically 
impossible for that individual to undergo change 
(i.e., if a given individual is immutable,,..) 
then that individual is such that it is logically
Pilce, God and Timelessness, p. 12.
^ B^runner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I,
p. 270.
^^Ibid., p. 270. Brunner is doubtful of the idea that fact and
value are united in God, The danger of pantheism is present with such 
an idea. He writes, "A connection between the "ought" and the "is", 
between law and life, is only possible by means of a pantheistic 
speculation v/hich is suspect alike on ethical and philsosphical grounds," 
(Brunner, God and Kan, trans, David Cairns (SCM Press, London, 1936),
p. 33).
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imposBible for it to exist for more than one 
moment in time,,,,and if a given individual is 
such that it is logically impossible for it to 
exist at more than one moment in time, then it 
is also such that it would logically impossible 
for it to have location in time ^
If God can have no location in time, then at no point or to no 
degree can it be said fact and value are united in God, Thus community, 
theologically speaking, has no grounds for significance. This is 
assuming, of course, that community can have 'meaning* only if the 
facts of existence have some degree of essential value, A case can 
be made for this, theologically, only by conceiving God, in his essence, 
as related to time and the time process, Brunner has not done this.
Since this is so important in the whole discussion of man's par­
ticipation in society, it is necessary to substantiate our findings 
from other statements in Bininner's writings. That God has an aspect 
of timelessness in his nature is implied throughout his works, in 
spite of his inconsistencies.
The suggestion that God is timeless for Brunner is meant to 
convey the thought that in no earthly event is God 'meaningfully' 
present. Or to restate it, the 'Good* is not a possibility within 
history. This is so, regardless of the distinction he makes between
45special and general revelation or natural grace and grace of redemption.
He is prepared to grant God a presence in the world with this distinction. 
It is even a presence which is observable by looking at the world, God, 
after all, created everything and left his imprint on creation. As
^''Pike, God and Timelessness, p. 43*
45See Brunner's, The Christian Doctrine of Création and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, pp, 154ff@ See also the first chapter of The Mediator,
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Brunner expresses it, "God has given the world its "orders", and it 
is precisely in these orders that He constantly reveals His Creator- 
Spirit, and His Power as Creator,....This constancy of the order of 
Nature, and of the foms of Nature, is the expression of the divine 
will, of the limitations imposed by God, and of the divine faithful­
ness,"^^
The separation of revelation into special and general categories 
does not nullify the interpretation of Brunner thus far. Natural 
grace or general revelation is not personal. It is not 'meaningful*. 
There is no saving truth within general revelation. When dealing with 
the 'orders', in the first chapter, the impersonal, mechanical quality 
of their nature was emphasised. The 'orders’, for Brunner, are within 
the general revelation of God, Thus, the understanding that God's 
nature is without time is applicable.
It must be admitted that Brunner has a logical problem before 
him arising from his treatment of the 'ord.ers' and general revelation. 
As stated earlier, Bruimer will not accept any notion of the par­
ticipation of God's essential nature in time. The location and 
extension of God in time, we reasoned, would be against his convic­
tion, This is where the problem arises, Pilce has shown us the im­
possibility of speaking of God's creation without involving Him 
essentially in time. To create is to have location in time,^^ Perhaps 
it was this realization that made Brunner speak of creation without a 
beginning or an end. Chronological time is not part of Brunner's 
understanding of creation. Creation is, rather, a statement defining
runner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, p, 152,
^^Pilce, God and Timelessness, p. II7,
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human existence^’^ and not something related to a before or an after* 
This could also be the reason why Brunner speaks more of God's pre­
servation of the world than his creation of it. The former might 
avoid the association of God and time. From deeper analysis, however, 
it is impossible to speak either of preserving or supporting the world 
without relating God essentially to time. Pike has pointed out again
that ta11c of preservation fairs no betrer than the doctrine of creation 
49itself. He uses the illustration of the sea. supporting the ship.
One cannot talk of such support in a timeless sense, that is, without 
temporal extension. To maintain the non-involvement of God with time, 
as Brunner wishes to do, one would have to speak of God's supporting 
and preserving powers in an a-temporal sense. And this logically 
cannot be done.
To return to the topic at hand, there is further support for the
concept of God as timeless in Brunner's favorite expression of God as
50
'Absolute Subject*, This is an expression which only leads Brunner 
more deeply into the position for which we criticise him. In relation­
ship with God, he says, man does not enter into relationship with fact, 
or with something. He writes:
We understand that when God speaks with me 
the relation to a "something" stops in an 
unconditional sense, not simply in a con­
ditional sense as in an ordinary human 
encounter. When I stand opposite to God,
I am face-to-face with hjjii who uncondition? 
ally is no "something," who in the uncon­
ditional sense is pure "Thou," Therefore
^^Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption. 
Dogmatics Vol. II, p, 8,
k 9Pike, God and Timelessness, p. 117,
^%runner. The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I, p. 14,
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I have nothing to "thinlc"; that is to 
say, I have nothing spontaneously to 
disclose. He alone is Discloser, In 
this relation of facing one another, 
not only that "which" is opposite 
becomes something other - a Thou in­
stead of a something - but the entire r. 
relation undergoes a fundamental change,,,
God is, thus, beyond any kind of objectivity in terms of our world;
He is 'only Subject*, Brunner continues to v/rite;
The idea of God of faith is only gained in 
the sphere of faith, not in that of meta­
physical, neutral thinking, which only pro­
duces neutral "objective" results. True 
theological thought should never leave the 
dimension of revelation, the "I-Thou" re­
lation, in order to pass into the dimension 
of the "It". Since thinking about God con­
tinually leads theologians to slip into the 
tendency to regard Him as an object, they 
need continually to reverse this tendency by 
moving back to the original situation: 
revelation-faith. True theology, therefore, 
must not only begin with the knowledge of 
God as the absolute Subject; its one, its 
sole task, is to make this c l e a r , 32
The importance Brunner attributes to the Subjectivity of God 
in maintaining His Sovereignty and Lordship over time, can be defended,
51Brunner, Truth as Encounter, p, 115.
Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I, p. 141, 
Brunner would find much difficulty with Ian Ramsey's talk of cosmic 
disclosure as providing a "basis in fact" for all our theological 
assertions ('Talking About God; Models, Ancient and Modern* (Philosophy 
Today, No, 2, (The Macmillan Company, London, I969), pp. 155-1T97)»
"I would cladm", writes Ramsey, "that it is quite clear that cosmic 
disclosures are ontologically privileged in so far as they disclose 
that which confronts us as basic "given," that v/hich is set over 
against ourselves in every situation of this kind, that which individ­
uates the Universe." (p. I67). Similarly, Gordon Kaufman, in speaking 
of the meaning of God, refers to the experiential limit of life which 
reminds one of the One v/ho limits man ('On tne Meaning of "God": 
Transcendence V'ithout Mythology* (New Theology, No. 4), p. 74). From 
an ontio analysis, that is, a description of the kinds of experiences 
human beings enjoy in the world, v/e can gather fact, or 'disclosures'. 
In Ramsey's terminology, they have an objective content and lead the 
experient to talk about God.
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If this were the sole intention of his expression, there would he 
little debate with him. To make God subject to anything would be 
an infringement on his Lord.ship and Sovereignty, without which God 
would not be God, At least, this is the traditional understanding 
of the word God, Any attempt Brunner makes to protect this under­
standing receives this writer’s support.
Clearly, however, Brunner wants to make more of the expression 
than this. With it, he wishes to proclaim as well the absolute 
Subjectivity of God, in the sense that there is no objectivity in his 
nature. And it is to this intention that exception is taken. The 
reality of God would lose its intelligibility to modern man in the 
process. There would be no purpose to any discussion of God in
'fact*. Philosophical inquiry about the truth of life would be made,
53of course, irrelevant and impossible. But v/hat is more important 
in our debate with Brunner, community would be relegated to a minor 
role in the meaning of the 'self*. The 'Good* would have no objective 
reference,
Biunner's thinlcing, at this point, is not unlike that of Martin 
Buber, And this is understandable since he had a great deal of 
respect for him, Buber*s influence on the theologian cannot be
53George Schrader made this criticism of Brunner when he wrote,
"It is meritorious to insist upon the transcendence of God and the 
uniqueness of faith and revelation. But it is unfortunate if this 
emphasis either makes God irrelevant to the world or introduces a 
bifurcation between the God of philosophy and ordinary experience 
and the God of Faith, If that occurs, the transcendence of God is 
maintained at the cost of His reality, and the purity of faith at 
the price of its intelligibility," ('Brunner's Conception of Philosophy* 
(The Theology of Emil Brunner, ed, Charles V/, Kegley (The Macmillan 
Company, New ïork, 19627, pp, 111-133)).
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54denied, Buber's understanding of God as pure "Thou", to whom nothing 
of the "It" world can be ascribed, was probably influential in the 
development of Brunner's whole doctrine of God and, as well, his thouglit 
of man. For Buber, God transcended the object-subject antithesis of
^^3runner admits to this influence himself (of, Kegley, The Theology 
of Emil Brunner, p, 11), Certainly the similarity of Brunner with 
Buber's personalism can be seen in the former's understanding of the 
'self* (for a consideration of the influence of personalistic philosophy 
on the thought of Brunner, see an article by Paul K, Jewett, 'Ebnerian 
Personalism and Its Influence upon Brunner's Theology* (Westminster 
Theological Jounial, Vol. XIV, No, 2, May 1952), p, 113ff7)V " 
discussion of the self will be reserved for the last chapter. There, 
the ramifications of both Brunner's and Pannenberg's thought will be 
elaborated on. The difference between them will be stressed. It is 
a difference expressed in the following: "Brunner sought support in 
the arguments of the personalistic anthropology of Buber and Ebner, 
but their thesis, which was also adopted by Gogarten, that the human 
"I" is unthinkable without a "thou", and is ultimately constituted not 
by the "thou" of our fellow men, but by the absolute "thou" of God, 
depends upon separating personal I-Thou relationships from the practical 
concerns of the human experience of the world,..." (Pannenberg, The Idea 
of God and Human Freedom, p, 89),
Unless objectivity may be spoken of in reference to God then 
community and the practical concerns of life will remain separated 
from the personal. Our suggestion with Pannenberg, will be to take 
the subjective-objective dichotomy up into God, while making God 
sovereign over it. Only in this way, can we hope to show how the 
community of man has value. Only in this manner, can it be thought 
of as personal,
George Schrader criticises Brunner for thinking of God without 
objectivity. His thoughts are woidh repeating in this context. He 
writes, "It is I thinlc, both bad theology and bad metaphysics to 
maintain that God is pure subject. The notion of a subject is surely 
a philosophical concept which has been assimilated by theology, or if 
you prefer, even as it may have been independently developed by theology. 
We need not claim that we know God perfectly, either on the basis of 
natural Imowledge or revelation. But if we are to talk or think meaning­
fully about God at all, we must reflect on v/hat we mean or can mean in 
referring to God as a Subject, Could He, for example, be in any sense 
a subject unless He were self-related, unless He were a self? And if 
He is an object to Himself and necessarily so, how does this in any way 
militate against the possibility of Icnowing Him as an object? In other 
words, in Icnov/ing Him as an object might we not in some way know Him 
as self and, even as a subject? Moreover, if God is related to the 
created world and to finite persons, must He not reflect this related­
ness in Himself? Is not the creation some sonb of expression of God 
in objective form and, if He is a living God v/ho is present to His 
creation, does this not entail that God is more than pure Subject?"
(The Theology of Emil Brumier, p, 126),
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the natural world and could never be thought of with any notion
of objectivity. This is pointed out very well in Paul Pfuetze's
interpretation of Buber, In his following statement a strong
resemblance to Brunner can be seen.
There is however, says Buber, one Thou which 
can never become an It, the eternal Thou, or 
God. Though we speak of God as He, the true 
meaning of His approach to man and His "address" 
to man is found only in the sense of the re­
lation of an I^  and a Thou, God lets himself 
be spoken to personally, and speaks only to 
persons, God, by his nature, never ceases to 
be Thou for us. He who Icnows God may at times 
know remoteness from God and the pain and 
barrenness of the tormented heart; but he does 
not icnow the absence of God: it is only man 
who is not always.faithful to the truth of 
meeting with the Thou, Vie cannot, declares 
Buber, define or measure or use God, God 
cannot be expressed: He can only be addressed,
Pfuetze continues to write the following words in reference to Buber,
Not only does the Thou-world transcend math- 
eraatical time to endure in presentness; it is 
also not set in the context of Space, In the 
Thou, both space and time fade in the back­
ground, I do not meet my Thou in some time 
and place, I can, of course, place him in 
time and space; indeed, I continually do just 
that. But each time I do it, I transform our 
person-to-person relation into an understood 
connection. I do violence to the truth of the 
meeting with Thou, The context of the Thou- 
world is the center, "where the extended lines 
of relation meet - in the eternal Thou."36
^^Paul Pfuetze, Self, Society, Existence (Harper & Brothers, New xork, 
1961), p. MA.
 ^Ibid., p. 155. See pp, 216-217 for Pfuetze's OT/n criticism of
Buber’s thought on the pure subjectivity or pure ’Thouness’ of God, H. D, 
Lewis, commenting on Buber (and again this could apply equally to Brunner) 
writes, "It has often been urged by myself among others, that there can 
be no mere encounter. This seems certainly true in our ordinary dealings 
with each other. How can I encounter anyone unless I knovj something about 
him? In like manner religious life, at least all but the most incipient, 
has some filling or content obtained from some experience of God or 
divine disclosure. Religion is not just the sense of the being of God,
It contains more precise beliefs about v/hat God is like, how He deals 
with us and how we experience Him, what He requires of us and so forth, 
Some account must be given of this and the way it is warranted, Y/e 
cannot just cry 'Encounter*, and dodge the issue." ('The Elusive Self 
and the I-Thou Relation* (Talk of God), p, 179).
"SO—
From the discussion, thus far, the case we are making against
Brunner, with regard to God and time, should he evident. With him,
57the concepts remain mutually exclusive. The consequences for 
man's community remain as stated.
To add further support to our analysis, however, focus may he 
directed toward Biunner's thought on the nature of time, A few 
pages will be devoted to this consideration, as the relation of 
God to time (time and eternity) is vital to the discussion through­
out this work.
It is sometimes difficult to tell whether the exclusiveness of 
God and time in Brunner is because of the manner in which he conceives 
God or because of his negativity of time itself, Which comes first 
could be a matter of debate, \Ye have chosen to argue from the stand­
point of his God concept. Nevertheless, an investigation of his 
thought on time will support our contention that a timelessness is 
present in his idea of God,
57In one place Brunner states categorically that there is no 
essential relationship between Jesus Christ and the structures of 
community. He writes, "Y/here the State or the Family are mentioned,,, 
the Nev/ Testament does not speak of Christ, as ruling through His Word 
of reconciliation, but simply of the "ordinances of God"," (The Christian 
Doctrine of Creation and Hedemntion, Dogmatics Vol, II, p. 8)T In a 
similar way, Brunner writes, "at first sight, however, the idea that 
God's "metaphysical" Being is not only "God as He is in Himself" (Subject), 
but also God as He is "For-us", is objectionable, because it seems to 
suggest that such a relation of Goa to His creation should be reckoned an 
integral part of the Nature of God, which, indeed, is unthinkable,"
(The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol, I, p, 193). One can under­
stand Brunner's objection to correlating Christ completely with community. 
Hov/ever, it is a matter of debate v/hether Visser't Hooft, whom he refers 
to, implied the strict directness of relationship that Binnmer assumes for 
hjjn when he writes, ",.,it is sul'ficient to ioiow the Gospel of Jesus, the 
Saviour, in order to lay down norms of conduct for the State, education, 
law, culture, oo" (Tne Christian Doctrine of Creation and Eedej/iDtion, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, p, 320j, hnile agreeing tnat a, scrrct correlation is 
not defensible, we do not agree to the total absence of correlation, as 
with Brunner.
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Time, for Brunner, is a reality, characterized by inevitable waste­
fulness, It is, thus, not a level of reality to be classified as per­
sonal, Human activity in time has about it, it is true, a certain 
measure of purpose. This was seen in the preserving and manipulating 
functions of the orders of creation, which are time bound. There is 
as stated, however, nothing essentially important about this. Thus 
the valuelessness of time is, in actual fact, the real significant 
thing emerging from contemplation of the orders.
As we suggested, truth is concerned with the wholeness of life 
in Brunner's writings. Time, being a fleeting experience is dis­
associated from wholeness. The 'primal experience of the time- 
factor* can best be summed up in the words, 'time passes away,*
"Everyone Imows", writes Brunner, "that the moment which was just now 
and is now gone never more returns,.Precisely this feature, the 
character of the one-way street, this time-form which is different 
from space by the fact of its linearity and irreversibility, is "the 
deepest source of the world's s o r r o w " , T h i s  is the reason for 
Brunner's hostility to any thought of Utopia or progress on the plane 
of £rofane hist o r y , The contingencies that would precede such a
^^runner. Eternal Hope, p. 45.
^^Ibid., p, 45.
runner makes a distinction between profane history and proper 
histoiy. Profane history is the level of historical reality in which 
we all participate. Proper history is history from God, Time, in 
which v/e participate, has no essential relationship with the latter 
(of, Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, trans. A, J, D, Parrer and B. 
L, Wolf (Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd,, London, 1957), PP. 123ff.)#
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goal in history would never participate in the end result. He 
writes;
This belief in meaning which made intelligible 
both the individual and the whole has been 
dissolved by the rationalistic faith in progress, 
by hope based on self-security. But this attri­
bution of meaning, as we have already seen, v/as 
only possible by a sort of forgetfulness. For 
what sort of meaning could the progress of 
humanity give to m^y life, the life of the indiv­
idual man? The individual had, as it were, in 
order to attribute meaning to history, to re­
sign meaning for himself in favour of a mean­
ing for humanity as a whole. For no doubt a 
vaguely conceived humanity in the remote future 
might well share in the goal of progress, but 
not he, the individual man, of to-day. Humanity 
must, as it were, form a pyramid where each 
generation would climb higher than its predecessors 
until the last, climbing over all the others, 
reached the top,6l
This writer sympathises with Brunner's suspicion of Utopian
ideals. It is our conviction, as well, that complete wholeness
(truth) cannot be attained within the scope of historical time.
However, Brunner's refusal to grant any measure, or appearance, of
wholeness to tijne is not accepted. The theme being developed in
this study will stress the participation of the individual in an
'anticipated* wholeness of time. This is an idea taken from
Pannenberg which has immense social and ethical relevance,
Brunner's scepticism of man's progressive development stems
from his negative attitude toward time rather than, as with
Pannenberg, the thouglit of life's incompleteness on the plane of
history. There is no sense in which wholeness may be experienced
in time, as time continually falls away from itself in wastefulness.
Brunner, Eternal Hone, pp, 82-83,
' III I I ... **• A
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Meaning or wholeness J, for Brunner, is found only above time. It
is above profane history, in another realm where God is present
and existing as love. To illustrate this point, the following
statement is cited;
Christian faith knows nothing of any history 
of the world in the sense of a unity. Its 
unity is not historical, but that Y/hich 
belongs at once to "Urgeschichte"..,It is 
not the course of history as such that is 
of interest,.Rather what is of interest 
is the lightening-flash in history of what 
lies behind history, the effective self- 
assertion of a factor that by its very 
nature does away with history, viz, the 
reality of divine revelation.
Brunner's depreciation of historical time here is not unlike
63
the attitude expressed by modern nihilism. His description of 
historical reality, apart from the Christian faith is expressed in 
a way that is very nihilistic in character. His denial of any 
purposeful role (meaning) to secular morality and ethics, is indic­
ative of this. At one point in Brunner's earlier writings, he dares 
to suggest that outside the Christian faith there is little that can 
help man in distinguishing good from evil. In reference to Nietzsche 
and Hitler, he says there is no reason why ethics, left to itself, 
should not turn out to be similar to that of the totalitarian 
dictators, "Nietzsche, Hitler and Mussoline," he writes, "have
runner. The Philosophy of Religion, p, 126.
/ X
By nihilism is meant that philosophy of existence which 
stresses the questionableness of all things; there are no answers. 
The questionableness of life is in itself not nihilistic. It is 
rather, the acceptance of questionableness as the final verdict 
of all things. If no answer can be given to anything, the result 
is that spoken of by Albert Camus in The Rebel; ",..,the hopeless 
ga-p between the question of man and the silence of the universe." 
(Vintage Books, New Xork, 1956, p, 9).
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done humanity the great service of making it plain what nature is 
like left to itself
Brunner is suggesting by his picture of time as inevitable 
wastefulness, that facts of history, being without value, can be 
given any value. Facts are of no account in the evaluation of the 
truth of life. The inference is that facts of history are 'bîrute* 
(without value) in character. They cannot be interpreted unless 
one recognizes the extreme subjectivity in doing so,
Brunner was, undoubtedly, influenced in this attitude by the 
nineteenth century historiography present in his time. With his 
acceptance of the depreciation of existence in Kant, it would not 
have been difficult for him to concur with this particular histor­
ical-critical study prévalant during his earlier scholarship. The 
positivisitic assumptions of such study were in ho,rmony with his
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own intentions.
Nineteenth century historiography, which made its most 
vigorous contact with the Christian faith in the critical-historical 
study of the scriptures, operated on the premise that value had no 
relation to fact, R, G, Collingwood in his book. The Idea of History,
runner, Glaube und Ethik, p. 12,
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David Hume is considered by some to be the father of this 
historical positivism. He undercut the rational principles of 
Enlightenment philosophy with an epistemological scepticism,
Tillich points out tnat what Hume did for England, Kant accomplished 
on the continent; he destroyed the natural, rational, foundations for 
belief in God, leaving the natural world void of any moral and religious 
valuation, Tillich says that Kant imprisoned man in his finitude with­
out any way of escape. In this way, he represents the attitude of 
Protestantism, Kan was left with the facts of historical existence 
emptied of meaning (cf, Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th 
Century Prot-estant Theology (SCM Press Ltd,, London, 19o7) P. o4ff,),
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writes about this premise in a way that is helpful. He says the 
nineteenth century historian accepted two rules in the treatment 
of the facts of history:
(i)Each fact was to be regarded as a thing
capable of being ascertained by a separate
act of cognition or process of research, and 
thus the total field of the historically 
Imowable was cut up into an infinity of 
minute facts each to be separately considered,
(ii)dach fact was to be thougJit of not only as 
independent of all the rest but as independent 
of the knower, so that all subjective elements 
(as they were called) in the historian’s point 
of view had to be eliminated. The historian 
must pass no judgement on the facts: he must 
only say what they w e r e , 60
The positive contribution made by the historical-critical method
of the nineteenth century historian is not questioned. Through their
persistence they helped to point out the fallacy of verbal inspiration
in relation to the scriptures. The questionableness of authorship
and of the scientific premises under which certain books of the
bible were written were brought into the open. Many of the traditional
views of the orthodox Christian faith were rightly challenged, Brunner
recognized the value and authority of this research in these words,
",,,,the church,,,has had to renounce many "historical facts" hallowed
by tradition but not forming part of the substance of the faith, and
67
has had to recognise the claims of historical research,"
On this, one can agree with Brunner, The results of historical 
criticism cannot be disregarded without falling into the pitfalls of 
biblical fundamentalism. These are too numerous and too obvious to
G, Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1946), p, 131.
Emil Bruimer, Revelation and Reason, trans, Olive V/yon (SCM Press
Ltd,, London, 1947)g p. 283,
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mention at this point. However, it is possible to accept the fruits 
of such research without accepting the premise under which it was 
carried out, namely, historical positivism. In questioning the 
world-view of biblical times, the historical-critical method was 
itself tied to one just as deserving of criticism, Brunner, as well 
as other dialectical theologians of his time, failed to challenge 
this. Rather, he merely accepted it and established the claims of 
the Christian faith 'above', in another realm. It is this accept­
ance that is difficult to defend.
Nineteenth century historiography was concerned not so much 
with the denial of the essential facts of the Christian faith, such 
as the existence of Jesus and events of his life,^^as with the appli­
cation of meaning to them. History was regarded only as the compil­
ation and establishment of facts. And it was sufficient merely to 
discover and state them. However, no interpretation or judgement 
of them was permissible. This would violate their neutrality.
Thus, history became the disinterested, objective task of pinpointing 
facts on a time line of no significance. As stated, Brunner and 
other dialectical theologians endorsed this. If not directly, then 
indirectly by making no attempt to meet the historians on their own 
ground. He allowed them supreme reign on the question of the nature 
of historical fact. Faith was placed in a realm outside history and
68It should be noted that events such as the Resurrection and 
the Fall, by the very fact that they were unusual to natural events, 
were denied the qualification of history, David Hume's scepticism 
expressed in his Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles of i.'orals, ed, L, A. Selby-Bigge, becond 
Edition ^ Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1902, Sect, VIII, Part l) that, 
"Manlcind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history 
informs us of nothing new.,,,"(p. 83), remains the postulate of the 
historical-critical method.
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was thought of, at least by Brunner, as inunune to historical and 
scientific invasion. This is verified in some of his writings.
In a sense, Brunner does not deny the applicability of 
historical criticism to the Christian faith. At one point he writes, 
"If faith postulates as absolutely necessary certain historical 
facts which can be proved by historical science to be non-existent,
69then that faith is erroneous." With the next breath, however, 
Brunner can speak of faith as unconcerned with the relative know­
ledge gained from historical science, "Faith makes full allowances 
for the relative character of the formation of opinion which is 
effected by the process of historical research. It is faith in 
particular which sees more clearly than the majority of critics 
how very uncertain are all historical statements. It is precisely 
faith which does not take established results into account,
Brunner continues, "He (Brunner is referring to the believer) is 
always ready to compare his judgements of faith about the realm 
of fact with the results of science, but he knows beforehand that,
,...science may indeed assault his faith, but can never really 
71refute it." The'beforehand* of Brunner's statement separates
runner. The Mediator, p, I66,
^^Ibid., p. 169,
71Ibid., p. 170, Pannenberg says such escape to another realm 
•above* history, as we suggested of Brunner, v/as typical, as well, of 
the existentialism of Bultmann and the pre-history of Barth, He writes, 
"Their common starting point is to be seen in the fact that critical- 
historical investigation as the scientific verification of events did not 
seem to leave any more room for redemptive events. Therefore the theology 
of redemptive history fled into a harbour supposedly safe from the critical- 
historical flood tide, the harbour of a suprahisrory - or with Barth, of 
pre-history. For the same reason the theology of existence withdrew from 
the meaningless and godless course of "objective" history to the experience 
of the significance of history in the "historicity" of the individual," 
(Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, po I6),
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the realm of faith from the realm of fact. Faith is left in the 
precarious position of having no factual foundation. Thus, God 
gives 'meaning' to life a-temporally. With this thought, the 
significance of community is seriously weakened,
(C) God as Existing
In the proceeding section, it was suggested that the weakness 
of Bnanner's concept of community rested in the timelessness at the 
heart of his doctrine of God, In this section the other major weak­
ness of his ethics, the presence of determinism, will be investigated. 
Such a thought is contrary to the freedom and individuality of life 
and, thus, must be challenged. Again, this challenge can come best 
by analysing the basis for this particular aspect of his ethical 
formulation. If the wealcness of community can be seen in his concept 
of God as 'timeless', then the denial of individuation with determinism, 
can be seen in the concept of God as 'existing*.
The two concepts, God as 'timeless* and God as 'existing' have 
much in common, in that God as 'timeless* implies an 'existing' being. 
Timelessness, as such, would logically entail the absence of any 
future reference. It would mean the completion or 'existence* of 
something* Without a future reference in the concept of God, it 
is difficult to escape the notion of an 'existing' being. The latter, 
it will be debated, has within it implications irreconcilable with 
human freedom and responsibility, God as 'existing', however, does 
not necessarily imply God as 'timeless'. This will be dealt with 
below.
To begin our investigation. A, D, Galloway's ai'ticle 'Fact and
72
Value in Theological Ethics' is helpful in focusing attention on
72A. D. Galloway, 'Fact and Value in Theological Ethics' (Religious 
Studies, Vol. 5, No, 2, December 19^9? PP* 172-178),
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the problem before us, Galloway writes of the enthralled positions 
in which humans live. He uses the word 'enthrallment' to refer to 
the fact-value nexus manifested in life's experience. In a son's 
relationship with his father, for example, a relationship may 
develop in which the son is enthralled with the father. That is, 
he patterns his life after him as much as possible. In this sit­
uation, the son does not grow emotionally and intellectually; he 
does not mature or exercise an individual expression necessary for 
maturation. The reason for this is that the father is regarded by 
the son as perfect and complete in all respects. In this sense, 
it would be proper to say the father 'exists' for the son. For 
the son, fact and value are absolutely joined in the father. And 
with this his freedom, which is a prerequisite for individuality 
and maturity, is eradicated by what is. The son reaches a stage 
of idolization in which his life can be said to be determined by that 
of the father. At this point, any relationship with the father would 
be static and restrained; value is seen to be present and complete 
in what is at hand,
Galloway makes the point that only when the child is able to 
break from the fact-value nexus, that is, see the father in a sense 
as non-existing, does he acquire the incentive for maturity and 
individuality. Only then can he have the freedom necessary for growth 
and change. It should be understood that Galloway is not saying there 
are no situations in which the fact-value nexus is proper and good, 
Galloway would be prepared to argue that the identity of fact and 
value, such as institutional values, is necessary and unavoidable in 
life.
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other important statements are made later in his article, 
however, which we hold in question, Vf hen he says the task of the 
present day moralist should be directed toward the separation of 
fact and value in ethics, there is no objection. But when he 
states that only in God is the fact-value nexus unassailable, it 
is difficult to agree, Man can worship, says Galloway, only because 
it is not possible to separate fact and value in God, The suggestion 
is made that such a separation would be tantamount to a limitation 
in God, Limitation, in turn, is contrary to the confession of His 
infinite goodness, mercy, wisdom, majesty and glory, He reasons 
that if anyone tried to accomplish the separation of fact and value 
in Godi
*,,,he would be failing to understand what 
the Word 'God' means or to grasp what those 
who talk about him most convincingly are 
getting at. He would have failed to re­
cognize the kind of thing that is being 
said when it is confessed that God is 
infinite in goodness, mercy, wisdom, majesty 
and glory, etc* He would have failed to 
perceive that to believe in God as God 
(at least in the Judao-Christian sense) 
entails the belief that there is no humanly 
attainable limit to the significance of God 
as the exemplar of flourishing. He would 
have failed to see why in this case, as 
distinct from the case of creatures, the 
temptation to abstract the principle of 
value from the fact and so attain release 
from enthralment is a temptation. He 
would fail to understand the part played 
in biblical mythology by the temptation 
'ye shall be as gods laiowing good and 
evil',73
The conclusion Galloway draws is that only in relationship to God 
is 'enthralment' lasting and absolute.
^hbid., p. 177.
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The motivation behind his reasoning is quite clear. He is 
rightly protecting the sovereignty and glory of God without which 
He would not be worthy of worship. For example, in commenting on 
the thought of Pannenberg he writes, "With good reason it has always 
been held in the Christian tradition that if God lacks some perfection 
yet to be developed then he is not truly God,"^ *^' The caution Galloway 
is making in this context is valid. At the same time, the question 
can be asked: Gan one speak of enthralment with God and maintain 
freedom and responsibility? In other words, is there not a deter­
minism present in such an argument?
In saying that the fact-value nexus is unassailable in God, is 
one not implying things similar to those of statements about human 
enthralment? In effect God would be complete in his essence and as 
such would have no new possibilities open for Him in His essence.
In other words, what is being said is that God ' e x i s t s ' , A n d  He 
'exists* for us, as the father in Galloway's illustration was said 
to 'exist' for the son, Y/here there is no future with respect to 
God's nature, one must say that God 'exists' and does so in 'fact'. 
There are problems with such reasoning.
^^A. Do Galloway, Wolf ha zd: Pannenberg (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
London, 1973)? p. 96.
76This argument is relevant because God as 'existing* is true 
of Brunner, as well. Brunner differs significantly in that God 'exists* 
for him a-temporally. This will receive further attention,
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Helen Oppenheimer follows Galloway's article in the same periodical 
(Religious Studies, Vol. 6, Ho, 2, December I969, p. 179) with the caution 
that it is too simple to suggest that we can idolize each other but only 
worship God, "V/e can idolize God", she writes, What Oppenheimer is 
saying has relevance to this iliesis. If I understand her correctly, she 
is referring to the possibility of restricting God in His freedom, that 
is, making God subject to God, When man idolises someone, or God, he 
restricts their freedom of action, by regarding essence as complete. There 
is no future in their being as they are what they are; everything that 
happens does so because of what they are (shades of Hegel's concept
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^continued)
which will be referred to later), Oppeniieimer continues with this 
important statement: "....there are elements in our relationships with 
each other here and now which it is perhaps not presumptuous to suggest 
point towards some kind of fulfillment of relationships in a satisfying 
harmony for which 'worship* would be the only adequate word." (p. 179).
This statement suggests something Pannenberg refers to when he writes,
"The arrival of what is future may be thought through to its conclusion 
only with the idea of repetition,...in the sense that in it the future 
has arrived in a uerinanent present." (Pannenberg, Theology and the
Kingdom of God. pTin^pyr"" —  ---------
Tuere is currently much argument in the philosophical field, 
particularly linguistic analysis, over the possibility of the statement,
God 'exists'. Txieir concern is different from ours but not unrelated.
The concern of the linguistic analyst is wnether or not any sense at all 
can be made of the word God and what it is we are saying when we use the 
word. Does the expression 'God is' have a corresponding reality?
Perhaps, they suggest, this is purely an evocative statement which lacks 
verification, Kai Piolsen, for example, in an article entitled, 'The 
Intelligibility of God-Talk* (Religious Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 
1970, pp. 1-21) discusses this whole subject, Nielsen is not looking 
at the statement, 'God exists', from the standpoint of its metaphysical 
ramifications; his argument hinges on the possibility of metaphysics 
itself. He questions whether or not linguistic analysis undermines 
metaphysics completely, Nielsen, in the end, is very positivistic.
He feels that verification of religious statements is necessary for 
them to have any degree of credibility and intelligibility. He doubts 
that such verification is possible. He writes, "....surely many people - 
and I am among them - can make nothing of 'disembodied action'.
Religious people, or at least those who reflect, are themselves per­
plexed about it. To those v/ho think they can understand it, it is well 
to ask them, in a concrete way, for the tiuth conditions of their claims.
If they can give none, we have good grounds for being sceptical that 
they, their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, understand 
what they are saying," (p, 17).
Statements that have no historical factual basis have no meaning 
or relevance for Nielsen. This is understandable as one would be left 
with pure assertion which is too often the case with Christian pro­
clamation. However, the other insinuation he makes which must be and 
is seriously questioned today, is that metaphysical statements can have 
no basis in fact (cf. an article by James V. V/oelfel, ' "Non-I.letaphysical" 
Christian Philosophy and Linguistic Philosophy' (Nevx Theology, No, 2, 
ed. Martin Marty (Macmillan Company, New York, 1985), pp. 50-62) in which 
the author explains the challenge that comes from the linguistic analyst 
and offers some suggestions to meet it,). It is not within the scope of 
this thesis to deal specifically with this question but hopefully matters 
will be discussed in our study that will throw some light on it. This 
may not come via Brunner's thought because he himself is among tlie 
theologians of revelation who reject the relevance of metaphysics. He 
may be called a 'theological positivist' (throughout his writings, Brunner's 
attack on metaphysics is evident and strong, as for exemple, in The 
Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I, chapter I6). In Pannenberg, 
however, there is an entirely different approach. In his theological 
programme he brings metaphysics and historical fact into closer agreement,« 
His theological method has much promise in dealing with this question. In 
his system, the metaphysical attributes of God (His immutability, etc.), 
are related to reality in a vfay that gives them relevance to our actual 
existence.
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One of the main problems is the implication of determinism and, 
thus, the denial of human freedom. For a deeper appreciation of the 
perplexities involved, an article by Nelson Pike, entitled 'Divine 
Omniscience and Voluntary Action'^^is referred to. He does a good 
job in showing the irreconcilability of the statement 'God exists' 
with the proclamation of human freedom. The author is not arguing 
in favour or against the statement 'God exists'; he is only drawing 
out the logical consequences of such a statement. He writes, 
there is a selection from among the various doctrines and principles 
clustering about the notions of knowledge, omniscience, and God which, 
when brought together, demand the conclusion that if God exists, no 
human action is v o l u n t a r y . P a n n e n b e r g  is equally convinced that 
human freedom cannot be maintained when God is thought of as an 
existing being. He writes, "An existent being acting with omni­
potence and omniscience would make freedom impossible. But such 
a being would also not be God, because it could not be the reality
which determines everything, for the reality of freedom, of human
79subjectivity, would remain outside its grasp."
Pike is not saying that God cannot be thought of in any manner 
that would include human freedom. He is stating only that there must 
be another conception of God and his relationship to the world than 
the one in the statement 'God exists', if human freedom is to be 
defended. His argu.ment proceeds as follows. If God is omniscient
^^Philosophy Today, No, 2, ed, Jerry H. Gill (Macmillan Company, 
London, 1 965 j f p p ” 20-141 ,
’^^Ibid., pp. 120-121,
^^Pannenberg, The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p, 109.
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(to deny Him omniscience would be tantamount to denying Him his 
Godness)^^then one must also say God in His knowledge cannot be 
mistaken. He can hold no false beliefs. Therefore, Pike continues, 
if God cannot hold any false beliefs, and if he knows the future, 
that is, if the future stands "equally directly before Him as the 
present stands before us", then the following can be said to be 
ti’ue.
Choose an event (E) and a time (T2) at which 
ÏÏ occurred. For any time (T1) prior to T2 
(say, five thousand, six hundred, or eighty 
years prior to T2). God laiev/ at T1 that B 
would occur at T2,^^
Pike continues to write:
Last Saturday afternoon, Jones mowed his lawn. 
Assuming that God exists and is (essentially) 
omniscient in the sense outlined above, it 
follows that (let us say) eighty years prior 
to last Saturday afternoon, God knew (and 
thus believed) that Jones would mow his lawn 
at that time. But from this it follows, I 
think, that at the time of action (la.st 
Saturday afternoon) Jones was not able - 
that is, it was not within Jones's power « 
to refrain from mowing his lawn. If at the 
time of action, Jones had been able to re­
frain from mowing his lawn, then (the most 
obvious conclusion would seem to be) at the 
time of action, Jones was able to do some­
thing which would have brought it about that 
God held a false belief eighty years earlier.
But God cannot in anything be mistaken. It 
is not possible that some belief of His y/as 
false. Thus, last Saturday afternoon, Jones 
was not ablo to do something which would have
Pike writes, "....any person who is not omniscient could not 
be the person v;e usually mean to be referring to when using the name 
"God"," ('Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action' (Phiiosoohy Today, 
No. 2), p. 121).
81
Ibid., p. 124.
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brought it about that God held a false 
belief eighty years a g o , ^2
If God is said to 'exist' and to be omniscient, the conclusions
85Pike has reached would be very difficult to refute.
Having stated this, let us return to Brunner's concept of God,
In doing so, care must be taken as he differs significantly on a 
particular point. Firstly, it was suggested that God as 'existing' 
is an appropriate characterization of his thought. Essentially,
God is complete, for Brunner; that is, there is no sense in which 
God can be incomplete in His essence, Brunner writes, "...what can 
be lacking in One from whom alone we receive all we can know Î What 
could be lacking in Him who is the Source of all Norms, the Lawgiver 
who has given all laws I Even to put the question at all is foolish, 
Brunner is not really prepared to argue for or against the perfection 
of God as he feels this would make God's nature dependent on earthly 
standards.
Having established that 'God exists' is appropriate for Brunner's 
thought, let us remember the 'timelessness' in his God, The question
82
° Ibid., pp. 124-125.
85In the concept, God 'exists' one is necessarily making God 
subject to God; that is, his freedom is derived from the previous 
existence of His essence, Pannenberg criticises Hegel for not 
allowing for freedom in his system of thought, because of the prior 
concept from which everything follows by necessity (pannenberg.
The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p. 172), Pannenberg states 
something which Pike has pointed out, as well, "The traditional 
theological doctrine of God has no solution to this dilemma. Hegel 
shares with it the acceptance of eu absolute being which already 
exists before the act of divine freedom," (ibid., p. 173).
runner. The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I, p. 288.
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is before us, therefore; Is it possible to proclaim God as existing
a-temporally, that is, in a timeless fashion. Here again, mention is
made of Nelson Pilce as he has dealt with this question at some length. 
Arguing from the viewpoint of Boethius, he says such a theological 
expression can be made without engaging in logical contradiction.
He writes;
We say that there exists a prime number between 
5 and 9. Some contemporary philosophers have 
suggested the following account of the term
'exist* as it occurs in this statement. Suppose
that at three o’clock I said; 'There exists a
prime number between 5 and 9.' What I said was 
true. But it does not follow that at four o' 
clock the statement; 'There existed a prime 
number between 5 and 9' could have been uttered 
truly; nor does it follow that at two o'clock 
the statement; 'There will exist a prime 
number between 5 and 9' could have been uttered 
truly. There is no use for the locutions 
*exist_ed' or 'will exist' when talking about 
numbers. It follows (on this account) that 
had I said at three o'clock that there exists 
a prime number between 5 and 9 uow (meaning 
at this moment), my remark woulï have been 
incorrect. Had the prime existed at three o’clock 
(as would have been affirmed had I said at that 
time that it exists now), it would follow by the 
ordinary meaning of tensed phrases, that at two 
o'clock the future tense existential claim could 
have been made correctly and at four o'clock the 
past tense existential claim could have been 
made correctly. The conclusion is that there is 
sense of 'exists' (present tense) that does not 
bear the usual logical relations to 'existed*
(past tense) and 'will exist* (future tense).
To affirm of something that it exists in this 
special sense of 'exists* is not to affirm that 
the thing in question exists in the temporal
present.85
Assuming from the above that one can say God 'exists* in an 
a-temporal sense, hoy/ does this statement hold with reference to the 
earlier criticism v/e made of the determinism present in Brunner's 
thought?
85pilce, God and Timelessness, pp. 12-13,
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Pilce argued for determinism from the standpoint of God in time. 
Foreknowledge, he claims, is possible only if the expression 'God 
is Eternal' does not imply a timelessness, "If God knew that a given 
natural event was going to occur before it occurred, at least one of 
God's cognitions would then have occurred before some natural event. 
This, surely, would violate the idea that God bears no temporal 
relations to natural events,
How is one to interpret this qualification in terms of our claim 
for Brunner? Is there still thus, a determinism in Brunner's concept 
of God when, as we argued, there is a timelessness present? Has Pike 
nullified our criticism?
In answer, it can be said that Brunner's determinism differs from 
the strict historical determinism spoken of by Pike, One could not 
claim for Brunner that every step of man and every activity in which 
he engages is determined by God, He would not endorse this nor is 
it evident in his writings. Nevertheless, as we indicated at the 
end of the last chapter, there is a determinism with him in another 
sense. In the sense that 'meaning* or truth is divorced from the 
facts of existence, in that God has no association with them, the 
good for which man longs thus,is given to him, that is, determined 
for hi_m. The concepts of freedom and responsibility are denied him, 
at the same time, because he plays no part in the determination of the 
good. Let us remember that, for Brunner, good is a quality that belongs 
to God alone and has no relation to historical existence. Praise and 
blame, thus, which would be involved in any concept of man's respons­
ibility, is removed, God determines man's goodness and 'meaning'.
^^Pike, 'Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action* (Philosoi 
Today, No. 2), p. 123.
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If value ('meaning') is something above 'profane' history,
then decisiveness, which is the essence of human freedom, is denied
him. One can then say in an important sense that man’s life is
determined. His responsibility is removed.
,,,,true Good can never flow from feverish 
intensity of effort, from all xnis labour and 
pain, from all this painstaking endeavour to 
attain the Good, but sinply solely from the 
central source of goodness as a state of 
existence. The "Good" which issues from effort 
is, for that very reason, not really good; the 
Good must descend from above, not be striven 
for from below, otherwise it lacks genuiness 
and depth. 7
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CHAPTER THREE
PANNENBERG'S CONCEPT OF GOD
CHAPTER THREE 
PANNENBERG'8 CONCEPT OF GOD
(A) A Prolegomenon for Fannonberg’s Doctrine of God
In the first two chapters Brunner's position, with reference 
to the individual and the community, was established. His concept
of God was analysed in an effort to determine the basis of his
ethical stance. In doing so, it was suggested that neither the 
community nor the individual were given a sufficient degree of 
significance in the question of 'meaning',
In an effort to resolve the stated problem in society and to
find a corrective for the Protestant position expressed by Biunner,
attention will be focused on the thought of Wolfhart Pannenberg,
More specifically, his concept of God will be analysed and compared 
with Brunner, Before doing this, however, our purpose will be served 
by looking first at the conditions and factors for which he seeks 
recognition in his God concept. The latter can be understood much 
better if this groundv/ork is done.
In the second volume of his Basic Ouestions in Theology, Pannen­
berg writes, ",.,,it is unnecessary to dispute the fact that the need 
for an encompassing unity that makes it possible to experience even 
the multifarious as a positive wealth is so deeply rooted in himan 
existence and in the structure of human reason that it inevitably 
brings up the question of the extent to which this religion or that 
can provide a basis for a universal unity in the experience of reality, 
which is very likely the criterion of its relevance and saving power - 
and thus, perhaps, of its truth, too," In this statement much insiglit
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p, 82.
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of the concerns with which Wolfhart Pannenberg approaches Theology 
is given, A glimpse of the method by which his theological state­
ments are formed is also shown.
He writes, in the above, of the structure of human reason and 
the nature of human experience. Existence is given as the basis 
by which to judge the relevance and acceptability of religious 
expression. His method, thus, in contrast to that of Emil Brunner, 
is one rooted in an ontic analysis of life, that is, a description
p
of the types of experience human beings enjoy in being in the world, 
Pannenberg chooses to call his approach, 'Theological Anthropology*, 
that is, theology that takes due cognizance of the fundamental 
experiences of man a,nd the self-understanding they imply,
His determination to proceed with his theology in this manner 
is rooted, basically, in his understanding of history as the field 
of God's activity and life. As the title of the book Revelation as 
History^implies it is within the realm of historical reality that man 
seeks his meaning. Religion and history, thus, are essentially 
correlated. As a human being, one is not required to search outside 
history and human existence in order to experience God, More impor­
tantly, such natural and historical experiences of God have saving
2
There are theologians who are prepared to argue, with Brunner, 
that this theological method gives too much attention to human real­
ities, It is too philosophical in approach and, thus, does not 
warrant the name of 'revelation' theology (cf. Lothas Steiger, 'Révélation 
“History and Theological Reason; A Critique of the Theology of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg' (Journal for Theology and the Church, Vol. 4, 1$67, 
pp. 82-107)), Pannenberg is sometimes prepared to see a similarity 
between his method and Brunner's (of. pannenberg. The Idea of God and 
Human Freedom, p. 89).
X
"^ pannenberg. The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p. 93.
^Revelation as History, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg, trans, D, Granskou 
and E, Quinn (Sheed and bard, London, 1969)#
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significance. The urgency of an anthropological approach to
theology is, Pannenberg says, in the need to make God understandable
to the modern mind. He writes;
Anyone who tries to speak of God today can 
no longer count on being immediately under­
stood “ at least, not if he has in mind the 
living God of the Bible as the reality which 
deteimines everything, as the creator of the 
world. Talk about the living God, the creator 
of the world, is threatening to become hollow 
today, even on the lips of the Christian, The 
term "God" seems to be dispensable, if not in­
deed an interference, in the understanding of 
the reality of the world in which we exist, 
determined as it is by science and technology.
The everyday life of every person, and the 
Christian too, is conditioned by a life and 
thought without God, This lived atheism is 
today the obvious point of departure for all 
thoughtful reflection. Even the mere question 
whether God exists and who he is needs special 
justification today if such a question is to 
lay claim to being taken seriously by men 
generally.,«,8
As indicated, atheism presents the challenge with which theology 
must now wrestle. Atheism, which treats religion and God as unessen­
tial aspects of man's being, and even more, which sees religion as a 
dehumanizing force in man's life, is the principal challenge in the 
effort to give the word 'God' credibility, Pannenberg refers especially 
to Feuerbachian atheism. He quotes Feuerbach as saying, "religion 
, ...is consciousness of the infinite; thus it is o-nd can be nothing 
else than the consciousness which man has of his own that is not 
finite and limited, but infinite nature,"^ The idea of God in the
V/e shall try to make this understanding clear in succeeding 
chapters. The words 'an experience of God' were qualified with 
'saving significance' because in the theology of Emil Brunner there 
are experiences of God in the natural world that are not 
experieneeËr"%cf. Bmnner, The Gnristian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics, 
Vol. I, pp. 22?ff.).
^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p. 201,
^ibid., p. 186,
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light of this criticism is regarded only as the product of man's 
self-alienation. It is the projection of anxieties'and longings 
into an imaginaiy heaven, "Theology", writes Pannenberg, "has 
to learn that after Feuerbach it can no longer mouth the word "God" 
without offering any explanation; that it can no longer speak as if 
the meaning of this word were self-evident,,,,,"^
This claim of the self-evidence of God, was central to Karl 
Barth's thought and dialectical theology in general. It is seriously 
disputed by Pannenberg, Barth, he suggests, accepted the criticism 
of Feuerbach as a strengthening force for the Christian faith.
However, this was for no reason other than showing the barrenness 
of any attempt to reach God by means of anthropological consideration. 
For Barth, the criticism of atheism only emphasised the special 
position of the Christian faith with regard to knowledge. Atheism, 
in actual fact, accentuated the Christian experience as one immune 
to any criticism from the rational and historical realms of Icnow-
Q
ledge. In Barth, and this is true of Brunner as well, revelation 
has no dependency on human loiowledge. Thus, statements of faith 
are not liable to attack or criticism from any human source,
Pannenberg condemningly refers to this thinking as a cheap form 
of modernity and one of the real sources of Christian weakness at the
Ibid., p, 189.
9
^There are statements throughout Brunner's writings tliat can 
support this claim. Indeed, Brunner's theological method as a whole 
prevents him from giving any credence to the theological significance 
of man's power of reflection. In Man in Revolt, for example, he writes: 
"The demand of reason,,,.destroys the content of the Christian con­
ception of God, For this content cannot be conceived as a rational 
content; it can only be believed as a revelation. In reason man remains 
by himself, shut up within the self-sufficient reason; in faith, however, 
he is approached by the self-revealing 'Thou' who addresses him 'from 
without *, " (p. 2 l\.2),
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10present time. His comment has some validity and should be con­
sidered, By retreating from true dialogue with atheism and claiming
a special area of 'meaning', the social relevance and force of the
11Christian faith could easily be reduced. This would obviously 
weaken Christianity in the world. It also could have a cheapening 
affect in rendering theological statements or statements of faith 
meaningless. If no argument or evidence can be presented in re­
lation to the truth or falsehood of a statement then the statement 
must be classified as meaningless. Thus it becomes something 
different.
In a theological statement there is a cognitive element; one 
is stating something to be true, Barth and Brunner, by their in­
sistence on revelation apart from reason, only give support to the 
linguistic analyst (Ayre, Hare and Austin) that utterances in theology 
are simply common expressions of emotion and exhortation. They are 
not statements in which truth or falsity would logically arise. To 
give support to tliis kind of thinlcing would ultimately undermine the 
Christian faith and the fact upon which it rests.
Thus, Pannenberg's opposition to this theological retreat and 
his challenge to the church to meet atheism on its own ground is 
is welcomed. Anthropology is that common ground. The church, says
10Pannenberg, The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p. 88,
11This is not to deny that Barth (and even moro such post- 
Barthians as Moltmann) have proved to be among the most effective 
theologians of the political left with its deep human concern and 
involvement. Nevertheless, they have failed to provide it with 
the "human face" which it so obviously lacks. Until man's political 
activity is correlated with God's activity, in some way, politics 
will not remain "human",
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Pannenberg, must take into consideration the arguments, results and
problems that are expressed and developed in every field of study.
Unless God can be shown to have credibility here and, in turn, unless
our conception of God can be reconciled with any realities uncovered,
then the Christian faith will be incredulous to modern man, Pannenberg
writes of the Christian's predicament:
If it cannot be shown that the issues with 
which religion is concerned, the elevation 
of man above the finite content of human 
experience to the idea of an infinite re­
ality which sustains everything finite, 
including man himself, are an essential 
of man's being, so that one is not really 
considering man if one ignores this dimen­
sion - if this cannot be shown with suffi­
cient certainty, then every other view­
point with which one may concern oneself 
in this field is an empty intellectual 
game, and what is said about God loses 
every claim to Intellectual veracity,12
Til© inference made in this statement is that unless our religious
expressions match the realities of the world they remain doubtful.
This, in effect, works both ways. There is a challenge here directed 
to anthropology to give a deeper and more penetrating analysis of its 
subject. Are there not dimensions of existence that may be explained 
only in terms of religion? Pannenberg has dealt with this clearly 
in his book. What is Man?» The other challenge is directed to religion. 
Careful and thoughtful attention must be paid to the implications of 
religious statements for reality itself. If such implications are 
opposed to, or do not concur with, the basic experiences of man, then
we are faced with the loss of what Pannenberg has called 'intellectual
veracity*.
^^Ibid., pp, 88-89.
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Pursuing this line of thought, briefly, will help us to under­
stand Pannenberg's choice of concepts in relation to God, In par­
ticular, the relevance of his concept of God as 'Future', which is 
peculiar to him, will be underscored.
As stated, Pannenberg regards it essential that statements 
about God have some means by which they can show truth or falsity. 
That is to say, theological statements must be answerable to fact
just as other statements porposing to contain cognitive material,
1 5His argument with respect to this matter is cogent, and helpful 
to the discussion in the rest of this chapter, Pannenberg admits 
that the logical positivists have made a valid point in demanding 
verification of statements, "A statement that in principle cannot 
be checked would be no statement at all. As a statement, it would 
be meaningless."^^ He takes exception, however, to the require­
ments for verification which the positivists have laid down. Their 
demand for sense data as the only legitimate source has, in his 
estimation, proven to be prejudicial, unacceptable and controversial, 
"Verification in the strict sense of logical positivism by reduction 
of statements to sense data is certainly not attainable in theology. 
But even statements of natural law in the natural sciences do not sat­
isfy such a requirement, since no general rule can be verified by a
15finite number of individual cases," He agrees in principle that
^^blfhart Pannenberg, 'The Nature of a Theological Statement* 
(Zygon - Journal of Religion and Science, Vol. 7, No, 1, March 1972,
^^bid,, p, 8, 
^^Ibid,, p, 18,
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there niust be some possible means of control for statements that 
are made or we end in a position of meaninglessness. He feels, 
however, that there must be broader and less precise means of 
checking statements for content than those permitted by the 
positivists. In defence of this, Pannenberg offers a convincing 
suggestion.
He says every statement is of the nature of an hypothesis.
This applies to theological statements as well as to all other 
statements containing cognitive material. In fact, this means 
they can be judged true or false. Truth and falsity are not self- 
evident judgements and this is, in his estimation, especially so 
with religious expressions,^^ Pannenberg notes that there might 
be a difference between theological statements and statements of 
another kind. For evidence in science, a direct appeal can be made 
to the subject at hand. Through immediate laboratory inspection the 
data necessary to substantiate the hypothesis can be provided. In 
theology this is not possible. The subject of theology (God) cannot 
be visibly pointed to and thereby claimed as the proven basis of 
theological theories and hypotheses. This would be impossible for 
two basic reasons. Firstly, the reality of God is not complete in 
terms of human knowledge. Secondly, peihaps more importantly, to 
claim G-od as directly accessible for verification would contradict 
the claim of divinity made of Him. It would, in effect, make Him 
one subject among others. This would logically be opposed to our
It should be noted here that Pannenberg is undertaking a 
mammoth task as some of his predecessors (Barth and Brunner in 
particular) declaimed any association with the principle of 
verification in matters of faith.
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understanding of 'God* as that reality which determines everything,
Pannenberg, thus, introduces a broader and wider basis by which
the relevance, truth and falsity of religious statements are to be
judged. He writes:
Statements about God, about his acts and 
his revealing himself are therefore not 
directly testable by a sort of inspection 
of their subject matter. But this does 
net mean that they are not testable at 
all: It is also possible to test state­
ments by an examination of the consequences
that can be derived from them. Statements
about divine reality and actions are test­
able by reference to their implications 
for the understanding of finite reality 
insofar as God is maintained to be the all- 
determining reality,17
It is a much accepted standard that the truth of a statement
can be gauged by whether or not the derived consequences match reality.
In seeking a definition of a horse, for example, one might say the
horse is a quadruped and all-powerful in strength. Having made that
statement, one could then proceed to draw certain consequences or
implications about the horse and its relationship to reality. It
could be taken for granted that the horse could then move a boulder
one thousand times its weight, for example. Prom man's observation
of the horse, however, he knows this to be a falsehood. No horse has
ever displayed that kind of strength; thus, the original statement
about it was false. It would then be necessary to redefine 'horse*
in the light of the facts, so that statement and fact are reconciled.
The credibility of every statement, that is to say, the degree of truth,
depends on the compliance of the statement with reality as experienced.
^Tpbid., p. 12,
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In a sense, Pannenberg is applying this same standard of judgment 
in his defence of Christian statements.
He starts with the presupposition that God is an all-determining 
reality. One cannot fault him with this qualification. In both the 
biblical and philosophical traditions, this is what is understood by 
the word 'God', In any statements about God this implication must be 
present or one is seriously departing from what is logically entailed 
in the word. Whatever is to be said about God, or whatever concept 
is chosen in reference to him, this meaning must be included. Other­
wise, it may be safe to say, we are not speaking of the same subject 
at all.
Assuming then that God is the reality that determines everything, 
the truth of any statement about God can be examined by testing it 
against the experiences of finite reality. The question is, thus, 
asked: Does the former have determinative significance? To state 
it more adequately in Pannenberg's words, .statements about God 
can be examined as to whether their content is really of determinative 
significance for all finite reality as it is available to our exper­
ience. .To the degree that this is the case, one can speak of a 
corroboration or confirmation of theological assertions."^^
18
Ibid., p, 12. This is the reason why Pannenberg finds theologies 
that refer to a direct encounter with God unacceptable, as if the Subject 
of the religious statement could be investigated immediately. Immediate 
encounters, in the sense that Brunner describes them, become invalid in 
the light of the requirements that Pannenberg is articulating in the 
above.
For our purposes we need not pursue Pannenberg's argument any further 
at this point. He does go on, in the article to which we have referred, 
to state that it is really in the history of religions that one can best 
see the truth of the above argument. This is so because the anticipated, 
all-determining reality, which is implicit in human experience as we know 
it, is really thematic in religion. He writes, "In the ongoing process 
of religious life, traditional beliefs and rituals are continuously tested 
for the capacity of the traditional gods to integrate the continuously 
changing experience of reality," "In this process, it is again and again 
an open question whether there arise strange powers which manifest
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Having reached this point, the question can he asked; V/hat
realities of life are there in experience which must be assured in
any formulated concept of God? This question takes us back to the
statement of Pannenberg with which we began this chapter, partiularly
the part that reads: "*,..it is unnecessary to dispute the fact that
the need for an encompassing unity that makes it possible to experience
even the multifarious as a positive wealth is so deeply rooted in human 
19existence
These words imply two basic aspects of human existence which 
must be maintained: unity and contingency. As man lives out his life, 
says Pannenberg, he experiences reality in terms of these two dimensions. 
It is important to stress here that these are not deductions that 
Pannenberg is making from an assumed statement about God; they are rather 
conclusions reached by process of induction, from analysis of life as 
we experience it,
Pannenberg's contention is that human life is meaningful (personal) 
only if due recognition is given to both aspects. Indeed, the problem 
of man in society has been, as stated in the beginning, his failure 
to guarantee these realities of life in his political, social and 
economic creations. This, Pannenberg would say, has added to the 
impersonalization of man in our time. His ov/n theological efforts
( continued) themselves in concrete experiences and which the 
inherited traditions fail to explain." (p. 15). In conclusion he 
writes, "....a provisional corroboration of theological hypotheses 
seems to be within reach and will be possible to the same degree 
that they illuminate the problems of the religious traditions and 
the implications of meaning in present experience," (p. 19).
19Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p. 82,
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have been directed toward a resolution (even if only theoretical)
of the problem. There is some validity in arguing that without a
convincing theoretical presentation little practical progress will
be made in the establishment of personal existence, Pannenberg is
important in this respect.
Any talk of personal existence for Pannenberg involves the
presence of contingency (individuality) and unity. The latter may
be interpreted in more practical terms as community. The question
of personal being can be given no suitable answer other than one
evolving from the discussion of individuation and participation.
It must also guarantee the significance of each, Pannenberg writes;
....only contingent events can be perceived 
as personal acts,,,,,20
He add-3 ;
There must be something more than contingency 
to justify understanding events as personal 
acts. Otherwise to speak of a contingent 
event may mean little more than to refer to 
the apparently erratic character of happenings. 
Contingency is not enough to give events a 
personal quality. The required additional 
factor is the identity of the power that is 
operative in a series of contingent events, 
a unity behind contingent self-expressions,21
The discussion at this point has importance in that no attempt
has been made, thus far, to show that community and individuality are
essential to personal existence* It was suggested earlier that these
two aspects did not receive much significance with Brunner, in his
consideration of the 'Good' (meaning). However, it was not suggested
there could be no 'meaningful' (personal) existence apart from these
elements. Any argument in this direction would serve to strengthen
20
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 58<
21
Ibid., p, 58.
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our criticism of Brunner, It would also underscore the forthcoming 
consideration of Pannenherg, especially with respect to his concept 
of God.
In speaking of the conditions for personal existence, Pannenherg
is endeavoring to establish a relevant prolegomenon for a doctrine of
God, For this purpose, his analysis is directed primarily to secular
experience. At this level, he searches for material from which to
formulate his theological assertions.
Prom his search Pannenberg discovers, first of all, that man in
the daily exercise of his life experiences life as contingent. Secular
man affirms life increasingly in terms of events that come to him
unexpectantly and without planning. There is a sense of being in the
world, in the midst of events that have no apparent necessary cause or
rationale. Modern secular experience, as Pannenberg defines it, is
characterized by the feeling, or the awareness, that life is open
beyond every existing structure. He refers to this awareness as
22
* openness to the world' and in his o'wn words describes it this way:
"Man is not bound to an environment, but is open to the world. That
means he can alv/ays have new experiences that are different in kind,
and his possibilities for responding to the reality perceived can
23
vary almost without limit."
22Pannenberg, What is Man?, p. 3* The meaning of this phrase 
which comes from the German 'Weltoffenheit* is used by Pannenberg 
with several intents: (1 ) Openness of man to his world; (2) Openness 
of man beyond his v/or3.d; (3) Openness of the world to new elements 
in its future. In each case, however, the freedom and individuality 
of life is the focus of attention,
^^Ibid., p. 5#
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There is nothing original in his analysis of human existence 
in this fashion. He is merely pointing out a facet of life which 
has been growing increasingly in society. Particularly in modern 
times, man does not feel tied to necessary structures or ultimate 
models of existence on this earth. He feels free to organize him­
self and to create meaning for his own life. Nothing is imposed 
on him from beyond his actual contact with reality. Secularism, as 
we understand it today, is a viewpoint firm in this.claim. Freedom 
has become its watchword in recognition of the contingency of life, 
Langdon Gilkey writes clearly of this attitude in this way:
Secularism has interpreted our existence within 
the world as if man's being were to be under­
stood solely in terms of those finite forces with 
which he obviously interacts; the nature that has 
produced him, the social environment that shapes 
his capacities, and the latent powers that reside 
in him. It has emphasized, therefore, the con­
tingency of man’s existence and all that surrounds 
him, the relativity and transience of all that 
appears in history and so all that he can accom­
plish, and his autonomy and freedom in a world 
without ultimate coherence and so one in which 
he alone can be the creator of security and of
meaning,25
As the above affirms, secularism sees life solely in terms of con­
tingent reality, Pannenberg is only re-echoing this fact and re­
affirming its essential association with personal life.
^Langdon Gilkey affirms that contingent awareness has been 
growing since the seventeenth century and arose, perhaps, as an 
end result of seventeenth century science. He goes on to speak 
of the enormous influence Darwin had in creating this awareness,
"More than any other result of modern inquiry, his theory of 
origins seemed to displace man from his former setting within an 
eternal rational order, or a purposefully willed order, and 
pictured him as the product of the blind law of selection combined 
with random mutations," (Gilkey, The Renewal of God-Language, p. 40),
p. 251.
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This claim for the personal value of contingency is not difficult 
to understand, Man generally has found those situations which imprison 
him in life, impersonal. This would include anything that prevents 
a control or share in his destiny. He feels inhuman and impersonal 
in those circumstances that deny him freedom of movement and decision. 
This is especially so when conditions, which are not congruent with 
the givenness of reality, are forced upon him,^^ An essential re­
quirement of a free man is the feeling that he, in some sense, can be 
the creator of his own meaning. It is the claim of the atheist that 
any affirmation theological, or otherwise, is suspect and incredible 
when it fails to guarantee this.
On the other hand, to stop with this affirmation, as if one had 
said everything about personal existence, would be wrong. Pannenberg 
mentioned another factor which must be taken into consideration in any 
relevant theological discourse. Once again his claim is derived from 
an ontic analysis of life rather than an ontological statement about 
man's being. This is always the procedure in his writings. Any 
statements of ontology are made in the light of man's ontic awareness. 
Part of that awareness, he notes, is man's search beyond him­
self toward an ultimate which is not present in any final form in
26Existentialism, above all, has stressed this aspect of human 
existence. In its expression, it has emphasised freedom and respons­
ibility as essential to man's humanness. If man is forced to adapt 
to existing strucutres and is given standards without any chance of 
response, he is not existing authentically. One could also appeal 
to modern psychoanalytic theories for support. Psychological health 
is affirmed in terms of the power in the individual to rise above 
external authorities and the Super-Ego. As well, Whitehead may be 
cited in his assertion that each entity comes to realization through 
a self-creativity in freedom, Pannenberg finds hijnself, thus, well 
supported in his accentuation of contingent reality.
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the actual process of life. Life, in other words, is forever
seeking a unity, that is, an ultimate in which fulfillment can he
found, Man is by nature historical. He is historical in the sense
that decisions of action and destiny rest with him periodically.
But, he is historical in another important sense, expressed in the
following: ",,.,not only is the individual act of decision historic,
but each man also lives in an interconnected series of events, which
involves both his own decisions and also the things that happen to
him. Together these things constitute his history, which is entirely
27particular and unique," Life, in other words, involves the exper­
ience of unity or wholeness. This, says Pannenberg, is the other pole 
of human existence without which it would not be personal, Pannenberg's 
contention is that contingency itself, the awareness that life is finite, 
limited and open, leads to the dimension of unity. However, he says, 
this desire for unity has been denied its just recognition by secular 
society itself.
The awareness that nothing is permanent (contingent) has been
turned by secular society into an absolute negative. This has fostered
28
a mood nihilistic in its character. It is this mood that requires 
challenging, not by bringing in knowledge claimed outside the secular 
field but by a thorough-going analysis of secular experience itself, 
Langdon Gilkey stresses this same point in his writings. He says 
if life were a series of unrelated and insignificant acts with no inner 
telos or strong bonds of community, then the inner sense of one’s own
27
Pannenberg, What is Man?, p. 139*
28Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Tlieology, Vol. II, p, 219<
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reality would disappear. Thus, he rejects the affirmation of
secularism that defines life merely in terms of the contingency
that is basic to it. He writes;
This human world is, to be sure, a world of 
relative, mutually dependent beings in 
common interaction with one another, Neveiv
theless, it is also a world where our own
contingent existence must be affirmed; where 
knowledge and understanding of that network
of interaction is possible; a world also
characterized by the search for meanings
and values in what we do there and in the 
history in which we participate; a world 
filled with the urge both for freedom and _ 
community, for selfhood and its integrity,,,
In substantiation of his claim for unity, Pannenberg appeals to
several factors in life. In reaction to the position of Nihilism,
which treats the questionableness of life as absolute, he points out
the sound fact, that all human inquiry is made with the intention of
an answer. To inquire about human life in any other sense, for example
that by which the nihilists proceed, is to inquire in abstraction
from present assertions. This is unrealistic.
Both this nihilism and the opposed views 
that confront its negation with mere 
affirmation, bespeak a spiritual indolence.
Concrete, critical reflection upon the 
tradition and on the situation of current 
experience does not reach the point of 
nihilistic dissolution because, although 
it makes use of the same negative dialectic, 
it does not do so in abstract isolation, as 
nihilism does, but as an element of its 
inquiry into the essential content about 
which it is reflecting. Solely for the sake 
of this essential content must all previously 
given answers be superseded. In this attitude, 
critical inquiry reiiiains directed toward the 
content that will appear in the form of a new 
answer,
29
Gilkey, The Renewal of God-Language, p,
p. 253
31Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, pp, 219-220,
“116—
Pannenberg has considered an aspect of human inquiry which
is more realistic than that propounded by the nihilists. Inquiry
is always made in the context of an expected answer, or response.
For further support of man's unifying experience, he points to
the desire of an individual to have the recognition of others. There
is an innate tendency in everyone to seek confirmation of his tasks
from others around him, or by the society in which he lives. It is
a common desire to seek support and approval, or adversely disapproval,
from those to whom our efforts are directed. Recognition, says
Pannenberg, means the certainity that we have not laboured in vain
and that we have participated in the universal human destiny by
32
developing one's own uniqueness. It is his contention that in 
seeking the approval or disapproval of other human beings, man is 
reaching out for meaning that is common to all. Such meaning does not 
imply uniformity which destroys the 'unique*. Rather, it refers to 
a unity which co-ordinates all uniqueness in a common purpose. It 
is in marriage, friendship and comradeship, he affirms, that this
3%
unity of life is best displayed. Even the conscience, he brings 
to our attention, is a demonstration in the individual of an extension
31,
of meaning beyond himself.
^Pannenberg, What is Man?, p. 86
p .  87.
another expression, Pannenberg speaks of the tension at
the center of human life between the ego and reality. This tension, 
he claims, is basic to life. There is an innate tendency in man for 
the ego to draw all things into itself,. This, Pannenberg claims, is 
a manifestation of the unity which is essential to personal life, 
"Men", he writes, "have rightly striven again and again to incorporate 
everything real in some way into the world that they have constructed 
for themselves. This is because a person's own living space and plan
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In asserting that unity is basic to the personal, Pannenberg
has support in other studies, One could turn to modern thought
expressed in the fields of Psychology, Philosophy and Sociology
35for verification of the same contention, Pannenberg is no
(continued) for life can be stable only if it corresponds to 
the whole of reality. Only in a world that is a unity can our life 
succeed as a whole and remain or become healed, that is, whole." 
(pannenberg, What is Man?, p, 6l), It is Pannenberg*s conviction, 
however, that this tension is a natural thing to man and not some­
thing inherently evil. Unlike Brunner, he relates this tension to 
meaning by taking it up into God, It is not eradicated in our relation­
ship with God,
35George Mead in his book. Mind, Self and Society (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1 9 3 ^ ) ,  speaks of the unity or community of 
man in a way that confirms much of Pannenberg’a reasoning. Mead 
also spealcs of freedom as an essential in life. Personal existence 
is possible only when both individuation and participation have 
their place. He speaks of the ’generalized other’ and by this he 
means the attitudes, morals and values assumed by the individual 
from his community. These things become part of his meaning. In 
every individual, he says, there is an *1' and a ’Me’, The ’Me* 
is that element in life (attitudes) which the individual adopts.
When an individual reflects or decides he has certain data before 
him (p. 176), This data is not outside the common attitudes and 
values that are around him. The *1’ is the individual’s response 
to this ’Me® (p, 177)* It is the answer which the individual gives 
to the attitudes which others (the community) take toward him. This 
*1* is the novel element in life; it is the freedom, that is, the 
contingent factor of reality, that must exist if human life is to 
mature into the personal. As stated, Pannenberg saw personal life 
as inclusive of both realities. With George Mead, it is evident, 
as well, that individuation and participation must somehow be held 
in balance if life is to continue humanly. The ’I’, Mead is quick 
to point out (p, 178), is uncertain and unplanned in its response.
There is no mechanical necessity that makes the ’I* what it is.
At the same time, its identity depends on the ’Me', This dis­
tinction between the *1* and ’Me’ is,according to Mead, that which 
keeps life progressive and exciting. The self is a social process 
because of the dynamics of these two phases. If it were not for 
these phases, says Mead, there could not be conscious responsibility 
or novelty in experience, (See also Peter L, Berger, The Social 
Construction of Reality (Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London,
1971), pp.
Eric Fromm in his book, Man For Himself (Fawcett Publications, 
laco, Greenwich, Conn,, 1947? PP» bb-W), speaks of the need in 
man for orientation and devotion. He tallcs of the inevitable 
dichotomies at the center of human life which man cannot escape,
"He has to strive for the experience of unity and oneness in all 
spheres of his being in order to find a new equilibrium,".(p, 55).
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stranger, for example, to George Mead, Peter Berger and their
analysis of the social dimension of man’s life. Indeed, it could
be argued that proof for a different understanding of personal
36existence would be difficult to defend and far less credible in
(^■^continued) There is even talk today of the existence of tv/o 
distinct spheres of the brain which support our findings. It is being 
speculated that the right side of the brain, for example, produces 
new ideas, while the left side of the brain deals only with facts. The 
right side, in other words, would be in line with the ’I’ to which Mead 
refers. The left, that which deals with the orthodox and the conventional, 
would be in line with the ’Me’ (’Use Your Right Brain’ (insights and 
Innovations for the Management of Change, ed, F, D. Barrett, Vol. 5?
No, 2, March 1975)7*
^^One might turn to tlie philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre as a
challenge to the comprehensive analysis of man which Pannenberg is
suggesting, Sartre recognizes the inalienable freedom of man and the 
necessity of this freedom in the pursuit of life. But with Sartre there
is no recognition of the other dimension of life suggested, that is,
community. He speaks of absolute freedom or contingency. The first 
source of freedom, according to Sartre, is the basic thesis of existential­
ism; existence proceeds essence. Because there is no essence which pre­
determines what will or will not be, each individual is absolutely free 
and entirely self-responsible (L ’^ fcre et le néant (Librairie Gallimard, 
Paris, 1943)3 p, 515). Man is free, for Sartre, because he is completely 
undetermined. He maintains this in spite of the fact that he also says 
man is determined by the interpretations others put on his actions. 
Notwithstanding this slight inconsistency, however, it would be right to 
sum up Sartre’s position by saying that man is free. This is so first,
because he is nothing to start with and second, because he makes his own
attempt to become something, Man, thus, is solely responsible for what 
he becomes. The freedom of man for Sartre, is expressed in the notion of 
’lack’, "Freedom makes only one with lack, it is the mode of concrete
being of the lack of being," (p, 652), (For this interpretation of Sartre,
and the quotations, I have consulted the work of Harold Hatt, Cybernetics 
and the Image of Man (Abingdon Press, New York, I968), pp, 112-121°}^
Pannenberg does a good job in countering Sartre’s argument (cf,
Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, pp, 221-222), He points out that 
Sartre’s concept of ’lack’ is in view of "the particular totality which 
it is lacking". If this is so, says Pannenberg, then the existence of man 
at least presupposes the possibility of that totality, "And insofar as 
it is the case that the ground that makes it possible can lie neither 
in man himself nor in the extant world, it is always previously presupposed 
in the existence of man and his world as the reality that supports them. 
This reality is therefore not simply "hypostatized" as transcendence beyond 
the world, nor is it only the "ideal" that man projects in his desire for 
self-realization, since he is instead already dependent for all self- 
realization upon that supporting reality, which is antecedent to all such 
projections as the ground of their possibility," (p, 222), Thus Pannenberg 
argues, man is determined always by this totality which manifests itself 
in life constantly, if only in a provisional form.
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the light of life's experience itself. To be creative within the
37strong bonds of community, is to render life human and personal.
37Let us note here that Pannenberg's concept of person, with 
which we deal in the last chapter, is one that is constituted by 
t?70 poles; a determined pole which is the community and a contingent 
pole which is the individual. Both must receive proper recognition.
What has happeneed, largely through the influence of Decartes, is 
that a dualism has been set up between the determined pole of per­
sonality and the contingent. Decartes saw minds, the free aspect 
of the person, as immaterial and operating separately from the body.
The body, on the other hand, was a machine for Decartes, inhabited 
by the mind. Although immaterial, the mind was able to respond to 
the material world and act upon it. This let to what Gilbert Ryle 
called the 'dogma of the Ghost in the Machine' (Gilbert Ryle,
The Concept of Mind (Hutchinson and Go, London, 1949), pp. 11-18),
Brunner did not escape the implications of thought associated with 
Decartes when he expressed the I-Thou relationship. We shall see 
this in our,argument later in the thesis,
Ryle feels that the theory of mind-body dualism is based on 
what the analytic philosophers refer to as a category mistake, which 
is simply using a term in a way that is inappropriate for it, Ryle 
gives an example of what he means. If you were to show a person around 
a university campus and at the end of the tour he were to reply, "You 
have shown me the library, the classrooms, the administration buildings 
and the dormitories, but you have not yet shown me the university.
When will we see it?", this would be a category mistake (for this and 
other examples, see The Concept of Mind, pp, 16-13, 22-23). This, 
says Ryle, is a category mistake because it is putting the university 
in the same category as the buildings that make up the university and 
this cannot be done. Much of our thinking about the mind, according 
to Ryle, is a category mistake in that we thinic of the mind as a 
thing that must enter into relationship with the body somehow. The 
mind is not a thing; it is an action of a person, says Ryle, There is 
no such thing as an absolute separation between what is done by the mind 
and what is done by the body. They are part and parcel of the same per­
son. It is persons who are in process, who act, and the mind and body 
are aspects of this process.
In referring to Ryle, a criticism by H, D, Lewis should be noted, 
Ryle, he says, tends too much in the direction of materialism and does 
not see enough separation between mind and body» He writes, "Suffice 
it to note that while Ryle is not an outright materialist, in the sense 
of straightway telling the whole story of our conduct in terms of nerves, 
muscles, states of the brain and so on, he leaves us nothing besides the 
observable physical behaviour and certain more or less consistent dis­
positions, The purposing, which makes our conduct other than mechanical 
or accidental, is thought of entirely in terras of dispositions, and 
however ingeniously....this is extended to cover the cases where,,,,we 
seem rapt in thought, it just goes against the obvious facts of everyone's 
experience, namely that we have mental processes of which each person 
is aware at the time in the very fact of having them," (The Self and 
Immortality(The Macmillan Press Ltd,, London, 1973), p.
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(b ) God as Future
The problem to deal with now is one of considerable magnitude.
If the nature of personal existence is as suggested, that is, if 
individuation and participation are both essential ingredients in 
the development of personality, then theological relevance depends 
on the expression of ideas and concepts that are inclusive of these 
facts. Anything else would render theology meaningless as a discipline, 
At no point, says Pannenberg, is this so important as in the con­
cept of God, If religion is to regain its relevancy in man's life 
then the concept of God which it offers must have 'determinative 
significance for all finite reality as it is available to our 
e x p e r i e n c e , T h u s ,  God cannot be thought of any longer without a 
concept that will be determinative of the realities of contingency 
and unity in human experience.
There are two problems that arise here, and Pannenberg recognizes 
them. For God to be determinative of unity, it must be shown, in some 
way, that the tendency in man for unity is a reality incomprehensible 
within man himself. It must be shown that a reference outside man, 
in the sense of an all-determining reality, is required for explanation, 
Secondly, it must be shown that this reference, which is the totality 
of everythijig, is personal. This means it must be the guarantor of 
freedom or contingency,
Pannenberg dealt with the first problem in his criticism of Jean-
39Paul Sartre which has been alluded to. He showed how Sartre's con­
cept of 'lack' is only understandable in relation to and in recognition
58
Refer back to footnote 18 of this chapter, 
^^Refer back to footnote 3^ of this chapter.
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of a totality of things outside man. He suggested that Sartre’s 
argument for 'lack* leads logically to this conclusion itself,
Pannenberg*s reasoning with Sartre would be applicable, as well, 
to the thought of Eric Fromm, Fromm states, for example, that the 
tendency in man for uniqueness and orientation needs no other reference 
other than man h h i i s e l f I d e a s ,  he says, which man cannot help from 
projecting, are simply an attempt to bring about a state of equil­
ibrium in life, as much as this can be done. The suggestion that 
"man is not free to choose between having or not having "Ideals 
indicates an element of compulsion about them. Does this not lead 
Fromm away from his inference that they are simple projections of 
man and imply, in turn, something beyond man?
To this question one must add that Fromm's idea of man’s 
struggle for orientation and devotion, as a simple process explan­
atory within man, falls down before the standard which he has set 
for the truthfulness of an ideal itself. He writes, "We must unde3> 
stand every ideal including those which appear in secular ideologies 
as expressions of the same human need and v e  must judge them with re­
spect to their truth, to the extent to which they are conducive to 
the unfolding of man's powers and to the degree to which they are a 
real answer to man's need for equilibrium and harmony in his world.
The thouglrfc that no ultimate reconciliation of the tension at the 
center of man’s life is to be hoped for, as suggested by Fromm, would 
hardly meet man’s need, Man keeps reaching out for an equilibrium, or
^S?romm, Man For Himself, pp. 48-58, 
p, 58. 
p. 58.
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a totality of things, and the thought that there can and will not 
he any solution is unbearable to him for any length of time. With­
out the hope of reconciliation or equilibrium, man cannot function,*^^ 
Pannenberg expresses it very cogently when he writes:
To live in the attitude of radically open 
inquiry without any anticipation of a 
possible answer is possible under normal 
conditions probably only with regard to 
questions which for the people involved 
in the inquiry are not ~ or no longer - 
concerned with the central issues of life.
Otherwise there is as a rule an envisaged 
answer. If no answer appears at this point, 
that signifies a threat to the very poss­
ibility of living, which cannot be endured 
for very long,^
Fromm's "Ideals", thus, fall before his own standards and requirements. 
The first problem proposed, to restate it, was that of establishing 
the reference for unity outside man. "^[his was dealt with by Pannenberg 
in showing the congruency of the idea with the basic experiences of 
life itself.
The second problem, however, is even more crucial and not quite 
so easy to deal with. As Pannenberg himself would be quick to point 
out, the mere point of reference outside man, for the totality of 
existence, does not warrant the use of the word God, It merely 
shows man as dependent upon being encountered by something
45For Fromm, one of the conditions for the truthfulness of an 
Ideal is its capacity to empower man. In this context he speaks of 
hope. In his book. The Revolution of Hope (Harper & Row Publishers, 
New York, 1968), he says that an ultimate shattering of hope would 
mean the destruction of amn. Any Ideal therefore which contains no 
final solution, or ansv/er, or hope for reconciliation, would destroy 
man's powers (p, 22).
^'^"^annenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, pp, 224-225*
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that functions as a supportive ground for the existence of man in
its transcending movement into openness, as well as for the totality
45of all extant reality, the world." The real problem exists in
the reconciliation of the following and hitherto seemingly exclusive
concepts: the concept of a power outside ourselves which is all
determinative, and the concept of person. In using person in this
context, the contingent aspect of life, that which makes for free,
individual expression, is referred to. The question before us is
this: Can an all-determining reality guarantee, at the same time,
personal existence in the sense of contingency? If these two
concepts can be thought through or presented in a compatible way,
then there is a basis for an affirmation of God, Pannenberg expresses
the problem in his own words this way;
Obviously, the word "person" automatically 
brings to the fore an understanding whose 
combination with the idea of an all- 
determining power has become unbelievable 
for us. If I see the matter correctly, 
the crises of the idea of God since the 
eighteenth century is connected chiefly 
with the problem of hovf the power that 
determines all reality can be thought of 
as a person.46
This is the challenge, as stated previously, that is directed 
to religion by Atheism, Does the mention of God as an all-determining 
reality necessarily exclude the reality of freedom? That is, does it 
destroy individuality in life? Can we speak of God as the all-deter­
mining reality and as the source of individual expression and freedom 
at the same time? The atheists, and here such names as Nietzche, 
Hartmann and Sartre might be mentioned, claim this is an impossibility,
p. 223. 
‘^■^Ibia., p. 227.
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Tlie affirmation of human freedom, they say, necessarily includes 
the proclamation of the non-existence of God. The weakness of 
dialectical theology, of which Brunner was a representative, was
its failure to deal with this criticism adequately.
Pannenberg is convinced that the atheist’s criticism strikes 
at the heart of theology. It is a challenge that cannot be taken 
very lightly. This is so because there is power in the criticism 
and because a response must be made to it, Pannenberg accepts 
the atheist's challenge as one with which the theologian must 
wrestle. There is no thought that the particular discipline of 
theology, by virtue of some special knowledge, can transcend it ; it 
is a challenge that must be met on its own ground. Atheism in its 
challenge makes it virtually impossible, in his estimation, for the 
Christian faith to retain God concepts deterministic as models of 
reality. Such concepts cannot be reconciled with personality in the 
important aspects of freedom of choice and decision, Brunner's con­
cept v/as seen as weak on this score.
Let it be clear, at this point, that there is no suggestion that
personality is absolutely without determination, Man is what he is
to a certain extent by the environment and community in which he lives. 
However, if this were a closed determinism, in the sense that contingency 
(the unexpected) could not have its place, then it would be destructive 
to freedom, Sartre, for example, could not reconcile determinism and 
freedom in any manner or degree and opted for absolute freedom. He 
failed to realize that freedom, with no boundaries, is usually de­
structive to human life. It can easily develop into licentiousness.
It was noted in Brunner that without the aspect of decisive meaning 
in community the dangers of antinomianism were present. He and 
Sartre would share similar criticism on this point.
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In speaking of the irreconcilability of personality with detei'- 
ministic models of reality, reference is made to models that allow 
for no decisiveness on the part of the individual. The problem of 
God, as the atheists see it, is that all present concepts of Him as 
an all-determining being, leave no room for this essential freedom. 
Omnipotence and omniscience, which are the traditional attributes 
signifying God’s all-determinacy, must either be dropped, in which 
case God would not be God for he would not determine everything, or 
the conflict between the world and theology must be accepted as 
inevitable. To continue with God-talk then, it would be necessary 
to place it above criticism from the secular world. For reasons 
stated, the latter is no alternative in that it would forever weaken 
the proclamation of the gospel. The first alternative is also 
unacceptable for the reason referred to,
Wolfhart Pannenberg attempts a response which is brave, original 
and very challenging. He brings forth a concept of God which gives 
ontological priority to the future. He refers to it as God as 'Future®, 
This expression of his concept of God has biblical foundation, logical 
construction and promise in terms of the requirements set out thus 
far. The biblical soundness of the concept will be investigated in 
a succeeding chapter, Pannenberg's views on the manner of God's
When referring to unity, Pannenberg writes, "This unity acquires 
identity by exhibiting some meaningful connection in the sequence of 
events. If this meaningful connection is understood in such a way as 
to replace the contingency of events with deterministic models of 
reality, the notion of a personal power behind those events is untenable," 
(Pannenberg, Theology of God, p, 58),
^^Pannenberg, Sasic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p, 242,
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appearance in Jesus and the message of Jesus himself in the gospels 
will be important on this matter. The logicality of the concept 
will depend on the satisfaction it offers to all requirements of 
the word "God" in our language, without which it would not make 
sense to speak of God, The promise of the concept rests in the 
strength it shows in meeting the demands that human existence puts 
upon it, including those of contingency and unity. It is this latter 
relevance that is so essential to the discussion in this thesis. The 
'personal* cannot be maintained unless the community (unity) is 
stressed with importance and significance while entertaining the 
special place of the individual.
It is important that the reader realize the basic intention of 
this writer in referring to Pannenberg, It is the promise within 
his concept that will be stressed most of all. In using the word 
promise, the embryonic position of Pannenberg's ideas is stressed.
He does not claim to have resolved all the theological dilemmas 
brought forth in the discussion at hand. At the heart of his theo­
logical method is the suggestion that everything is open and pro­
visional. This is the case with his own work. Therefore, in Tfhat 
follows, residual problems will arise which will not receive further 
attention by this writer. This is so, not only because it is beyond 
his capabilities to resolve them, but also because the present work 
does not depend on their resolution here. To restate it, our aim is 
to elaborate the promise in Pannenberg’s thoughtful expression. In 
doing this, the writer realizes that ha draws upon Pannenberg's own 
expression a great deal. This will be so sometimes without an attempt 
to explain the exact meaning of his phrases. In spite of this, the 
intention of this work should remain clear.
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Paiinenberg* s claim is that unity and contingency cannot be 
maintained without giving ontological priority to the future, that 
is, without employing the concept of God as Future; the latter 
logically entails the former.
With this expression, Pannenberg stands apart from, albeit 
very sympathetic to, theological and philosophical systems of 
thought which tend toward progressive development or necessary 
causes, This refers to the systems which give ontological priority 
to the past. Any system which sees the future as necessary, because 
of an innate futuristic direction or push in reality, would be 
included within this category. In these systems, the future, as 
well as the incompleteness of things and the changeability of the 
world, is referred to.
However, the future in such cases is a product from the past, 
that is, the past receives ontological priority. Such a perspective, 
Pannenberg argues, denies the essential contingency and freedom that 
is necessary for personal existence,^^
If something develops of necessity because of an innate drive 
within it, then the new that happens does not do so contingently.
Thus, it is not free or personal. It is for this reason that Pannen­
berg criticised the evolutionary optimism of nineteenth century 
liberalism in its emphasis on the progressive development of man in 
triumph over the elements of the world, Ritschl, who saw the eventual 
establishment of man's spirit over nature in the moral kingdom of God, 
would be open to such criticism. As stated, this was the point of
49See Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p, 114f, 
and also. The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p , 19^17"^
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Brunner's criticism of Ritschl, He accused Ritschl for not taking 
due cognizance of sin in life which would prevent any thought of 
inevitable progress and optimism,
pannenberg distances himself from Whitehead and Teilhard de 
Chardin as well. He has profound respect for both men and has 
been profoundly influenced and affected by their work and thought.
He says he can agree with Whitehead in considering the ultimate 
elements of reality in terms of single occasions contingently follow­
ing each other. He also agrees with Whitehead in the thought that 
each new occasion must apprehend the world it encounters. This would 
fall in line with Pannenberg’s whole understanding of hermeneutics.
He writes, however, in criticism of his philosophy, "In Whitehead’s 
ov7n theory the combined effect of a "creativity" which is attributed 
to matter and of ideal structures (eternal objects) tends to elim­
inate the novelty and contingency of events, in spite of Whitehead’s
50efforts to offset such a tendency,"
Teilhard de Chardin is a more appealing thinker to Pannenberg 
than is Whitehead, This has something to do with the former’s 
retention of the ’Omega’ point as the ultimate point of reference. 
And yet, within Teilhard de Chardin, the priority of the past, of 
which pannenberg is critical, exists, Pannenberg likes his idea 
of a transcendent spirit which dominates the process of evolution; 
this thought allows for contingent reality which, as stated, is a 
necessary condition for a personal universe. Disagreement arises
^^Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p, 66, This
criticism may stem from the fact that Whitehead leaves God open 
for development, thus sacrificing some of the all-determinacy of 
God for a creativity that is within matter itself, Pannenberg, as 
we shall see, while accepting growth in God, makes a vital dis­
tinction here from Whitehead, He does not want to recognize the 
development of God Himself,
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over Teilhard de Chardin's whole concept of energy. Instead of
thinlcing of energy in terms of a field of energy which would have
been reconcilable with his idea of transcendent wpirit, he develops
his idea of energy as an 'inside® reality of bodies. In doing this,
"....even the movement of self-transcendence and thus the entire
dynamic of evolution was attributed to finite bodies rather than -
as Teilhard wanted to do - to a principle transcending them as in
51the case with his point Omega.”
Both Brunner and Pannenberg clearly see tlie danger to the
individual's meaning in any such suggestion of futurism, Tliey are
united in their concern to protect the value of the individual in
his relationship to world history. Both agree that progressive
evolutionism denies the self such value, Brunner's conviction can
be represented in these words:
..,.what sort of meaning could the progress 
of humanity give to ^  life, the life of 
the individual man? The individual had, 
as it were, in order to attribute meaning 
to histoiy, to resign meaning for himself 
in favour of a meaning for humanity as a 
whole. For no doubt a vaguely conceived 
humanity in the remote future might well 
share in the goal of progress, but not he, 
the individual man, of to-day. Humanity
Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'The Doctrine of the Spirit and the Task 
of a Theology of Nature' (New Theology, No, 10, ed, Mar*bin E, Marty 
and Dean G, Peerman (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1973)? pp. 17-38), 
pp, 28-29. Teilhard de Chardin has been criticised by others for his 
futuristic method, Ernst Benz in his book. Evolution and Christian 
Hoj^G, trans, Heinz Prank (Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 19^^)? 
points out that present reality and the factors that comprise it, re­
tain little significance in the light of the powerful future that all 
things move toward. Everything is viewed as a contribution to the 
process of natural evolution. Even evil is seen in a positive light 
because it simply exists as a certain phase of the world on the way 
toward its goal (p. 231), Any evolutionary process which sees newness 
developing out of a past structure infringes on the rights and freedom 
of the individual in the social process to which he is referred. Thus, 
necessity and freedom, in this context, are irreconcilable. And an all- 
powerful God, which is the context in which Teilhard de Chardin develops 
his thought, would be less than personal and subject to the abiding 
criticism of modern atheism stated above.
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must, as it were, form a pyramid where 
each generation would d i m  higher than 
its predecessors until the last, climb- 
ing over all the others, reached the top,^
Pannenberg's opinion is expressed as follows:
The realization of man's being as such 
requires a community in which everyone 
has his own proper place, so that in it 
the conflicts between the individual 
and society, ai’e overcome. If the unity 
of man's being as an individual and a 
member of society is an indispensable 
condition for the realization of his 
humanity, it is not sufficient for a 
balance to be struck in some future 
order of society between the individual 
and society, even if this could be 
supposed possible under the present 
conditions of human existence, where 
the common interest must be discerned 
and furthered by individuals who re­
peatedly do so from the point of view 
of their private interests. But even 
if it were possible to establish the 
unity of men's individual and common 
interests in a future society, how 
then would people of previous gener­
ations participate in the destiny of man 
realized in such a future society?55
The distinctive difference between Brunner and Pannenberg, 
fundamental to our whole discussion, is that Brunner accepts the 
position of meaninglessness as inevitable on the stage of world
^^runner. Eternal Hope, pp, 82-83.
55Pannenberg, The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p. 198, This is
the same question Russell Norris directs to Roger Garaudy in the con­
cluding part of his analysis of him, Garaudy, Norris claims, is unable, 
in spite of his diversion from the traditional path of Marxism, to 
escape the danger inherent within it, that is, the danger of sacrificing 
the individual for a future utopia, Norris writes that Garaudy himself, 
is in danger of forfeiting his efforts to preserve individual initiative 
by subordinating individuality to collective totality, "'The question 
of the inviolability of the individual vis-a-vis the needs of future 
society leads back to the question of moloch, the false god to which 
this generation is sacrificed for the sake of speculative, unborn future 
generations," (Russell Norris, God, Marx and the Future (Fortress Press, 
Philadelphia, 1974), p. 197).
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histoiy; there is no escape from it. This was evident in his view 
of time, Pannenberg, on the other hand, suggests a new view of 
time which places the question of 'meaning* within history while 
avoiding the pitfalls of futurism. His concept of God is, of 
course, central to this idea, More attention will be devoted to 
this later.
If Pannenberg rejects an idea of God that gives priority to 
the past, for the reasons stated, neither would he accept a concept 
giving priority to the present, that is, a concept that views all 
moments of time cohering in an eternal present. In this under­
standing, there would be no logical order of time in God and this
54would, in effect, diminish the seriousness of historical reality.
As indicated in our last chapter, time has little value if it is 
not essentially related to God,
In the light of the inadequacies considered in these viewpoints, 
Pannenberg developed the concept of God as Future. Ttie question 
he sets for himself, and for us, is: Does the concept of the onto­
logical priority of the future meet demands of the personal? This 
is a necessary condition if 'God' is to be a relevant word. Does 
it preserve unity and contingency in human life? There are those 
who are prepared to argue that the concept does not satisfy these 
requirements. These criticisms will be taken up in succeeding pages. 
The first task, however, is to show the relevance the concept has, 
in the opinion of Wolfhart Pannenberg, For this purpose his chapter 
entitled 'The God of Hope'^^in the second volume of his Basic 
Questions in Theology, is very important.
^^ee Galloway, Wolfhart Pannenbm:^, p. 95.
55This, of course, is not the only chapter in which Pannenberg 
speaks directly about the God of hope. One could turn to many sections 
of his writings for such expression as it is basic to his whole theology.
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It is very difficult to determine the influences on an individual's
thought processo It is not to he denied that all scholars come under
the persuasion of others, to one degree or another. Pannenberg pays
respect to a number of scholars, philosophers and theologians in this
sense, Hegel's thought, for example, was a dominant influence on
him. Pannenberg's view of 'Revelation as History' is not unrelated
to Hegel's thouglit on the relationship of history to God, Whitehead
and the Process Theology that has developed from him could also be
mentioned as influential in the growth of his concepts. In the chapter
'The God of Hope', he mentions yet another man, Ernst Bloch, whose
insight has been valuable in shaping his thought, Pannenberg writes
in reference to Bloch, "Perhaps Christian theology will one day have
to thanlc Ernst Bloch's philosophy of hope for giving it the courage
56to recover in the full sense its central category of eschatology."
Let us briefly consider Bloch as this will lead into the dis­
cussion of Pannenberg's own contribution, Langdon Gilkey, in a 
57review article on Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology, has 
convincingly related the thought of Bloch to Pannenberg, It is 
sufficient here to reiterate some of the salient points he made in 
his article. These are points Pannenberg himself mentions. As Gilkey 
says, Bloch has a fundamental sympathy for religion in that it refers 
man to the future for his meaning and, thus, keeps alive the openness 
of existence necessary for his freedom. As well, Bloch feels that the
56
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, pp. 237-238,
57Langdon Gilkey, 'Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology: a 
Review Article' (Perspective, Vol. XXV, Spring '73, pp. 35-53). I will 
be referring to Gilkey's article for another reason. He presents a 
challenge to Pannenberg's thought which is helpful to our investigation.
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sense of divine mystery in the 'hidden God' of religion gives and
guarantees man's dignity. "Only in relation to the 'hidden God'
....is the problem of what is at stake in the legitimate mystery
58of the 'hidden man' ....kept open." Thus, Bloch can see the
value a God concept might have. However, in his estimation, such
value has been dissolved by the concept of God expressed by the
Christian faith through the years. The messianic theme with its
promise and hope motif became humanized and finally neutralized in
59the doctrine of the consubstantiality of Jesus Christ with God,
Bloch, finding the God-hypostasis defenseless, dropped the 
notion while holding onto the future reality which was implicit 
in it. Instead of deifying the future, Bloch secularized it by 
referring it solely to the plane of histoiy; thus, history is con­
ceptualized in the expression "S is not yet P",^^ In its implications 
this simply means that present reality is characterized by an openness 
and that future possibilities take precedence over everything that is.
'pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p, 241
^ I^bid., p. 238,
^^In the article, 'Ernst Bloch and "The Pull of the Future"',
(New Theology, No, 3, ed, Martin Marty and Dean Peerman (The Macmillan 
Company, New York, I968), pp. 191-204), Harvey Cox writes of Bloch in 
this way: "But what does Bloch help us to see? How would his thought 
be capsuled if it had to be described in a few words? Bloch himself, 
Adolph Lowe reports, was once faced with this challenge, A few years 
back at a late afternoon tea in the home of a friend, someone challenged 
the old man to sum up his philosophy in one sentence, "All great phil­
osophers have been able to reduce their thought to one sentence", the 
friend said, "VHiat would your sentence be?" Bloch puffed on his pipe 
for a moment and then said, "ïîiat's a hard trap to get out of. If I 
answer, then I'm making myself out to be a great philosopher. But if 
I'm silent, then it will appear as though I have a great deal in mind 
but not much I can say. But I'll play the brash one instead of the 
silent one and give you this sentence: S is not yet P,"" (pp, 193-194)«
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For Bloch, this preserves the dignity of man in that it ceases to 
tie him to any systems, expressions, or programmes of the present; 
that is, it gives him freedom, Man is assured of his dignity be­
cause history is open, Hope, at the same time, becomes history’s 
theme and not something in the past or present, Bloch joins the 
atheists in their criticism that freedom and essential hope are 
dissolved, however, by the concept of an 'existing* God,
Pannenberg, as he makes clear in the chapter referred to, 
accepts a great deal of what Bloch has to say. Although he 
questions whether Bloch, in actual fact, has done justice to the 
traditional concepts of God and the implications within them, he 
does accept the validity of Bloch's criticism that a divine 'existing* 
being annihilates man's freedom. Also, God Himself, being said to 
'exist', can be called into question with the rest of all existing 
things and beings. Thus, Pannenberg admits that Bloch and the 
atheists have pointed to a deficiency in the present understanding 
of God, Before us is the prospect of either dropping the idea 
altogether, ox’ redefining it in the light of man's basic experience 
of openness.
Dropping the idea of God would have serious consequences. It 
would reduce Christianity to the function of mere emotional expression 
or prescriptive language, as the linguistic analysts have suggested.
It would also remove the means of overcoming the inadequacies of Bloch's 
own position,
Pannenberg, while accepting the open possibilities of reality 
which Bloch has affirmed, goes on to show how the latter's affirmations 
are endangered by dropping the notion of God. By doing so, he says,
Bloch has not offered man any firm grounding for the hope that is in him.
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If one were to attribute such openness to man, one would alv/ays be 
depending on man's psychological incentive to project his wishes 
into the future and, thus, provide for creativity. As is only too 
evident, however, from observing certain circumstances of man's 
behaviour, he can so easily remain satisfied with his present cir­
cumstances and achievement. This is surely too common an experience 
in the life of every man to warrant explicit substantiation in this 
part of our discussion. If, on the other hand, one were to ascribe 
openness for new possibilities to potencies and latencies within 
history itself, then that very openness would be endangered by the 
notion of causality implied. Causality, in the sense of something 
new always arising as an effect from a cause, logically destroys 
any idea of openness and freedom. This weakness, as earlier suggested, 
is present in the thought of Teilhard de Chardin and to some extent, 
in the system of Whitehead and Process Theology, Pannenberg says 
even Bloch referred to latent forces within reality,And, with 
such an idea, it is difficult to see how he can escape the notion 
of historical inevitability which is diametrically opposed to in­
dividuality and openness. Sir Isaiah Berlin writes of the exclusive­
ness of such forces and openness in the following:
If the history of the world is due to the 
operation of identifiable forces other than, 
and little affected by, free human wills and 
free choices,,.then the proper explanation 
of what happens must be given in terms of 
the evolution of such forces. And there is 
then a tendency to say that not individuals.
61Cf, Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p, 239
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but these larger entities, are ultimately 
’responsible*
Dropping the idea of G-od, thus, is not a real option. It 
would logically implicate us in the direction stated. The future, 
in such a case, would be dependent on man's psychological powers 
or something within history itself. Such a method, says Pannenberg, 
would also be opposed to the basic experience in reality of reaching 
out beyond the finite to a completion and fulfillment of existence.
He indicated that Bloch himself was unable to escape this notion
63and, thus, was actually extending the future beyond history.
The only manner of protecting contingency and, at the same time, 
man's essential involvement with community, according to Pannenberg, 
is by grounding the future within itself, Man is then going beyond 
the process of history and inferring a higher power. With this, the 
question of G-od once again arises, Pannenberg’s argument is that the 
question of God, in the light of the above, is really unavoidable if 
personal existence is to be maintained. Thus, he has reversed the 
criticism of Bloch and the atheist by contesting their position in 
favour of religion, particularly the Christian faith. Let us go on 
to show his reasoning on the matter.
Isaiah Berlin, ’Historical Inevitability* (The Philosophy of 
History), p, I7I» Berlin writes further: "Whether the causes that 
are held completely to determine human action are physical or psychical 
or of some other kind, and in whatever pattern or proportion they are 
deemed to occur, if they are truly causes - if their outcomes are 
thought to be an unalterable as, say, the effects of physical or 
physiological causes - this of itself seems to me to make the notion 
of a free choice between alternatives inapplicable,,,.Freedom to act
.requires a situation in which no sum total of such causal factors 
wholly determines the result " (pp, 172-173)#
63Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p. 241.
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His argument would proceed in the following way. If the future 
has ontological priority, that is, if it is grounded in itself, then 
certain favorable consequences follow for reality. One, the contingent, 
which is basic to the personal quality of our life, is assured. Events 
are not viewed, thus, arising within the field of history itself, as 
products of existing forces or simply human initiative. This idea 
would oppose contingency and make meaning uncertain. Rather, events 
arise as contingent and unexpected and, thus, are truly free, Pannen­
berg writes in this connection, ",,,,the power of the future is dis­
tinguished by the fact that it frees man from his ties to what pre­
sently exists in order to liberate him for his future, to give him 
his freedom
At the same time, unity is preserved and guaranteed with the 
employment of this concept. All contingent events are now related 
to the same future. The future would be the same future for all 
events as contingent facts of historical existence arise out of the 
future,
One of the problems, mentioned above, is that of guaranteeing 
the value and dignity of the individual on the plane of history.
Both Brunner and Pannenberg are aware that any utopian notion, such 
as Bloch proposes, would allow all value to be placed on some sub­
sequent period of history which, at some future date, would reach 
fruition. All previous factors would thus be sacrificed for this 
utopia without their personal participation. The ontological 
priority of the future would protect the contingent against this
^hbid,, p, 243.
6bSee pp.157^ »^ of this thesis for an account of this claim. 
There, I have made some attempt to state how events arise out of 
the future.
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loss of value by relating all events to the same future, Brunner, 
as we have suggested, without the aid of such a concept, could see 
no possibility for the preservation of meaning other than 'above* 
history. Meaning, for him, was established in a relationship with 
G-od 'above' man's involvement with the social and historical realities 
of life. As stated, Brunner did not provide any reasonable corre­
lation of the two,
Brunner's refusal to place man's meaning on the construction 
of some utopia in the future is understandable. However, his complete 
separation of 'meaning* from history is not a convincing alternative. 
Divorcing 'meaning' from the social and political realities is at 
variance with the common experiences of man. Such a practice would 
render religion, and more importantly Christianity, incredulous to 
him.^^ The concept of the ontological priority of the future would 
help to retain the irelevance of the Christian faith in that history 
and the events that comprise it would be essentially in God. This 
would make political and social matters and, at the same time, 
natural morality essential to the 'meaning' of life. This will be 
elaborated in succeeding pages and chapters. First, let it be said 
that the concept of the 'ontological priority of the future' cannot 
be employed without giving serious attention to the things that are 
implied therein.
Two questions present themselves in the light of Pannenberg's 
concept of the 'ontological priority of the future'. How is one to
Barth and Brunner, it should be remembered, formed their 
theologies during World War conditions. They were experiencing 
the hoxTxd consequences of man’s attempt to conquer the world.
In disagreeing with their theological conclusions, there is also 
great sympathy for their intentions to confront man with the 
ultimate.
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conceive the reality of God? What right would one have in ascribing 
such power of the future to God? In Pannenberg's estimation, these 
are two crucial questions for the Christian faith at the present time.
The response to these questions also involves matters crucial to the 
whole discussion of man in community. The last question will be 
considered first as the very basis of the Christian faith itself is 
at stake. What justification do we have in ascribing the power of 
the future to God?
In dealing with any of Pannenberg's arguments the word 'probability*
should be used. He does not make absolute claims. This is particularly
so with the concept under consideration. He claims only a degree of
probability for it in relation to the truth. In Pannenberg's estimation,
this is a qualification that must be applied to all attempts to reach
the truth. With reference to the Apostles* Creed he writes:
Whether an examination of the truth of the 
statements in the creed can arrive at a 
final answer is, it must be admitted, doubt­
ful from the start. Who could definitively 
settle the question of whether the God whom 
Jesus preached created the universe? Or 
whether Jesus rose from the dead and will 
also raise those who believe in him from 
death to his ovm everlasting life? Or the 
meaning of the Holy Spirit? Who is really 
capable of settling all these questions?
Nobody who has become even remotely con­
cerned, But for the person who tries to 
discover the grounds of his Christian faith, 
the important thing is to penetrate so far 
into the ancient formulations of the creed 
that their factual basis becomes accessible; 
then the assurance can spring up that these 
formulations are not simply empty phrases 
but point to facts which are accessible to 
us as well, even There we should formulate 
these facts differently. Once this con­
fidence in the factualness of the transmitted 
credal formulae has grown up, faith can trust 
in the certainty of its foundation, even
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though this confidence will never communicate 
itself without any element of doubt,
Keeping this in mind, let us proceed with the question at hand.
It was suggested that the concept of the 'ontological priority
of the future' insures the two essential factors of personal existence.
The proposal was made that contingent reality or freedom can only
be defended with this understanding. Man is not absolutely determined
by something before or in him but is unbounded, in an important sense,
toward the future. Having stated this, it can be said that freedom
presupposes the future for its existence. If freedom is essential
for the personal, which has already been established, and, in turn,
is essentially related to the future, then one can say with Pannenberg,
",,,.futurity as a condition of freedom constitutes the very core of
the personal,
The next step, and perhaps the most important, is one that Pannen­
berg describes as very difficult. It centers around the question of 
the personal itself and the ground from whence it springs. The difficulty 
here comes from the atheistic challenge voiced by J, G, Fichte, The 
personality of God, he says, is nothing but the projection of man's own 
person outside himself, Pannenberg quotes him as saying;
What then do you call personality and 
consciousness? Is it not something you 
have found within yourself, which you 
have come to know in yourself and have 
designated by this name? The fact that 
you do not at all thinlc of this without 
limitation and finitude, nor could do so, 
you can learn from the most cursory atten­
tion to the way you have constructed this 
concept. You make this being, accordingly, 
by attributing this predicate to a finite 
being, to a being like yourself, and you
^^Volfhart Pannenberg, The Apostles' Creed, trans, Margaret Kohl 
(SGM Press, London, 1972), p, 11,
^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, pp, 24-3-246.
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hav0 not, as you intended, conceived
God, but only reduplicated yourself in
thought,
Fichte's claim in this statement is that the personal is grounded
only in anthropology. He suggests it is from this basis that the
idea originates. Any tallc or reference to the personal in what­
ever context, therefore, must refer back to this anthropological 
starting point. In this argument, Fichte declared a victory over 
the claims of the Christian faith. The God of that faith could 
now be nothing but a figment of man's imagination, that is, an 
illusion.
How is this criticism to be met? By withdrawing from the 
realm of experiences open to human life and placing support for the 
personal in faith as immediate encounter? This method is adopted 
by Brunner, As intimated, however, such a retreat would have the 
unfortunate effect of weakening the claims of the Christian faith, 
Pannenberg reasons that man must meet the attack more directly than 
this if he is to restore relevance and credibility to the word 'God', 
He approaches the problem in the following manner. He says if a 
close examination is made of man's experiences in life, then it is 
not so self-evident, as previously thought, that the personal is a 
product of these experiences. This is borne out by the fact that 
freedom, which is an essential of the personal, is frequently denied 
man in this world. This is so in theory as well as in fact. The 
behaviourist, for example, claims our actions as purely the result 
of pre-conditioning. There are also theories that look upon man 
as impersonal, that is, a phenomenon of evolutionary forces working
pp. 227-228.
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themselves out in time. In practice, there are circumstances in 
which the individual is regarded and treated as a thing. He is 
manipulated hy those who happen to have superior power. The 
writings of such men as Solzhenitsyn^^reveals the depth of this 
impersonal force at work in political systems at the present time.
If the personal was as self-evident within man as Fichte claimed, 
it would be difficult to explain these existing impersonal ten­
dencies, They are expressed not only in the occasional quirk 
of man's behaviour, but also in the ideological and political 
structures that embody the impersonal in their creeds.
In the light of this, Pannenberg aslcs the question: "Does 
not his dignity as a person have more the character of an article
of faith than a demonstrable element singled out from experienced
71anthropological realities?" He means, is the person not a matter 
of trust, rather than an awareness based on human experience? In 
asking this question, Pannenberg is associating the personal with 
religious experience. He looks at the life of primitive man for 
an answer to this question. Primitive man personified objects that 
surrounded him. This was a practice that grew out of the religious 
dimension of his existence and not from self-reflection. Pannenberg 
gives the example of the child in play personifying things in his 
environment. It is known, through the process of time, that such 
objects are not personal; this does not, however, take away from 
the personal nature of the power encountered. This personal power
70Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, trans. Thomas 
Whitney (Collins & Harvill Press, London, 1974)*
71Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theolq^, Vol. II, p, 228,
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makes a concrete claim upon man through his religious experience and
leads him to the probability that the personal is an experience that
comes man and not from him, Pannenberg writes:
A personal conception of the divine reality 
on the sense described above is unquestion­
ably common to wide areas of the history of 
religions. It is not in every sense something 
specific to the biblical understanding of God.
On the other hand, there seems to be great 
differences among the different religions 
and even between the different deities of one 
and the same religion with respect to the 
peculiar manner and significance of their 
personal character. Thus the personal element 
in the conception of God in the Olympian re­
ligion of the Greeks seems to have been from 
the first far less important than in the ancient 
Near East, and here the leading deities of the 
Tigris-Euphrates valley seem to have had more 
sharply drawn personalities than those of Egypt,
In comparison with them, the personality of the 
biblical God exhibits still other specific 
features. This God is characterized by a free­
dom of action that, together with the exclus­
ivity of his claim upon those in covenant with 
him, sets the God of Israel off from the other 
divine figures with whom the people of the 
ancient Near East otherwise a s s o c i a t e d ,72
This understanding of the origin of the personal not only has 
the important effect of undermining the power of Fichte's criticism 
of religion and the Christian faith, but also, of associating the 
personal with God in a way that was previously not possible.
Let us now return to the first question proposed, "What con­
sequences would the concept of the 'ontological priority of the
Ibid,, pp, 231-232 (see also J, Bowker, The Sense of God 
(Claredon Press, London, 1973), pp. 43ff., where the author, in 
comparing different primitive religions, also asks the question 
of the personal. Is it generated entirely within the social as 
Durkheim argues? Or is it an experience outside the social?).
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future* have for our understanding of God? If the personal has 
futurity as its essence and if the personal can be related to 
God through the concrete claim of religious experience, what does 
this say about God? Pannenberg answers with the statement: 
the question must now be concerned exclusively with the possibility 
of a God "with futurity as a quality of being," and therefore a 
return to the God of theism must be ruled out at this stage,"
The significance of this statement should not be under­
estimated. In considering it, a new concept of God is brought for­
ward. Pannenberg*s originality of thought is most clear and chall­
enging in his expression of God as Future, In spite of its rudi­
mentary character, it is an expression that has much promise in 
meeting the demands of the personal (freedom and unity), while 
protecting the sovereignty of God (His all-determinacy). It is a 
conception, at the same time, that must be examined cautiously 
because of its divergence from the traditional path of understanding, 
"Does this mean", writes Pannenberg, "that God is not yet, but 
is yet to be?" His answer to this question is ambiguously a yes 
and a no. Yes, there is a sense in which he is saying God does not 
yet exist. This can be seen clearly if we reflect on the Lordship 
of God, that is. His rule. To think of God is to think necessarily 
of His rule over man and creation. Yet it is obvious that such rule 
and Lordship is not complete; it is not finished. This incompleteness 
of rule implies, in a very important sense, that God does not yet exist
73'•^ Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p, 242, 
^^^bid,, p. 242.
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because rule is essentially related to his nature, Pannenberg writes
as a conclusion, "Thus it is necessary to say that, in a restricted
75but important sense, God does not yet exist,"
Pannenberg should not be misunderstood when he makes such 
statements. On the surface it might appear that he is rejecting 
something of paramount importance to traditional Christianity, namely, 
the self-sufficiency of God, If this is rejected then it is question­
able whether one can proceed with the discussion any further and still 
hold to the basic intention of the word *God' itself. But, as seen 
from our investigation of Pannenberg so far, he means to hold firmly 
to this traditional conviction. His description of God as all- 
determinaoy infers that God is not subject to any other thing or 
creature. He writes clearly, "This does not mean that God could not 
be God apart from the existence of finite beings, for God certainly 
can do without anyone or anything else,"^^ Pannenberg makes this 
point once again when he comments on the Whiteheadian idea of 
development in God, He writes, "....we cannot agree when Whitehead 
suggests that the futurity of God's Kingdom implies a development in 
God, It is true that, from the viewpoint of our finite present, the 
future is not yet decided. Therefore, the movement of time contributes 
to deciding what the definite truth is going to be, also with regard 
to the essence of God, But - and here is the difference from Whitehead 
what turns out to be true in the future will then be evident as having
^Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. $6. 
^^Ibid., p. 55,
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been true all along. This applies to God as well as to every finite 
reality.
(C) Assessment of Pannenberg*s Concept
In any assessment of Pannenberg’s theology it must be stressed
that his faults lie not in weakening the power and glory of God.
At least it should be said that his intentions to preserve God's
sovereignty are strong. Nevertheless, the question must be posed;
Is it possible to hold to a sameness in God and to a change in God
at the same time? Not a few theologians, in their assessment of
Pannenberg's thought (including those who have much respect for his
intentions), find this aspect of his thought difficult. It has not
been given enough clarity and, thus, creates some confusion. A, D,
Galloway, in his recent book on Pannenberg, although very sympathetic
to the understanding Pannenberg is offering, finds this one of the
weak points that must be reconsidered and clarified,
Langdon Gilkey finds this part of Pannenberg’s expression most
confusing and under-developed. He says Pannenberg is trying to defend
two notions that are theologically, linguistically and religiously 
79different, It is important to deal with Gilkey's criticism at some
77Ibid., pp, 62-63, Ian Barbour, who has great respect for 
Whiteheadian metaphysics in that he finds him closely assimilated 
to the modern physics conception of nature and the world, admits 
this is one of the weaknesses of Whitehead's God, He writes,
"God acts in the word, the communication of meaning: we have freedom 
to respond or not, for grace is not "irresistable", Moreover, by 
limiting God's power, Whitehead absolves him of responsibility for 
evil, though at the expense of his ability to overcome it. For in 
this presentation, God lacks both the sovereign control and moral 
intensity of the biblical Jehovah," (lan Barbour, Issues in Science 
and Religion (SCM Press Ltd., London, I966), p.
78See Galloway, WoIfhart Pannenberg, p. 96f*
79Gilkey, 'Pannenberg*3 Basic Questions in Theology: a Review 
Article* (Perspective, Vol. XIV, Spring *73), p. 50.
- 147-
length because he has clearly expressed things that puzzle many 
admirers of Pannenberg's thought.
First, Gilkey does not understand how Pannenberg can escape
the notion of development in God, His reasoning proceeds on the
basis of the following interpretation. Pannenberg is saying,
Gilkey claims, that (a) God as future exists; that God's being
is the same during the course of history, in the past, present,
and future, "What here (meaning "a") Pannenberg means then by the
futurity of God's being is that during the course of history God
always acts from the future, that he is always "ahead" of every
present as its future, rather than the present ground of events.
Thus for Pannenberg God, during the course of history, always "is"
and is in relation to every present, but only as the future,
He is also saying, Gilkey claims, that (b) Gcd will in the end be
in some sense a different reality than what he is now, "For then
God's deity will be realized, manifested and so recognized - he will
really be God as r u l e r , G i l k e y  goes on to clarify this distinction
further in these words:
In "a", and so during the course of history, 
the future God exists (is real) in some 
important and basic sense; but he exists as 
hidden or absent, since he is only effective 
on history's events from the future and has, 
for some reason, not yet achieved full control 
of these events. In meaning "b" the hidden­
ness obviously drops out, the effectiveness 
vastly increases, and God then rules completely 
and so visibly.
p. 50. 
^’ibid., p. 50. 
^^Ibid.j pp. 50-51.
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If we do not make this distinction, says Gilkey, then Pannenberg 
is left with an almighty, omnipotent, ruling, present God determining 
all events. If, on the other hand, the distinction is made one cannot 
escape the thought of development in God's reality.
There is a second problem Gilkey brings to our attention in his
analysis of Pannenberg, which we shall mention before responding to
the first* It arises from the meaning of God "a", that is, God's
relationship or effectiveness during the course of history as a
future reality, "Surely", writes Gilkey, "with such an agent reality
determining events from the future, the freedom of man and the openness
85of history are deeply challenged." Gilkey does not think Pannenberg*s 
shift of causality from the present to the future alleviates the problem. 
He is referring to the suggestion which Pannenberg makes of a reversal 
in the time sequence, Pannenberg writes of the matter in this way;
"Our considerations are based on a reversal of the time sequence usually 
presupposed in notions of causality. In contrast to formulations about 
natural order, which describe the impact of past conditions on present 
and future, we have suggested an idea of creation which understands the 
present - and each present now past - as resulting from its future,
"Now it is obvious", writes Gilkey, "that on this new view, man's freedom 
from necessitating coercion and so history’s openness are not funda­
mentally challenged by past or present causes or necessities,,,.rather 
if transhuman causes, especially the divine causality, come in from 
the future, it is from that direction, and not from the past, that 
human freedom and the openness of history are really endangered. For 
a God determining all from the future - and the only relevant deter-
p. 52.
^Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 70.
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rainatioïi is from the future in this view - is precisely the omni­
potent ruler on this view of causality that the Gcd of theism, 
present at hand and omnipotent, was on the old view of causality,
These criticisms are cogent, and helpful in pinpointing some of 
the confusion that accompanies Pannenberg's statements. When speaking 
of causality, for example, there is a vagueness of meaning Intended,
If it were defined in terms of the natural sciences then difficulties 
as to the openness and contingency of reality would arise. This is 
not an issue that has any conclusive settlement as it is still open 
for considerable discussion and debate,
Regardless of the question of causality, however, there are 
certain things that must be said in defence of Pannenberg, which 
Gilkey fails to understand or mention. The promise and challenge 
of his concept will not become clear until these are dealt with.
First, Pannenberg will be better understood if an explanatory 
statement he made is considered,
,,,,God's becoming and his sameness must be 
considered more exactly in their relatedness.
It will hardly suffice to speak only of a 
becoming "in the other," as if an inner being 
of God were to be distinguished that remains 
completely untouched by such becoming. The 
maker himself is changed by the production 
and shaping of another being. The change 
cannot be held remote from God’s inner being.
But this does not necessarily affect his 
identity. To be sure, such identity can be
85Gilkey, ’Pannenberg’s Basic Questions in Theology; a Review 
Article* (Perspective, Vol. XIV, Spring ’73), p. 33.
^^The question of causality is a timely one in philosophical 
circles today (of. The Philosophy of History ed, Patrick Gardiner, 
in which the question is dealt with at some length, and the series 
History and Theory (Mouton and Co,, S, Gravenage, I96I, *62, ’63,
’ é4jjr"~~î'here is much question as to whether causality can be thought 
of in a strict deterministic sense as with Karl Popper,
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conceived together with a becoming in 
G-od himself only if time and eternity 
are not mutually exclusive,87
The words at the end of this assertion are extremely important to
88Pannenberg’s whole programme, Tdmae and Eternity, he says, should
not be thought of as mutually exclusive concepts. Rather, they
89should be considered part of the same reality. In his thought,
God takes times up into Himself so that it becomes part of His 
essence, Ttius, there are not two separate realities, the reality 
of God and the reality of time. The reality of God includes time 
within itself. Therefore, it is impossible to conceive the reality 
of God as unfinished in the sense of there being a development to 
Him, This latter idea (Whitehead) makes God subject to time; at a 
future time, something different from God now would come in to 
being then. The reality of God ia, in Pannenberg*s thought, but 
only in the sense that there is nothing outside the reality of God, 
Any development then, if that expression can be used (perhaps it 
would be better to use the word change or movement), would be within 
God, It would be in God’s inner being and not to God as reality 
Himself, Ihis distinction, on Pannenberg’s behalf, is a vital one in 
defending his understanding of God as an all-determining reality, 
Gilkey is forgetting its importance when he writes, ",.,it is 
hard to see, granting the vast difference in God’s manifestation of 
his deity, in the level of his effectiveness, in the relation of his 
power to time (in "b" he acts in the present) between the two notions^
"^^ Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, trans, Lewis Wilkins and 
Duane Priebe (SCM Press Ltd., London, 320,
88The subject of time and eternity will receive further treatment 
in the next chapter,
^^More explanation will be given on this when the Christological 
position is examined.
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how there is no development in God’s reality, especially if reality
90or being are defined in terras of God's effective rule," Again, 
in the light of this, let us state that only if time and eternity 
are viewed as inclusive concepts can a difference in God be claimed 
with a sameness. Whether or not it is possible to see time and 
eternity in this sense has not been supported thus far. This is a 
question we will reserve for the next chapter. The Christological 
positions of Brunner and Pannenberg are crucial on this point.
Without immediate attention to this support, this much, at 
least, can be said. If time is outside God, that is, if time and 
eternity are not inclusive concepts (Brunner), then time can have 
no conceivable value, and contingency is thereby threatened, Pannen­
berg’s suggestion that they are not exclusive protects the significance 
of time and, as well, meets Gilkey's criticism.
Does it not, however, add to the problem of determinism? This 
is a threatening problem every time God is said to be involved in time,^^ 
Gilkey pointed to this as a problem in Pannenberg’s concept of God, 
especially the quality of all-determinacy. It was from the conviction 
that deterministic conclusions could not be avoided that he wrote,
"Only an ontological and so theologically conceptual limitation on the 
divine sovereignty - whether from eternity, from the present, or from
the future - can guarantee the openness of history, not a mere change
92in the temporal locus of God's being and work."''^
90Gilkey, ’Pannenberg’s Basic Questions in Theology; a Review 
Article’ (Perspective, Vol. XIV, Spring ’73), p. 51*
91Refer to the argument in Chapter II of this thesis, pp, 93ff,
92Gilkey, ’Pannenberg’s Basic Questions in Theology: a Review 
Article’ (Perspective, Vol. XIV, Spring ’73), p. 34*
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Gilkey is not alone in writing of this problem in Pannenberg’s
thought, Ted Peters also made note of it in an article on Pannen-
berg's apologetic method,He says this is one of the big areas
of disagreement between the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer and
Pannenberg, in spite of many similarities in their understanding
of hermeneutic. Both share the view of a comprehensive horizon, in
the sense that the individual’s meaning depends on the life forms and
nexus that encompass him. For Pannenberg, such a nexus of events
extends beyond the limited totality that is present, to ever greater
horizons such as peoples and states. It extends beyond all things
to the totality of mankind and universal history, Gadamer, on the
other hand, saw such a move as destructive to the finitude and free-
94dom^  of man’s life. He says if man wa.s regarded as part of a total
horizon then the absolute openness, which is essential for his freedom,
would be jeopardized, even if this total horizon were God,
Gilkey thiiiks the same thing happens when Pannenberg attempts
to re™theologize Bloch's concept of the open future. He writes:
For Bloch, although ideals, not-yet possibilities 
"determine the present" (as final causes), the 
agents in historical change were presently exist­
ing men plus the past and present "tendencies" 
and "latencies" in the process of histoiy of which 
Bloch vaguely spoke. Despite Bloch's language, 
then, his thought involves, as far as the efficient 
causes of historical change are concerned, no 
reversal of ordinary causality vis-a-vis time: 
men in the present, fired by future possibilities, 
act to bring changes into the immediate future.
Thus in his philosophy (since he left "latencies"
93Ted Peters, ’Truth in History: Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and 
Pannenberg’s Apologetic Method’ (The Journal of Religion, January 
1975, Vol. 35, No. I, pp, 36-57)0 See, as well, Pannenberg's 
article, 'Hermeneutic and Universal History' (Basic Questions in 
Theology, Vol, I, pp, 97-136),
^^See Peters, ’Truth in History: Gadamer'3 Hermeneutics and 
Pannenberg's Apologetic Method’ (The Journal of Religion, January
1975, Vol. 55, No, 1), p, 49.
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merely latent) history could he said to be 
generally open and free since not-yet 
possibilities remain undecided (merely 
possible) until human freedom chooses and 
enacts them. In Pannenberg, however, these 
not-yet ideals are "theologized" into an 
agent reality God, who is "all-determining,"
"producing events which are the effects of 
his choices," "so that everything that has 
come to pass, even in times long gone.,,, 
has come about and also has been changed 
once again through this same power of the 
future which decides over the present just
as it has brought it forth," Surely with
such an agent reality determining events 
from the future, the freedom of man and the 
openness of history are deeply c h a l l e n g e d ,53
Pannenberg would be the first to agree that both Gadamer and
Gilkey have legitimate concerns in their criticisms, Man must
always live with the awareness that generalizations and universals 
of any nature are limited from within history. He cannot succeed 
in projecting a total horizon that would encompass all things, Pannen­
berg writes, ",,,,it remains true for the one who wishes to have 
experiences as well as for the one who is experienced and who knows 
about being overtaken by continually new experiences, that they can 
never regard as complete the knowledge they possess or that they may
96somehow attain." Pannenberg would agree, as well, with the impli­
cation of their criticism, that a being existing prior to man's 
historical reality would destroy the finitude and freedom that are 
common experiences in life. For this reason, Pannenberg would not 
accept the main point of their criticism that his thought is deters 
ministio. He points out something with respect to Gadamer that may 
be helpful in dealing with the criticism from Gilkey.
The whole work of Gadamer, he says, is one which is formed
95Gilkey, 'Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology: a Review 
Article* (Perspective, Vol. XIV, Spring *73), p. 52.
96Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, p. 121.
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by a partly open, partly tacit, debate with Hegel, With the reali­
zation of Pannenberg’s own attraction to Hegelian philosophy, there 
is probably a suspicion that his concept of universal history is 
plagued by the same inadequacies that afflicted Hegel’s system itself, 
Hegel has been criticised for his notion of history in that it presents 
history as a self-contained process unfolding with necessity or com­
pulsion, Pannenberg writes, "....Gadamer shuns the "speculative 
claims of a philosophy of world history,,,.because he sees - with 
good reason - in Hegel's attempt to sublimate history into "the
absolute self-consciousness of philosophy",,,,a contradiction to the
97finitude of human experience,,,,"
Gillcey, as indicated, includes Pannenberg in those systems of 
thought which, as with Hegel, deny the finitude of life. It is 
debateable whether or not Pannenberg has sufficiently guarded himself 
against such criticisms. He would be the first to admit that his views 
on causality, for example, have not been thought through to the degree 
necessary to insure clarity of thought. Much work in this area remains 
to be done and Gilkey is right to draw our attention to the shortcomings 
in Pannenberg's thouglit at this point. Nevertheless, there is some­
thing here that Gilkey is not considering. It is an important aspect 
of Pannenberg*s reasoning if strict determinism is not to be attri­
buted to him,
98On this point, I refer to an article in which Pannenberg himself 
examines the philosophy of Hegel and malces the same criticisms made 
by Gilkey and Gadamer, What he says in his criticisms is very per­
tinent to the defence of his programme.
97lbid., p. 121,
98Pannenberg, The Idea of God and Human Freedom, pp. 144-177*
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Initially, Pannenberg is very defensive of Hegel against the
attacks of his critics. He claims, for example, that the charge
of pantheism against Hegel cannot be held. It must be understood
that the unity of finite and infinite, of which he speaks, is always
99referred to as a negative unity,*^ *^  The importance of this concept 
of negative unity for Pannenberg himself will be noted in the 
consideration of his views on the relationship of Jesus to the 
Father,
In spite of his defence of Hegel, however, Pannenberg makes
it plain that he departs significantly from him. He stands firm
against any idea of the logical necessity of things, for which
Hegel was criticised. This is particularly clear in the article
to which Yie referred. He writes;
The idea that God necessarily brings the 
world into being, and that - in Hegel's 
own words - "the positing of Nature necess­
arily belongs to the notion or conception 
of spiritual life", did not become the main
stumbling block for Christian theology with­
out a most serious reason. But it seems to 
underlie all other theological objections 
to Hegel's philosophy. The misinterpretation 
of Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute as 
pantheism, and a denial of the personality 
of God, neither of which can be verified 
in the text of his writings, can only be 
understood as the supposed consequences
99"^ Any system that speaks of an identity of finite and the 
infinite must be careful of the dangers of pantheism. This is a 
concept that is difficult to reconcile with contingency and par­
ticularity, In a sense it would be possible for one, on cursory 
reading, to make this connection with Pannenberg's theology, as 
time is taken up into eternity. As with Hegel, however, the con­
cept of negative identity is very important here. In relation to 
Hegel, Pannenberg writes, ",.,.this is always a negative unity, an 
identity mediated by the negation and superseding of the finite, 
which consequently cannot properly be thought of as being contained 
in God," (Pannenberg, The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p. 162), 
Pannenberg points out, as well, that in the Phenomenology of Mind 
a vivid distinction is made between the movement of God within the 
Trinity and the world process.
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imputed to Hegel, of this single assertion, 
the necessity from the nature of the godhead 
of the creation of the world.100
As the above quotation indicates, an appreciation of Hegel
does not necessarily imply an identification of thought with him,
Pannenberg is very much aware of a problem in Hegel and is eager
101to show his difference from him. It is fundamental, in Pannen­
berg* s thought, that all notion of a prior existence, whether in 
terms of man or God, be avoided if history is to be kept open and 
if freedom and contingency are to be supported, Pannenberg feels 
that Hegel failed most of all in this respect. He praises Hegel 
for giving us a concept of truth that defies any notion of its 
complete realization in any one event of life. He supports Hegel's
concept that truth carries the individual beyond everything he has 
102or experiences. He very strongly criticises the philosopher, 
on the other hand, for not allowing truth itself to remain open, 
for tying it to the Notion (der Begriff) which was complete in 
itself. The 'Notion* in Hegel's thought took precedence over 
freedom and everything followed out of necessity from it. With 
this, contingency and particularity are seriously threatened. Their 
existence arises necessarily. Pannenberg notes, "In spite of all
^^^^anuenberg. The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p. 168,
101I say eager here because Pannenberg wants to make a firm 
distinction between himself and Hegel's thou^t in this respect so 
that there is no misunderstanding on the part of his critics of his 
own position. At the same time, Pannenberg is very sympathetic to 
Hegel in that Hegel did not have the benefit of the Eschatological 
understanding of scripture that is available to us now (of, Pannenberg, 
Basic Questions in Theology, Vol, I, p, 155).
1 02Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p, 21,
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his efforts to allow the particular and the individual to receive
their due, and to have the notion find its content only in its
renunciation (Ent'ausserung), he remained fixed in the primacy of
the universal. Thus, Hegel could set truth in simple opposition
to external history, the Icind of thing that should not happen in
any understanding of truth that is truly historical and oriented to
103the contingency of experienced reality,"
Hegel's problem, says Pannenberg, was the same one encountered 
by theologians of traditional Christianity, He allowed the 'concept' 
to function as complete, that is, as 'existing*. The unity achieved 
was, therefore, a necessary unity. In this manner freedom is deter­
mined by the 'logical nature of the concept* in which the individual 
and the universal are necessarily co-ordinated. The same thought, 
Pannenberg claims, exists in the traditional concept of God,^^ God 
is conceived as existing. Freedom, thus, is determined by this 
previous existence (freedom is viewed as the existing identity of 
God), instead of the other way, that is, having freedom determine 
His identity. The latter is the only way, he says, that contingency 
is protected. If freedom were viewed as a derivative of a prior 
being then it could not escape the appearance of necessity, a 
necessity inherent within the existing being itself.
The only serious alternative to this, he claims, is to conceive
105God as the 'absolute future of freedom*, Freedom is not viewed.
p. 23.
*T'annenberg, The Idea of G-od and Human Freedom, p. 173.
1 05Ibid,, p„ 174. This is a very difficult qualifying statement. 
There are obscurities within it which are not dealt with here. No 
attempt is being made to minimise the vagueness that such terminology
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tiiua, as a faculty of a previous being, but is absolute and unlimited. 
This is the point Gilkey missed in Pannenberg which is essential in 
the latter*s efforts. Freedom as absolute means there is no future 
outside itself, that is, it is not a quality of anything else.
Freedom as absolute means it is its own future. This means there 
are no conditions (the 'notion* in Hegel) that establish freedom 
as a reality. Freedom decides all reality.
There are 'existing' conditions in life in which man may say 
he is free. People, for example, say this of democratic institutions. 
To live within democracy is a freeing experience claimed by many.
This understanding of freedom has certain validity. While saying 
this, one must also be aware that this freedom is not absolute. No 
earthly condition can successively defend such an abolute claim. 
Therefore, no strict determinism is implied. To say, however, that 
freedom can be associated with God as 'existing* is a different thing. 
All conditions and circumstances of freedom would thereby be deter­
mined in advance, as God is all-determining. To escape this impli­
cation, one would have to proclaim, with Pannenberg, God 'as absolute 
future of freedom*, Thus, God can decide, change and create with no 
prior necessity. He is absolutely free, God, it can be said, 
decides  ^^ t^o let the present exist, to separate it from Himself as
( continued) brings with it. In spite of this, however, it is 
promising as a concept in its implications for God's relationship to 
the world and time. Notwithstanding its obscurity, therefore, it 
seems a necessary condition of God's nature if the word 'God' is to 
acquire credibility. Only if God has no prior nature (so that things 
arise necessarily from Him), can particularity and contingency arise 
freely. They can truly be said to be gifts from God and not necessary 
impositions from Him,
^^^The capacity to decide is really the crux of freedom. To be 
able to decide is to have freedom within oneself. Ultimate freedom 
means, at the same time, ultimate decision.
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future, and to give it an existence contingent in its character,
God is not compelled to let go; He decides to let go because His 
nature is absolutely open and free. In love (one cannot love 
necessarily) He wills to create and give of Himself so that life 
may exist,
In every event the infinite future separates 
itself from the finite events which until then 
had been hidden in this future but are now re­
leased into existence. The future lets go of 
itself to bring into being our present. And
every new present is again confronted by a
dark and mysterious future out of which certain 
relevant events will be released. Thus does 
the future determine the present.107
Thus, for Pannenberg the present is regarded as a gift from God 
and not a necessary extension of His nature, Man is given freedom 
in existence because he comes from the absolute freedom of God, In
turn, reconciliation is not conceived as the inevitability of a pro­
cess working itself out nor as the rescue of finite man from sinful 
reality. Rather, it is the loving desire on the part of God to see 
creatures at one with Himself and each other. This is an understanding 
that does not call for Brunner's pessimism regarding progress in the 
world nor, Teilhard de Chardin's optimism of the world's inevitable 
improvement. It is an understanding that permits one to work and 
live in the world with confidence that, in spite of sin, the present 
world is not meaningless, Pannenberg expressed this in saying that
God, being the future of every present, keeps that present within
103Himself and does not allow it to annihilated.
This is important, as well, with respect to the question of
1 07Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p, 59- 
p. 63.
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fulfillment (ultimate meaning). Again, the thought of inevitable 
progress or, inevitable doom, is removed. In its place is the con­
fidence that God, in his own good time (God being absolute freedom), 
will bring forth the fulfillment to which life points and for which 
we hope, Pannenberg does not discuss the extent human life here
prepares for this fulfillment, or what degree of importance it is 
109to have, In keeping with his thought on the freedom of life and 
the relevance of time to God, one can suggest that a great deal of 
importance is bestowed on man's own activity and planning. There 
will be a large measure of continuity between this world and the 
next.
As a final reference to the promise within this concept of God, 
the sovereignty of God can be mentioned. In a.ixy statement of God, 
this must be defended. In the challenge from atheism, it was 
suggested that the sovereignty (all-determinacy) of God and free­
dom were exclusive concepts. This was proven to be the actual case 
when Brunner's understanding was examined. In the light of Brunner, 
talk of God implied a determinism. Seemingly, the only way of pro­
tecting freedom would be to limit the sovereignty of God, Following 
Gilkey'3 suggestion, one might think of an ontological limitation 
of Him, that is, make God subject to time. The nature of God, not 
being complete, or 'existing', would assure freedom and contingency. 
Clearly, however, this sacrifices the all important sovereignty in 
question. Can one speak of God without proclaiming the latter?
This has been argued in the negative. In Pannenberg, the possibility
 ^^ 8ee pannenberg. The Idea of God and Human Freedom, p, 199 
for reference to this issueT"" " ' ' " " ” ' '
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of an alternative to the stalemate has been presented. G-od as the 
•absolute future of Freedom* brings freedom within God Himself, The 
sovereignty is preserved in that freedom is not outside God, At the 
same bime, God is related to the world in a way that assures the con­
tingent.
In concluding this chapter, one further criticism must be dealt 
with. We have partially answered the criticism, in dealing with the 
notion of the absolute freedom of the future as the true nature of 
God, It is important enough, however, to warrant further focus and 
attention,
Gilkey, at the close of his review article, posed the question 
whether the openness of man, of which Pannenberg speaks, is only an 
epistemological openness, lie writes, "....we should note that Pannen­
berg repeatedly defines that all-important "openness" of history and 
of the future epistemologically and not ontologically,,..In all 
probability it stems from the fact that Pannenberg*s thought is 
primarily related to historical inquiry rather than to metaphysics, 
and so "the future as open" means for him not so much that future 
events are as yet undecided by any relevant factors (as, e.g., in
Whitehead and Hartshorne), as it means that these events are as yet
110unknown and unlaiowable by any possible human inquirer," Gilkey 
is joined in this interpretation by another theologian, Ted Peters, 
Peters also thinks Pannenberg makes a subtle distinction between 
ontology and epistemology. He writes, "....what he is unable to do 
ontologically he can accomplish epistemologically through his
110Gilkey, 'Pannenberg*s Basic Questions in Theology: a Review 
Article* (Perspective, Vol. XIV, Spring *73)^  p. 46,
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111recognition of the provisional nature of all human knowing."
He continues, "Certainly, Pannenberg does not want to defend a
static ontology, but what else could that history in time be beyond
a simple striving on the part of man for an understanding of what
112in principle already is?"
In response, there are statements that support the validity 
of this criticism. For example, in an interview in The United 
States of America, when asked if God Himself develops or if it just 
seems like that to us, Pannenberg said it is only from the human 
standpoint that one can say God develops; for us there is develop-
113ment in God. From God's standpoint, however, this cannot be said.
One could cite other instances where Pannenberg speaks in terms of 
man's knowledge as the source of man's openness. He writes in this 
way: "....the end of history can also be understood as something 
which is itself only provisionally known, and in reflecting upon this 
provisional character of our knowledge of the end of history, the 
horizon of the future could be held open and the finitude of human 
experience preserved.
Gilkey remarks that this distinction is not an unimportant one. 
And with this we can agree. If the "openness" of man's life is 
understood only from the epistemological point of view then the con-
111Peters, 'Truth in History; Gadamer's Hermeneutic and Pannenberg's 
Apologetic Method* (The Journal of Religion, January 1973, Vol. 55,
No. 1), p. 50.
'^’^ Ibid., p. 50.
Theological Conversation with Y/olfhart Pannenberg* (Dialog, 
Vol. II, Autumn 1972, pp. 286-296), p. 294.
^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Tlieology, Vol. I, p. 155#
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elusion that Gilkey himself draws cannot be avoided, What he writes 
must be said to have logical weight: .contingency is only our
ignorance of the determining divine will, freedom only our sub­
jective ignorance of God's overwhelming influence over us, openness 
only the hiddenness of his future choices from us, and, since he has
thereby determined all past events, history's evil is as much God's
113responsibility as in any traditional view of God's omnipotence." 
Epistemological openness, in the sense of a seeking an understanding 
of what is, would have the effect of reducing God, as Gilkey implies, 
to the level of a strict deterministic power. This would defeat 
Pannenberg'3 purpose. The lack of freedom, for which he criticised 
Hegel would be implicit in his own thought.
One finds it difficult to imagine that Pannenberg, who is striving 
so urgently to develop a concept escaping the throes of determinism, 
would not have been aware of the logical implications such epistemo­
logical reasoning would involve. The lack of any mention in his own 
writings of the distinction Gilkey makes weakens any criticism of him 
in this respect. He, at no point, makes the distinction this inter­
pretation suggests. When speaking of the openness of man, he does 
not use the word epistemological. Rather, this is only a possible 
interpretation of certain statements. These statements must be 
placed in the wider context of his whole expression.
Contrary to Gilkey and Peters, we affirm that Pannenberg has 
wrestled with the problems of existence ontologically, as the con­
cept of God which he is expressing is an ontological concept. The 
veiy problem Pannenberg presents to us involves the nature of God's 
reality and this is an ontological problem. What Gilkey and Peters
115^Gilkey, 'Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology: a Review 
Article* (perspective. Vol. XIV, Spring *73), p. 33.
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have missed, and it is crucial to Pannenberg*s whole programme, is 
the point which was dealt with above regarding the absolute future 
of freedom as the nature of God's reality. Freedom, to repeat the 
point once again, is not to be thought of as a derivative of an 
'existing* God, Peters misunderstands this point when he reduces 
Pannenberg's God to a 'principle which already is'. When one thinks 
in terms of God as Absolute Freedom, then nothing is predetermined, 
God is free to do, act and decide in any way or manner that pleases 
Him, No prior concept, as with Hegel, limits the sovereignty of 
God, and the sovereignty of God is secure in that the freedom of 
man is within Him, When God creates, it is from freedom that He 
creates and the creature partakes of that freedom, as of the nature 
of God, Thus, to be in the image of God is to have freedom as the 
quality of being. New possibilities are opened up by God who 
separates the future from Himself and gives the present existence. 
Something new is brought into being, which, although God Icnew it 
beforehand, still retains its contingent quality, its newness.
This is so also with respect to God's essence. A becoming takes 
place in God, but not to God, because his nature is absolute freedom, 
If we keep this aspect in mind, it is then possible to say with 
Pannenberg that, ",.,,the movement of time contributes to deciding 
what the definite truth is going to be, also with regard to the 
essence of God, But - and here is the difference from Whitehead - 
what turns out to be true in the future will then be evident as
116having been true all along," It is clear in this statement that
i *1 ÔPannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, pp. 62-63, Bet 
us remember something stated earlier, that time is taken up into God 
for Pannenberg. Therefore, a becoming can be said to take place in
- 165“
Pannenberg does not wish to do away with the epistemological aspect 
either. At the end, in the Eschaton, he seems to be saying, reality 
will be an experience of something that has always been and yet some­
thing new.
This can be supported by turning to the resurrection. Something
entirely new came into being; it was not just an enlightening experience
on the part of Jesus or the disciples. It was not just increased
knowledge; something new came into being. And yet there is an epistemo­
logical aspect to it as well, for what came into being proves to have 
been true all along, in relation to Jesus* pre-Easter life. This will
be pursued at length in the succeeding chapter.
As stated, Pannenberg*s concepts are difficult and the one just 
mentioned is no exception. How can something new come into being 
if it was there all along? Again, this will receive further treatment 
in the next chapter. At this point, some clarification may be thrown
on the matter by his use of the word 'intention*.
....that an element of God's becoming and
being in the other, in the reality differ­
entiated from himself, is one with his
eternity requires that what newly flashes
into view from time to time in the divine
life can be understood at the same time as
having always been true in God's eternity.
This can be expressed in the form of the 
concept that the "intention" of the incar­
nation had been determined from all eternity
in God's decree. However, the truth of such
an assertion is dependent upon the temporal 
actuality of that thing, thus in this case 
the incarnation, What is true in God's
( continued) God, At the same time, there is a sameness about 
God as he is not subject to change or development by anything outside 
of him, Pannenberg writes of it this way: "Although the essence of 
God is from everlasting to everlasting the same, it does have a history 
in time." (Revelation as History, pp. 133-134)#
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eternity is decided with retroactive 
validity only from the perspective 
of what occurs temporally with the 
import of the ultimate.
The concept of intention here is not meant to be equated with 
God Himself, else God would once again be a prior concept. We 
would be back where v;e started. The intention is from God as 
Absolute Freedom, thus, there is no element of compulsion or necessity 
implied, God freely intends his will for man and in doing so offers 
us, as a gift, the possibility of life, Man is free to respond or 
not to respond to such possibilities that continually arise from 
God's intention. This checks any idea of progressive development 
toward fulfillment. In the end, fulfillment must freely arise from 
God Himself. Only this will protect man's freedom and God's 
sovereignty at the same time.
117Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, p, 321,
CHAPTER FOUR
JESUS PROM ABOVE OR BELOYf?
CHAPTER FOUR 
JESUS FROM ABOVE OR BELOW?
(a ) Theologians of Revelation
In the last two chapters, two distinctive conceptions of God 
expressed by two Protestant theologians were analysed. Some insight 
was gained as to the consequences for man's life in community which 
issue from these concepts. In Brunner, there v/as an implicit deter­
minism which destroyed the essential freedom of personal existence. 
The concept of an 'existing' God, in Brunner, cannot be reconciled 
with the contingencies and individuality of life. Such realities 
are guaranteed only by conceiving God, in some way, as not-yet 
existing.
Important for our study, as well, has been the attitude to time 
or temporality implied within Pannenberg and Brunner's respective 
concepts, V/e argued that Brunner's thought of God excluded time.
The insignificance of community to the 'meaning' of life was 
attributed to the timelessness of God's nature. It was suggested 
that unless time and God could be conceived in mutuality, the basis 
for significant community would be destroyed. Value must be given 
some location or extension in time before man can proceed with any 
serious talk about the 'meaning' of community and his participation 
within it. This extension is inconceivable unless some attempt is 
made to remove the exclusiveness of God from time. This attempt 
will be made in this chapter.
Thus, the manner in which God is conceived is fundamentally
1
Refer back to p. 151 of the last chapter of this thesis.
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important to man's understanding of himself in his search for the 
2meaning of life, Pannenberg emphasises this when he writes;
The key to understanding the inextricable 
connection between love for God and love 
for fellowmen is the identity of God's 
being with the coning of his Kingdom,
Christian ethical failure is closely re­
lated to a misunderstanding of the doc­
trine of God, The idea that God is an 
entity which has the definite mode of 
its being in some transcendent realm of 
its own suggested, inevitably, that love 
for God moves in another direction than 
love for fellowmen. Consider the pious 
literature that speaks of our "vertical" 
love for God and our "horizontal" love
for fellowmen. Love for God, it is
suggested, takes off for heaven, while
love for fellowmen remains on earth.
Granted that love for God is supposed to 
generate love for fellowmen, but they are 
still two distinct acts, V/e need more 
clearly to see that love for fellowmen is 
participation in God's love; that is to say, 
love for fellowmen is participation in the 
coming Kingdom of God.3
Having established the relevance of man’s conception of God, 
it is important to consider the basis for our conceptions. Both 
Pannenberg and Brunner arrive at their respective positions from 
the standpoint of God's Revelation to man. In other words, both
men are theologians of revelation; theologians, that is, who stress
the essentialness of God's revelation to man in any understanding 
of God that develops. With Brunner, there is little question 
that such priority is absolute. This is indicated in his opposition 
to any rational approach to the understanding of God. The God of 
the philosophers, he states emphatically, has nothing, essentially.
^/e have not elaborated on the meaning of the self in community 
that follows from Pannenberg's thought. This will be reserved for 
the last chapter. There, Brunner's understanding of the self will 
be considered, as well.
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, pp. 112-113*
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to do with the God of revelation,^ He denies that revelation of the
personal, living God is a rational and observable possibility in the 
,6
5
world, "Either revelation supplies its own grounds or else it is
not revelation,"
With Pannenberg, some question may arise as to the priority of 
God's revelation because of his sympathetic treatment of man's reason 
and the task of philosophy. In contrast to Brunner, for example, he 
relates philosophy meaningfully to the subject matter of theology 
itself.
Philosophical criticism can help theology to 
achieve an understanding of the conditions 
of a credible way of speaking of God, which 
makes more careful distinctions and is better 
adapted to man's experience of himself and 
his world in nature and history. It can also 
help theology to study in a more impartial ?/ay 
the relevance of the life and ministry of Jesus 
of Nazareth to mankind and to the vhole of 
reality,7
He writes further, "Everything depends on whether the Israelitio, 
primitive-Christian understanding of God - to the extent that it 
proves itself to be a self-coherent whole precisely in its trans­
formations - has any relationship to contemporary experience of
Brunner's position on Philosophy, expressed implicitly and 
explicitly throughout his writings, changed very little from the 
beginning of his writings to the end. What he wrote in his The 
Philosophy of Religion can be taken as representative of his 
thought throughout. He writes, "By Christian faith is meant, not 
some universal truth, nor yet some universal religious experience, 
but a definite fact which as such is opposed to every universal, be 
it religion or philosophy," (p. 15).
^Ibid,, p. 15,
^Ibid., p. 16.
"^ pannenberg. The Idea of God and Human Freedom, pp, 138-139.
-170-
reality."^
Superficially, these statements could make Pannenberg a pro­
ponent of 'natural* theology. In a sense, such a label would not 
be out of character for him. This does not mean that, for Pannen­
berg, knowledge of God can be received apart from, or prior to, 
God's revelation to man, Pannenberg would not agree that man, 
apart from God, could by the power of reason reach God, This was
9
the fear Barth had of Brunner, Pannenberg can be classified as 
a 'natural* theologian only in the sense that temporality or the 
reason of man are not exclusive of God but essentially related to 
His nature. There are no sharp dichotomies, in essence, between 
God and the world, or theology and reason. The relationship is 
one in which truth depends on harmonization of knowledge gained 
from both sources, not on the acceptance of one to the exclusion 
of the other, Pannenberg is not inclined to make pure assertions 
about the nature of God from an analysis of natural existence, nor 
vice versa, to make baseless statements about the nature of reality 
from the revelation of God in Jesus, He argues for a sharing 
of perspectives, with the belief that one can offer light to the
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p, 237. 
Pannenberg writes at one point that the material for theology is the 
"...record of men's historical experience of themselves in the context 
of the totality of their world,,,." (The Idea of God and Human Freedom,
9I refer the reader to Natural Theology, trans, Peter Fraenkel 
(The Centenary Press, London, 192^ ), This is a book comprising 
'Nature and Grace' by Emil Brunner and the reply 'No!' by Karl Barth. 
In it Bai-th's adamant opposition to natural theology can be seen.
One could argue tliat Brunner's position, against which Barth argues, 
is not really so different from his own, Brunner would not agree 
either to a saving knowledge based on the reasonable capacity of man,
I believe that Barth more than Brunner, clarified his position firmly 
on this matter and in a way that did not leave so many questions of 
interpretation.
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other, He expresses this belief in the following statement»
little would be gained if without further ado we tried to 
abstract a general concept of appearance from the way in which God 
csjne to appearance in Jesus of Nazareth, In so proceeding one 
would merely arrive at theological postulates for which he could, 
at most, try to claim general validity. We would rather ask whether 
our theological example throws light on certain, perhaps otherwise
1 0hidden, sides of the general philosophical problem of appearance," 
Nevertheless, Pannenberg gives priority to revelation in all dis­
cussions of the truth. He writes, "Christian speech about God can 
be verified only in such a way that it is the revelation of God
itself which discloses that about man and his world in relation to
11which its truth is proved,"
Keeping in mind the centrality of God's revelation to man, in
the theologies of Pannenberg and Brunner, attention will now be
focused on their christologies, The support for their respective God
concepts comes from the manner in which they understand God's presence
in Jesus, I have chosen to characterise their respective positions
by the title of this chapter, because 'above* and 'below* are words
12they use themselves. They are also useful labels for the dis­
cussions to follow.
Unless support can be found in the biblical story of Jesus and
10Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 133#
11Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p, 207. In 
discussing the question-answer problem in theology, Pannenberg shares 
the thought of Barth that the answer always proceeds the question. He 
writes, "It would be an abstraction to imagine the questioner as still 
prior to all contact with reality he is inquiring about. Rather, the 
question is always framed only in association with the reality in 
question." (p, 225),
12Gf, Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, p, 33 a,nd Brunner, The Mediator
p. 272.
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his own words to his people for a conception of God, that particular 
conception rests on shalcy ground, Jesus has always been rightly 
thought of in the church as the conclusive revelation of God to 
man. For our two theologians in question, there is no doubting 
the finality of such revelation. For both, God is, essentially, 
revealed in Jesus. There is a difference between them, however, 
which is crucial for this thesis, Brunner understands God's pre­
sence in Jesus form 'above', in terms of Jesus' ontological depend­
ence on the Son. Pannenberg, on the other hand, understands the 
presence from 'below' in terms of Jesus' dependency on the Father,
This distinction will receive further treatment as we proceed.
It has been stated that with Brunner's concept of God as 
'existing' and 'a-temporal' neither the freedom of man nor the 
significance of the community of man is guaranteed. It was suggested, 
at the same time, that Pannenberg's concept of God as Future provided 
the necessary conception to assure contingency and unity.
The question to be considered is: How does each man justify
his concept in the light of the revelation of God in Jesus? A 
second question, arising from the first, is: What biblical-
critical support can each man offer for his particular view of Jesus 
as the revelation of God? Without the latter support, it is diffi­
cult to see how either theologian can be sufficiently removed from 
sheer speculation to warrant serious contemplation. This is so, 
even thou^ Pannenberg's presentation has credibility in terms of 
man's personal existence,
(B) Jesus From Below
Let us begin with Pannenberg, In the light of Jesus, how can 
he say God does not exist, God must be Future, and time is taken up 
into God (related essentially to his nature)? All of these statements
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were regarded, in our argument, as essential for a relevant social 
and personal ethic. They are, at the same time, very original and 
difficult statements to make. They challenge traditional thought 
and thus, cannot he made without some convincing argument. This 
is so in spite of the credibility of their implications, Pannenberg 
has spent considerable theological effort in providing such argument 
and it is now our task to investigate his presentation. His reason­
ing may not be conclusive and he admittedly lacks ultimate clarity, 
but this does not deter the challenge presented to every theologian 
who considers his position.
It was stated that Pannenberg's concept of God is original and 
difficult to grasp in the light of the traditional pattern of thou^it. 
This stems directly from the manner in which Jesus is presented for 
our consideration, Nomally, in the Christian faith, we are taught 
to think of the glory of God (Sd§<3C) as fully present in Jesus. There 
will be an expression of this when we turn to Brunner's christology 
at the conclusion of this chapter. In Pannenberg, there is a signi­
ficant departure from this tradition, Jesus is not regarded as the 
'direct' manifestation of God's full glory. Rather, God's glory is 
indirectly revealed in Jesus,
That revelation is 'indirect' is important to Pannenberg's 
theology. It is an expression upon which everything else hinges.
In writing about the difference between direct and indirect revel­
ation he says:
The Word of God would be direct communication 
if its content were directly connected with 
God himself, somewhat in the sense of a self- 
presentation of the divinity,,,.
Indirect communication is distinguished by 
not having God as the content in any direct 
manner. Every activity and act of God can 
indirectly express something about God,,,,
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Here the event in question does not
have the same aspect as it would if
one merely stood under the impact of ■ 
its content....Here lies the change
of perspective,*^ 3
The change of perspective indicated here is very significant
and an effort will be made to clarify it as we proceed. Support
for it is gained from the biblical scholarship of Gerhard von Rad,
Rolf Rendtorff, Ulrich Wilckens and others who have stressed
that in the Old and New Testaments God's glory is not presented
in Theophanal terms in the sense of direct immediacy. Rather,
it is disclosed in the acts of history which are always transitory
and moving, God reveals Himself tine and time again in the events
of history, but always provisionally and never in His full glory,
Man is continually directed toward the future where the full
revelation is anticipated. Until then, only partial appearances
of God come to man through the acts and events of history. In
speaking of Psalm 98 for example, and then of the passage in
II Isaiah 40:3, Rendtorff writes respectively:
The point in all these texts is that Jahweh 
himself becomes visible in his powerful acts 
of salvation. He becomes known through these 
acts; whoever sees or experiences them can 
know God in them. He becomes revealed in 
them ,.,
The still imminent and future self-vindication 
of Jahweh comes more and more into the center 
of expectation and hope. The earlier stress,
^^Revelation As Histony, ed, V/olfhart Pannenberg, p, 15#
^^ee the articles by Rendtorff and Wilckens in Revelation As 
History, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg, for the supportive scholarship 
of Pannenberg's position, Pannenberg finds Gerhard von Rad's 
writings particularly supportive as well (pp, 127ff.), See, as well, 
Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. I, trans, D, M, Stalker 
(Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, f93F), p ^  12lff,
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especially the basic one concerning the exodus 
from Egypt, is not forgotten, but it can no 
longer be understood as the sole ultimate 
self-revelation of Jahweh. New and greater 
things are expected. The full revelation . 
of Jahweh has become an eschatological fact.
The last quotation clearly shows that although one can say God
is revealed in the acts of history, this does not mean the act and
the content of revelation are identical. Only at the end of history
can such identification be claimed. As Pannenberg expresses it
himself, "....these acts cast light back on God himself, communicating
16something indirectly about God himself.
There is nothing original in the claim just made. Most theo­
logians of traditional Theism would admit to an indirectness of 
God's action in history in the manner stated by Gerhard von Rad and 
Rolf Rendtorff, Brunner himself admits this in his writings. In 
The Christian Doctrine of God, he writes, "In the Old Testament, it 
is true, there can be no question of such a point of view. Revelation 
is not only that Word of God which is communicated through the "YYord" 
of the prophets, but it is at the same time an action of God in History,
an Act of God, which cannot be ranged under the heading of the "Word"
17or the "Speech" of God," Brunner is at least agreeing that in the 
Old Testament, there is an indirectness of the revelation of God to 
man. How this can be reconciled with some of his other statements 
about God will not be discussed at this point,
Pannenberg departs significantly, important for our thesis, 
when he carries this 'indirectness* of revelation into the New
ed, Y/olfhart Pannenberg, pp. 32-33.
 ^^ Ibid., p, 16.
17Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I, p. 22
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Testament and speaks of it with respect to the conclusive and final
revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth, In the first thesis of
his article, 'Dogmatic Thesis On The Concept Of Revelation*, he
makes this very plain;
THE SELF-REVELATION OF GOD IN THE BIBLICAL 
WITNESSES IS NOT OF A DIRECT TYPE IN THE 
SENSE OF A THEOFHANY, BUT IS INDIRECT AND 
BROUGHT ABOUT BY ïvIEANS OF THE HISTORICAL 
ACTS OF G0D.18
Pannenberg, as the above thesis states, is extending the quality 
of 'indirectness* to the New Testament, inclusive of Jesus of Nazareth, 
This fact will prove to be an area of great difference between him­
self and Brunner, In Brunner's writings on the New Testament, he 
speaks only of a 'direct' revelation of God. For example, in The 
Christian Doctrine of God he writes: "Between us and the Old
Testament, however, there stands a new form of revelation, the 
fulfilment of all that was only promised in the Old Testament, and
the actual content of the divine revelation proclaimed by the Apostles
19and the Church; Jesus Christ Himself," More will be said later about 
Brunner's concept in this respect.
In considering Pannenberg's idea of indirect revelation in the 
New Testament, a problem presents itself. It is quite legitimate 
to say that God acts in history in an 'indirect* manner. Content 
and form in this case are not identical. No claim for absoluteness 
and completeness is made for such historical acts. Therefore, 
•indirectness* is an appropriate description. In speaking of Jesus, 
however, the area of final revelation is entered. Such finality is 
stressed by Brunner, as the reference above plainly indicates. He
^^Revelation As History, ed. Y/olfhart Pannenberg, p, 125,
1 9Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I, p, 23<
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is justified in this claim. If one is not to depart radically from 
the Christian faith, one must continue to uphold the conclusiveness 
of meaning in terms of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Pannen­
berg stresses the same thing. At the beginning of this chapter, his
position as a theologian of revelation was emphasised, that is, one 
who holds firmly to the centrality of Jesus Christ as the final 
revelation of God to man. He makes his intentions on this matter 
very clear at the beginning of his Christolcgical study. He writes:
The distinctiveness of the Christological way 
of speaking about Jesus resides in its theo­
logical character. As Christians we know God 
only as he has been revealed in and through 
Jesus, All other talk about God can have, 
at most, provisional significance. In this
sense it may be very meaningful and necessary,
even a presupposition for the message of Christ,
But the way in which God is revealed througli 
Jesus suspends even its own presupposition, 
so that one can only speak about God himself 
in that at the same time one talks about 
Jesus, Therefore, theology and Christology, 
the doctrine of God and the doctrine of 
Jesus as the Christ, are bound together.
It is the goal of theology as well as of 
Christology to develop this c o n n e c t i o n , 2 0
How can Jesus be thought of as the 'indirect* revelation of 
God, in the sense that the glory of God is not fully present in 
him, and at the same time, as the absolute revelation of God?
This is the question we direct to Pannenberg in the light of his 
statements. In actual fact he is taking something different from 
the content and saying it is the same as the content, at the same 
time. In speaking of Jesus, he writes of the unusual perspective 
in this way, "....it is just as the One who is different from Jesus 
that God is in him,"^ ^
Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, pp. 19-20.
21Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p, 135. All 
of this has direct bearing on the previous argument about God 
changing and yet remaining the same.
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Strange as this reasoning may sound, it is one for which Pannen­
berg offers biblical support and one which he claims as necessary 
in bridging the credibility gap between the modem world and the 
Christian church. He feels it is also a perspective which can
enlighten the problems that perplex the philosophical field in the
22whole discussion of essence and appearance. As strange as the 
logic of the whole thing may be, it is a perspective that serves well 
in developing a more constructive understanding of the self and 
community which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Still, in spite of its promise in this way, how is it accomplished? 
How can one say an event is * indirect*, as interpreted above, and at 
the same time say that it is absolute? Pannenberg pursues his purpose 
by looking at the significance of Jesus from a standpoint different 
from the traditional one. He views Jesus in terms of his fate rather 
than his person. Again, as is so often the case with Pannenberg, an 
original perspective is being presented. His Christology is unique 
and for this reason caution must be taken. The contrast of this with 
the traditional approach (concentration on Jesus' Person), will be 
shown in the consideration of Brunner's Christology,
What do v/e mean when we say Pannenberg looks at the significance 
of Jesus from the standpoint of his fate? It is a theological 
manoeuvre that has much to do with the distinction emphasised at 
the beginning of this chapter, that of seeing Jesus 'from below*, 
Pannenberg writes, "For Christology that begins "from above," from 
the divinity of Jesus, the concept of the incarnation stands in the 
center, A Christology "from below," rising from the historical man 
Jesus to the recognition of his divinity, is concerned first of all
22
Ibid., pp. 127-143.
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with Jesus' message and fate and arrives only at the end at the
23
concept of the incarnation."
By fate, Pannenberg is referring to the crucifixion and the 
resurrection.
This concept of "Jesus' fate" is intended to 
include his crucifixion and resurrection.
Both were "sent" to Jesus as an occurrence 
to be suffered and accepted. Neither the 
crucifixion nor the resurrection was actively 
accomplished by Jesus,.,,his passion and 
death remain something that happened to him 
and are not to be understood as his own 
action in the same sense as his activity 
with its message of the nearness of the King­
dom of God,^^
As the quotation clearly indicates, the crucifixion and resurrection 
are not to be thought of as events which Jesus accomplished by virtue 
of the divinity within him. They were events that happened to him. 
Again, as will be emphasised from our examination of Brunner, 
this thought is in contrast to the traditional inoarnational approach 
to Christology, With the latter view, the significance of Jesus is 
seen from the viewpoint of his Person, that is, as the Son of Man 
on earth from the very beginning of his ministry, with self-vindicating 
authority and power. For Pannenberg, such recognition and vindication 
came only with the resurrection. Thus, the divinity of Jesus (his . 
oneness with God) is viewed retrospectively (by looking back) rather 
than introspectively (by looking into). Notice should be given her© 
to an important point, Pannenberg is not saying that with the resurr­
ection Jesus acquires divinity. This is the position of Walter Kunneth
23Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, p. 33. 
p. 2if5.
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25which he firmly rejects. Pannenberg is saying something much 
different; he is affirming that only from the standpoint of the 
resurrection can it truly be said that Jesus' pre-Easter life was 
divine•
Let us briefly reflect on the meaning of Pannenberg's expression
summed up in the following statement:
..,.the resurrection event has retroactive 
power. Jesus did not simply become some­
thing that he previously had not been, but 
his pre-Easter claim was confirmed by God,
This confirmation, the manifestation of 
Jesus' "divine Sonship" by God, is the new 
thing brought by the Easter event. However, 
as confirmation, the resurrection has retro­
active force for Jesus' pre-Easter activity, 
which taken by itself was not yet recogniz­
able as being divinely authorized and its 
authorization was also not yet definitively 
settled. However, this has been revealed 
in its divine legitimation in the light of 
Jesus' resurrection,2b
It is an important aspect of Pannenberg's anthropology that
man's life is lived in openness, that every event he experiences
is experienced as incomplete and future oriented. Thus, only in
27the future will the full truth be revealed. Or, to state it
Ibid., p. 135. I have not gone into the views of Kunneth to 
verify vfhether Pannenberg's interpretation of him is correct or incorrect, 
I merely accept the reference to him as an indication of the view which 
Pannenberg does not want to be associated with,
^ W d . ,  p. 135.
27
The concept of openness was discussed in the third chapter of this 
thesis. For the original source of this concept see Pannenberg's book. 
What is Man? (pp, 1-14), See also, his article, 'What is Truth' (Basic 
Questions in Tlieology, Vol. II, pp, 1-28), in which he unfavorably 
compares the Greek concept of truth as something timeless above the 
shifting appearance of reality with the Hebrew concept that speaks of 
the truth as historical, as something that happens, Pannenberg finds 
support in Hegel for this when he writes, "Hegel's thesis that the truth 
of the whole will be visible only at the end of history approximates the 
biblical understanding of truth in two respects. It does so, firstly, 
by the fact that the truth as such is understood not as timelessly 
unchangeable, but as a process that runs its course and maintains itself
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differently, it is from the future that man receives the proper
28perspective on the value and meaning of the present. He draws
support for this insight from the thinking of Dilthey and Heidegger
and their suggestion that it is only from the end, that is, the end
of all things, that one can really see the relationship between the
part and the whole. He quotes favourably from Dilthey;
One would have to wait for the end of a life 
and, in the hour of death, survey the whole 
and ascertain the relation between the whole 
and its parts. One would have to wait for 
the end of history to have all the material 
necessary to determine its meaning,29
That this is an anthropological understanding common to much
of our experience would be claimed by many. It is so often man's
experience that an event in which he participated in years past can
be interpreted much differently in the context of his life in the
present. The meaning and value man attached to an event in the past
can be actually reshaped in the light of the future which is present
for him. As life proceeds, the connecting fibres of meaning in an
event become different, or perhaps more plain. This, of course, may
not always be the case. Some events in the past may always remain
obscure in their meaning for man. This, however, can be said to be
the exception to life rather than the rule,
Pannenberg is challenging us, in all of this, to stop thinking
( continued) through change. Secondly, it does so by asserting 
that the unity of the process, which is full of contradictions while it 
is under way, will become visible along with the true meaning of every 
individual moment in it, only from the standpoint of its end. What a 
thing is, is first decided by its future, by what becomes of it,"
(Ibid., p. 22).
28See Pannenberg's article, 'On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic' 
(Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, pp, 137-182).
^^Ibid., p. 1S3.
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in Greek terms in which truth is conceived as behind the fact. He 
is encouraging us to think more in terms of Hebraic thought in which 
truth is conceived as open-ended (not-yet decided). This is impor­
tant to keep in mind as he is not pleading a special case for the 
reality of Jesus and his resurrection. He is offering us an insight 
into all reality and, thus, is challenging us to thinlc of ontology 
in an entirely different light,
The question that arises in the light of the above is: At what
point, or when, can one look back and see the final perspective on
an event? At this point, Pannenberg breaks with Dilthey's and
Heidegger's thought. As he has pointed out, they regard death
(especially Heidegger) as the end of all things, Heidegger claimed
that in the anticipation of one's own death life is being lived in
31the light of the end, Pannenberg questions this statement and
asks whether death, rather than rounding out the wholeness of life,
does not ultimately fragment it. Only if an individual were able
to see his life fully satisfied within the confines of a social
construct, he says, would he be able to speak of final wholeness witii
respect to the individual. This, however, is an experience never
confirmed on earth. Whenever a person finds himself enthralled with
his group, whether the family, the nation or the society, he experiences
a static, impersonal existence. Pannenberg writes about it this way;
,...in spite of the truth of the statement 
that a man can realize his humanity only in 
community with others, one must affirm that 
the human destiny which every individual 
seeks is different from the particular comm­
unity and society in which he lives. Even 
if sometime or other the ideal state could 
be realized, the question would remain as to
^^Refer to pp<247ff# of this thesis for further discussion.
51Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, p, 166,
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the participation of individuals in earlier 
generations in the destiny of man in general, 
which is still the destiny of each individual.
But if the destiny of the individual man is 
not absorbed in his relation to society, the 
question is inescapable whether the individual 
may expect a fulfillment of his destiny as man 
beyond death, or whether the question about 
man's humanity must simply be disregarded as 
meaningless. In the life of the individual 
the search for the definition of his humanity 
finds, as has been said, no final answer,^
Thus, the conclusion to be drawn from this is that meaning for the 
individual life refers man to the future. It is a future, at the 
same time, beyond death itself and outside the realm of experience 
as we know it in this life. The future must then be one that comes 
to man from outside this world but, at the same time, have continuity 
with this world.
It is in this context that Pannenberg finds the apocalyptic 
thought of Jesus time, and one which Jesus shared with his con­
temporaries, socially relevant. He writes, "Whether or not the 
apocalyptic expectation of a resurrection of the dead can still have 
binding validity as truth today may be decided by its relation to an 
understanding of man consistent with the approach and results of a
way of thinking that is engaged with all presently accessible 
53phenomena,The 'presently accessible phenomena' to which he is 
referring is that of the future beyond death experience in human 
life.
In the pursuit of our answer it is necessary to dwell briefly 
upon this apocalyptic element. The tradition of the inter-testamental
^Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, pp. 83-84, 
p. 83.
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period, which persisted througli to the teaohing^Pf Jesus, has 
varied content depending upon the literature to which one turns. 
Pannenberg, however, has concentrated on certain features of the
35tradition which in his mind make it less obscure to the modern mind.
^Phat Jesus shared the basic tenets of Apocalyptic thought is 
something Pannenberg argues strongly in his book on Christology 
(of. pp. 58ff,). Justification for his attempts to do this is support­
ed in a book by A. D. Galloway. He writes, "I thinlc it will be generally 
agreed that only a very perverse and ideologically motivated scepticism 
would deny that the Jesus of the scriptural tradition did have a his­
torical prototype and that he proclaimed the coming of God's Kingdom 
in a context of apocalyptic expectation." (Wolfhart Pannenberg. p. 65)#
35That there has been much effort spent in theology to divorce the 
Christian faith from the apocalyptic message cannot be denied, Galloway, 
in his book, speaks of this denial (ibid,, p. 6I), Pannenberg, himself, 
refers to the attempt in theology to retreat from the findings of Johannes 
Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, He writes, "Both the New Testament exegesis 
and the dogmatic theology of our century have constantly retreated before 
the consequences of this insight, not only because such a viewpoint is 
irreconcilable with our contemporary view of the world, determined as it 
is by the natural sciences, but also because Jesus' expectation seems 
to have been proved wrong by the simple fact of history's continuance 
down to the present day, and hence by the non-appearance of the end of 
the world which he awaited," (Pannenberg, The Apostles' Creed, p. 49),
Galloway makes a very interesting point when he writes that Pannen­
berg always looks at apocalyptic thought through Christian eyes, from a 
Christian perspective. He writes, "On these grounds he is justified in 
taking up the notion of the end of the 'age' in apocalyptic as that of 
the completion of history. He is correct in interpreting the cosmic 
scope of apocalyptic imagery as representing the unity of universal 
history under God, These are post-Hegelian concepts. But they arise 
directly from the out-working of the apocalyptic context of the life 
and action of Jesus - even though it may be seriously doubted whether 
they were the first thoughts in the mind of a first-century Jew in that 
connection," (ïïolfhart Pannenberg, pp. 63-64), Galloway, much earlier 
than Pannenberg, spoke to us of the cosmic significance and social 
relevance of apocalyptic thought in The Cosmic Christ (Nisbet & Co.
Ltd., London, 1951), PP. 13ff.). In support of his contention in that 
work, one could cite the following works of other scholars who have 
done research in this field: H. H, Rowley, The Relevance of Apocalyptic
(Lutterworth Press, London, 1944), A, Wilder, Eschatology and Ethics 
in the Teaching of Jesus (Harper & Brothers, New York, Î950), D, S. 
Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (SCM Press, London,
1964).
For an opposing view, I would refer the reader to an article by 
W . R, Murdock, 'History and Revelation in Jewish Apocalypticism' 
(interpretation. Vol. ZZI, 196?, pp. I67-I87), Murdock writes, "One 
could think of the future earthly kingdom expected by the prophets as 
the goal of the history of Israel because it was believed that God was 
acting in the events of history to bring Israel into this goal, l^ n 
the case of apocalypticism, however, one no longer has to do with the
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Elements of great significance to him include the message that one
must look to the end of all events for the full revelation of God
and his glory, and that such glory will extend over all men, not just
Israel.And, what is all important for Pannenherg is the concept
of the resurrection of the dead which pervades the thought of apoca- 
37lypticism. This is an event, which although lying beyond the 
experience of man this side of death, nevertheless, for this very 
reason, is related to all history. At the heart of this resurrection 
concept, he points out, is the future of the Son of Man who will appear 
on the clouda of heaven in judgement.
It was only in the context of this apocalyptic thought, especially 
that which dealt with the resurrection from the dead, that any sense 
could be made of the fate of Jesus, Jesus* fate was understood as 
a resurrection event because this tradition, in which he himself stood, 
created an expectancy of resurrection. To use a modern analogy,
Russia would interpret American violation of their air territory 
as a hostile act only in the expectancy of war. Otherwise, it would 
be regarded as perhaps a freakish mistake in navigation. So Jesus* 
fate can be understood as resurrection only within the expectancy of
(continued) historical destiny of a nation, but with the eternal 
destiny of individuals. Hence, one might speak of the future aeon as 
the goal of righteous individuals, but not as the "goal of all history,,," 
(p, 176), In contrast to this statement, D, 8, Russell warns against 
making a radical differentiation between the prophetic with its 
emphasis on history, and the Apocalyptic, He writes of the apocalyptics, 
"They read and interpreted the ancient prophecies in the light of the 
new *wisdom* which had been given to them with its interest in astrology, 
angelology, cosmology and the rest, and in terms of the new eschatological 
expectation of their day," (The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 
p. 271), As Galloway suggested with reference to Pannenberg, it is the 
latter interpretation that is more suitable to the apocalyptic context of 
Jesus' own life,
36See Pannehberg's article, 'Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of 
of Revelation* (History as Revelation, pp, 131-135),
37See Panne nberg, Jesus God and Man, pp. 7^ f^f.
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resurrection alive in his time. Pannenherg writes of this necessary 
context in this way, "Only the traditional expectation of the end of 
history rooted in apocalyptic gave Paul the opportunity of desig­
nating the particular event that he experienced, as Jesus* other 
disciples had experienced it previously, as an event belonging to 
the category of resurrection life,*'^  ^ So for Paul, as foz’ the rest 
of the early Christiana, Jesus was first seen for what he truly was, 
in his fate. In this liglit, they realized the Ultimate had appeared 
in him. As time gradually moved away from the event, he became 
recognized as the Son of Man who, it was predicted, would appear on 
the clouds in the end time. It is necessary to quote Pannenherg 
once again so that his conviction is made clear. He writes;
As the one who has been taken away to God,
Jesus is a heavenly being. His coming from 
heaven, which was expected in the immediate 
future and was probably already initiated 
by the Easter appearances, will bring on the 
universal resurrection of the dead and judg­
ment, just as the apocalyptic tradition had 
predicted of the appearance of the Son of Man 
on the clouds of heaven. Thus it is under­
standable that Jesus was no longer dis­
tinguished from the Son of Man, but was himself 
seen as the Son of Man whose coming was expect­
ed in the future, and the tradition about Jesus 
down to the details was connected with the 
expectation of the Son of Man,,,,By virtue of 
the resurrection, Jesus had moved into the role 
of tiie Son of Man,39
Because the end of all things had taken place in Jesus, it was 
now possible to see the ultimate and final significance of his pre- 
Easter life. It was divine, that is, it was one with God, Jesus 
in his earthly existence, in the particularity of that existence, 
could now be said to be the Son of Man, In this way, Pannenherg
p. 81.
pp. 68-69.
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explains how a particular event in history can claim universal meaning, 
that is, be seen in absolute terms Jesus' uniqueness rests in the 
fact that he, alone, had the ultimate happen to him before the end of 
all history for the rest of humanity. No one can stand in Jesus' 
place in the historical time scheme of life. Nevertheless, we have 
the possibility of becoming sons of God with him. For Pannenherg, 
Jesus' uniqueness from us rests, as well, in the particular apocalyptic 
context in which he lived. The Jewish imminent expectation in which 
Jesus made claims about his Person, is unrepeatable, "Any attempt 
at repetition would have an anti-Christian character. Therefore, 
the mode of Jesus' unity with the Son of God so that he is the Son 
of God in the whole of his human life in the light of his resurrection 
is equally unrepeatable and unique,
Having established the above understanding let us go on to 
investigate the important statements about God in the light of 
Jesus* life.
In Pannenherg*3 doctrine of God the expression 'God as Future * 
was used. In turn, this implied that there is at least some sense 
in which God does not-yet exist. The essentialness of this per­
spective on divinity for the freedom of man was established.
Another conclusion we drew from his thought was that time and eternity 
were not mutually exclusive concepts but were to be viewed inclusively. 
The significance of this viewpoint was also discussed. The concern 
before us now is the basis of such theological statements. This 
support can best be found in his christology and the biblical 
material selected by him.
^^efer back to p, 178 of this chapter, 
Pannenherg, Jesus God and Man, p, 34-7.
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If Jesus is recognized as the Son of God only from the stand­
point of the resurrection, that means, as this man (Jesus), the man 
among men, he is the Son of God, The identity of essence of Jesus with 
the Father resides, thus, in Jesus' humanity and not in some meta­
physical being over and beyond it,
A. D. Galloway has pointed out this aspect of Pannenherg's 
thought very well. He says the impasse of the two nature doctrine, 
which stemmed from the attempt to take the subject of both the 
divine and human attributes to be the divine, eternal Son of God, 
is overcome by Pannenherg, He does this by looking at the Subject 
of the attributes (whatever they may be) as simply the man Jesus 
of Nazareth,
By thinking of Jesus in his humanity as the Subject of the 
attributes of Sonship, one can then go on to make the following 
statements: God and time are not mutually exclusive, or, to put it 
another way, temporality is taken up into the Godhead; God is in the 
temporal as the Future,
If Jesus as this man is the Son of God, then room must be made 
in God, Himself, for v/hat happened in Jesus, Temporality is, by 
this means, taken up into God, The necessaiy correlation of fact 
and value, established as important for the significance of community, 
is now present. In the light of this, it is now possible to under­
stand God as in temporal events; that is to say, he has location and
"See Galloway's book, Y/'olfhart Pannenherg, pp, 128-129, He 
continues to write, "The traditional solution has served to keep 
the fundamental problem at bay rather than solve it. The problem 
is alY/ays ultimately that of the credibility of a man who is 
alleged to be also the eternal Son of God.,.," (p, 129).
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extension in fact. Our contention'was that such a perspective is 
necessary before 'meaningful* community can arise, '
However, we are not only saying that God and temporality are 
united in Jesus; we are saying something else equally important. In 
considering the trinitarian relationship within the Godhead, vie are 
now offered the perspective that the difference between the Son and 
the Father is a temporal difference, God differentiated Himself from 
Himself temporally, so that He is Future in relation to the Son in 
the Godhead, God is always Future in relation to His Son, and since 
the Son has no other Subject than Jesus, God is Future in Jesus, This 
gives us insight into Pannenherg*s contention that God, in a sense, 
does not-yet exist. It also allows us to see the reason why history 
has gained so much significance in Pannenherg's system. Now the 
logical relation of time itself appears in God and thus, history in 
its contingent nature is preserved.
In further support of this presentation, Pannenherg makes a very 
important biblical manoeuver. He has attempted a very original and 
exciting solution to an age old problem in biblical theology. For 
many years, theologians have debated the issue of whether the Kingdom 
of God was fully present in Jesus or yet to come. The debate has 
been fostered by the presence in the biblical documents themselves 
of two different teachings. One speaks of the presence of the Kingdom 
in Jesus and the other speaks of the future of the Kingdom in Jesus, 
These have so often been presented as exclusive understandings, 
Pannenherg erases such exclusiveness by viewing the Kingdom 
in both respects. He has presented us with one perspective in which 
the two may be reasonably held together in the reality of history 
itself. The Kingdom was present in Jesus, but it was present as the 
Future, Galloway sums up Pannenherg*s position in these words:
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If we believe in the final consummation 
and open ourselves towards it in hope, 
then we see and value all things in the 
light of their destiny in God. In this 
way God's presence in the world is 
intimately experienced. But this is 
not a presence which is different from 
or contrasted with his final coming in 
judgement and salvation at the end of 
time. His presence in the world ^  the 
orientation of the world toward the end
of time,^3
When God's presence in the world is thought of as the presence of 
the Future, then reality is interpreted in a way that has immense 
social and ethical relevance. This relevance will be considered 
further in the last chapter as we discuss the question of hovi mean­
ing arises for the individual in Pannenherg's system of thought.
At this point, we must consider Pannenberg's substantiation of 
his Christological perspective. What does he suggest as biblical 
support for his presentation? On what does he base the claims of 
Jesus?
Again, Galloway is very helpful in our understanding of Pannen-
berg. He clearly beings out a point emphasised by Pannenherg himself
in his christology which must be stressed in any interpretation of
his thought. Let us quote him on this matter.
This is one which more than a hundred years 
of intensive historical research and liter­
ary criticism of the documents has been 
unable to settle. However, Pannenherg does 
ease the situation by minimizing the amount 
of historical information necessary to sus­
tain his argument, lie does not require any 
precise information about the nature of 
Jesus' claim to authority. He does not need 
to know whether he claimed to be Messiah or 
Son of God or Son of Man, It is enough for 
pannenherg to establish that he did make a 
claim to authority and a demand for decision 
in relation to his person and message within
p. 122.
—19*1 —
a context of apocalyptic expectation.
The true nature of Jesus* claim to 
authority and call to decision did 
not and could not become clear until 
the resurrection. There is therefore 
no attempt to establish the divinity 
of Jesus on the basis of his pre-Easter 
his tory ,44
The important points in the above quotation are that Jesus 
made claims of authority for himself and that he made them within 
the context of apocalyptic expectation. Both points are essential 
for Pannenberg if he is to maintain a firm grounding in his christo­
logical presentation. He justifiably claims the support of recent 
New Testament research for the first point. In defence, he turns 
to the scholarship of such noted interpreters as Paul Althaus,
Hermann Diem and Ernst Kasemann, all of whom stress the claim of 
Jesus of authority which preceded the faith of the disciples. In 
the statements by Jesus which begin "but I say unto you", which are 
recognized by Kasemann as authentic, Jesus stresses his superiority 
of authority over the Rabbi and Moses, This, in terms of the Jewish 
thought of his time, was nothing short of blasphemy and is thought to 
be one of the contributing factors leading to his crucifixion, Jesus* 
position with respect to the law may also be considered as direct 
evidence of his claim of authority over his contemporary religious 
authorities. Such a claim could not easily be denied by any serious 
New Testament scholar, in the light of the statements of Jesus con­
sidered most authentic.
The other important point, that Jesus made these claims within 
an apocalyptic context, is equally supported by most New Testament
^Ibid., p, 65, For Pannenberg's own statements, with respect 
to this whole issue, see Jesus God and Man (pp. 53ff.J* This is one
of the clearest and most emphatic accounts given by Pannenherg of 
the groundwork for his christology.
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scholars, Bornicajim, and even Conzelmann who disagrees with Pannen- 
berg on the futuristic tension of Jesus claim, are two examples.
Since Schweitzer, few theologians have been able to deny the apoca­
lyptic context of Jesus' teaching. Because of their misunderstanding 
of its message they may have, in some way, tried to skirt the full 
implication of its presence. Nevertheless, the presence Itself is 
rarely, if ever, denied,
Pannenherg contends that part of the meaning of standing within 
the apocalyptic tradition is that the future remains the pole by 
which the truth or falsehood of any claims is tested, Jesus, he 
maintains, had this aspect to his teaching; he never attempted to 
justify his own authority but referred to the future for vindication.
On this point Pannenherg makes much use of the saying from Q, "And 
I tell you, every one who acknowledges me before men, the Son of 
man also will acknowledge before the angels of God," (Luke 10:8f,),^^
The word 'never* in reference to Jesus above should be qualified, 
Pannenherg brings this to our attention by pointing to other sayings 
of Jesus, especially those referring to his deeds. In the part of Q 
that deals with Jesus* response to John the Baptist's question of 
his authority, Jesus refers to his deeds (Matt, 11:5f.), for example, 
healing the blind, Pannenherg points out that although these statements, 
in a sense, are defensive ones, they contain no ultimate reference,
"Jesus deeds could point to the beginning of the time of salvation, but 
they could not show unambiguously whether Jesus personally was the one
h 5
I find it inconceivable that Jesus could stand within the 
apocalyptic tradition and still claim absolute authority for himself 
such as Conzelmann suggests. See Pannenherg, Jesus Cod and Man, p, 38.
pp. 58-59.
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in whom salvation or judgment are ultimately decided," Luke (12:8),
on the other hand, makes this ultimate claim with reference to the future.
According to this statement it will only he in the resurrection of the
dead, when the Son of Man comes in judgment, that Jesus’ claim can be
said to be true or false. It is not something that Jesus can give
witness to himself, Pannenherg describes the situation in these words:
Ihus the whole of Jesus' work remained aimed
at the future verification of his claim to 
authority, at a confirmation that Jesus him­
self was unable to offer precisely because 
and insofar as it involved the legitimation 
of his ovm person, which is bound to the 
arrival of the announced end event. The 
question about such a future confirmation 
of Jesus' claim by God himself is held open
by the temporal difference between the be­
ginning of God’s rule, which was already 
present in Jesus’ activity, and its future 
fulfillment with the coming of the Son of 
Man on the clouds of heaven,4'
^^Ibid,, p, 64-,
Ibid., p, 63, That the saying of Jesus in Luke 12:8, Mark 8:38 
is authentic is very seldom disputed, H, E, Todt in his book, The .Son 
of Man in the Synoptic Tradition, trans, Dorothea M, Barton (SCM Press. 
London, 196^trrSTiIirrT27S"as an authentic saying of Jesus (p. 55).
He claims several other sayings with future emphasis as authentic, viz. 
Matt, 24-:27, Matt, 24-:37, (Q): Luke 17:30, Matt 24-:44, (q). In all of 
these sayings the Son of Man is introduced as a sanction for the present 
and a challenge offer of Jesus, Bultmann also accepts this Luke 12:8 
saying as authentic (cf. Theology of the Nevf Testament, Vol. I (SGM Press, 
London, 1971), pp, 29f,), However, he draws out the distinction between 
Jesus and the Son of Man to a point of no connection whatsoever between 
them. He regards only those passages which stress the distinction as 
authentic, and those which mention an indentification as creations of the 
early church,
Pannenherg might also claim Reginald Fuller's support in stressing 
the futuristic aspect of Jesus' claim. In his book. The Mission and 
Achievement of Jesus (SCM press, Ltd., London, 1956), Fuller stresses 
the importance of the sayings of Jesus which make a distinction between 
Jesus and the Son of Man, At the same time, contrary to Bultmann, he 
interpreted the other 'present' sayings in a manner compatible with this 
distinction. Fuller differs from Todt, however, in regarding the relation­
ship that exists between the Son of Man and Jesus in the Luke saying as 
christological, Todt regards it as soteriological (cf. Reginald Fuller, 
The Foundations of New Testament Christology (Lutterworth Press, London,
T965T7'pF*' 122f DT~”Even Frederick Borsch, who emphasises the identity
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Before leaving Pannenherg, one other matter must be mentioned 
as it is crucial in the apology he offers for his position. As 
indicated, Pannenherg refers to the resurrection as the event that 
determined the meaning of Jesus' pre-Easter life. In keeping with 
the rest of Pannenberg's method, this means the resurrection must 
be given some historical credibility. It must be made a rational 
candidate for belief, Bultmann may think of the resurrection as 
the effectiveness of the cross of Christ, Barth and Brunner may
( continued) of Jesus with the Son of Man at the expense of their 
differentiation, admits in his book, Tlie Son of Man in M.yth and History 
(SCM Press Ltd,, London, I967), that when it comes to the Luke saying 
(12:8), which he regards as authentic, there is a distinction that cannot 
be denied. In conclusion, he is even prepared to make the following 
statement which seems to agree with H, E, Todt and the others we have 
mentioned, "Is the Son of Man in these sayings in heaven or on earth?
There may be a sense in which he is both, the Son of Man on earth mani­
festing forth in this generation, and despite men's contempt and rejection, 
the Son of Man of heaven. As men treat him below, so are they treating 
the heavenly Son of Man, and so, in the end will they be treated by him,"
(p, 359). Borsch, it seems, is admitting here a future vindication of 
Jesus' claim which we have stressed in the above. Earlier in the same 
book, he wrote, "It was the one above who was the true divinity, who was 
really enthroned in heaven, while the one below was only his representative, 
speaiding for him on earth during the present age," (pp, 357-358), Borsch 
is, at least, denying here that Jesus was divine from the beginning (the 
Incarnational Approach), One finds the conclusion of his book somewhat 
difficult, however, v/hen he implies that Jesus was adopted at a certain 
point in his life by God to play the role of the Son of Man, and did so 
perfectly. He writes, ",,,,there would seem to be a sharp challenge for 
Christian orthodoxy, for the myth of the Man, as we believe it was under­
stood by Jesus, does not concern itself with one v/ho comes down from 
heaven to incarnate himself as the Man upon earth. The divine Man is 
a heavenly figure, and the Man on Earth only himself becomes divine in 
a qualified sense through his adoption. The earthly Man is given a 
basically functional rather than ontological office," (p. 407), In saying 
this. Borsch in the end does not want to make any distinction between the 
Son of Man and Jesus, as is the case with Pannenherg, He feels that Jesus 
became the Son of Man (adopted) on earth. He does admit that in the Son 
of Man tradition there is an earthly Man that is referred to and a heavenly 
figure. He identifies Jesus with the earthly Man,
It should be pointed out here, however, that Pannenberg's argument 
for his christology does not hinge upon the investigation that has gone 
on with respect to these sayings. This, as we have seen,was the point 
made by Galloway (Wplfhart Pannenherg, p, 63), Pannenherg is not dogmatic’ 
in one direction or the other but would say, in the light of the research 
that has gone on so far, that it is probable that Jesus never identified 
himself with the Son of Man directly, This was an assumption made by the 
early church in the light of the resurrection (of, Pannenherg, Jesus God 
and Man, pp, 56ff ,)•
-195-
think of it as something that is given by the sight of faith and 
not open to knowledge or investigation apart from that faith, 
Pannenherg, however, unlike these theologians, has committed himself 
to a method, that of historical analysis, which he must follow 
throu^out or admit to an inconsistency of thought. This would 
surely weaken his position. In the light of this the question 
which must be asked is: Can historical analysis and investigation 
apply when it comes to a reality such as the resurrection? Or to 
express it differently: Can historical evidence yield transcendent 
conclusions? Did they? The resurrection, Pannenherg claims, is 
the presence of the eschatological Future in the world. As stated, 
this idea is not new with him, Pannenherg, however, is approaching 
the event rationally. For him there are no hiding holes in faith.
What we want to do in the succeeding argument is show that the 
uniqueness of the resurrection is not a stumbling block to Pannenberg's 
theology. It is not our task (nor a possibility) to determine the 
actuality of the event. If, however, it can be shown to be an event 
commensurable with Pannenberg's method, then he has proper defence.
For this purpose, we turn to Pannenberg's writings themselves. In 
actual fact, he has provided his own defence,
Pannenherg makes the reader aware that when one speaks of the 
resurrection of the dead, reference is being made to an event unlike 
any of everyday life. "To speak about the resurrection of the dead 
is not comparable to speaking about any random circumstance that can 
be identified empirically at any time. Here we are dealing, rather, 
with a metaphor,"49 ipj^  ^word metaphor does not mean that the resun^ 
ection is something absolutely out of touch with us, Pannenherg
49Pannenherg, Jesus God and Man, p, 74,
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means one can speak only of the resurrection in an indirect manner.
In this context, he says it is like awakening from sleep. There is
50a sense in which the resurrection is 'unknown* to us, in that we
have never experienced anything like it in our earthly existence.
There is nothing comparable to it, "The intended reality is beyond
the experience of the man who lives on this side of death. Thus,
the only possible mode of speaking about it is metaphorical, using
51images of this-worldly occurrences,"
Having stated this, it is necessary to go on to the main point 
in Pannenberg's defence. He says the fact that the resurrection 
is unlike anything we have encountered in the world and must there­
fore be referred to only by means of a metaphor, is proof, in many
52circles, against the historicity of the event. Many people shut
themselves off from the historical possibility of the resurrection
by assuming as a premise that the dead do not rise, Pannenherg
writes about the assumption, or premise, this way:
If one starts from the premise that the dead 
remain dead, that death is the absolute end, 
and that nothing like a resurrection from the 
dead (in whatever sense one like to take it) 
can ever happen, in any circumstances what­
ever, this produces so strong a prejudice 
against the Christian message of the raising 
of Jesus that one no longer weighs up in detail 
the exact quality of the evidence with regard 
to its significance for a total judgment, in 
the way that is, after all, otherwise the his­
torian's duty and chief business,53
50Ibid., p, 74. I would refer the reader to a comment A, D, 
Galloway has made about the term 'unknown' in Pannenherg, as it could 
possibly be open for misinterpretation, Galloway points out that 
'unknown' here does not mean there is nothing to be said about the 
resurrection, otherwise it would contradict the 'doctrine of truth 
conditions and so of assertive meaning,* (Wolfhart Pannenherg, pp. 72f,),
51Pannenherg, Jesus God and Man, p, 75.
52Pannenherg, Basic Questions in Theology. Vol. I, p, 49.
^^Pannenherg, The Apostles* Greed, p, 1C4,
-197“
Pannenberg contends that such a premise is made by historians
54throu^ the wrong application of analogy. His reasoning on this 
matter is convincing and central to his method,
"The really critical point", writes Pannenberg, "for the relation
of historical method to theology lies,,,..less with the historical
correlation than with the principle of analogy in historical under-
55standing, which is the root of the comparative m e t h o d , H e  refers 
to Ernst Troeltsch as the principal proponent of the analogical 
principle used in the wrong way, V/e have little dispute with this 
reference. However, he also might have referred to David Hume who 
applied the use of analogy in his argument against miracles. One 
must rely on common experience and observation, according to Hume, 
in the assessment of whether or not something is probable. Let 
us quote Hume here for he represents, in the following statement, 
the position that Pannenberg is attacking in his theology, Hume 
writes:
A wise man proportions his belief to
the evidence. In such conclusions as are 
founded on an infallible experience, he 
expects the event with the last degree of
assurance, and regards his past experience
as a full proof of the future existence 
of that eventT^^
To be sure, Ernst Troeltsch represents a similar view which
is evident in his essay,'Uber historische und dogmatische Methode
57in der Théologie*, There, he argues that the historical method
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, pp, 39-55» 
p. hi.
 ^Jiume, Enquires Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning 
the Principles of Morals, Section X, part I, p, 110,
57Ernst Troeltsch, ®Uber historische und dogmatische Methode in 
der Theologie* (Gesammelte Schriften, Vol, II, Tubingen: J. C, B, Mohr,
1922), pp. 729-7537.
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rests on three interrelated principles. They are important enough
in this context to repeat and are listed as follows: (1) the principle
of criticism, which means that our judgments about the past are not
classified as proofs, that is, as either true or false, but rather
they are always open to revision; (2) the principle of analogy,
which means that such judgments of probability can be made only if
we presuppose that our present experience is analogous to that of past
persons; and (3) the principle of universal correlation, which means
that all historical phenomena are so interdependent and related, that
no change can occur at one point in the historical nexus without
effecting a change in all that immediately surrounds it. Historical
explanation, therefore, necessarily takes the form of understanding
an event in terms of its antecedents and consequences, in terras of
its temporal and spatial place in the causal nexus.
It is the second principle that Pannenberg takes exception to
in his theology. He reasons that if it is upheld rigidly then the
possibility of the *new* is left out of history, Troeltsch, he says,
is being overly anthropooentric by such a method, Pannenberg does not
deny that anthropocentricism is part of the analogical method, for one
must proceed, ",,,,from v/hat lies closest to the investigator's current
58state of knowledge," He questions, however, the assumption that this
is the only viewpoint that is open to man. Is man's viewpoint all
there is to be known about reality? "Yfho is to say", he writes,
"that the only things that can happen are the things which are by nature
58Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol, I, p. 44#
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59already fully and completely comprehensible."
Pannenberg contends that what happened in Troeltsch, and what
has happened to the use of analogy through him, was that a simple
method of historical-critical inquiry was turned into a world view,
an ontology. He speaks of Troeltsch's 'omnipotence of analogy*
which prohibits the acceptance of anything into the historical field
that does not match the common experiences of mankind; there must be
a fundamental homogeneity of all historical events. This is a
view of analogy* Tlius, its sole function is to limit man's knowledge
in the world and tie him to that which is already known,
Pannenberg opts for a more positive role of analogy. The negative
use presupposes a world view and is tied to it. It has developed, in
other words, the historical-critical inquiry into something absolute,
Yfhen that world view is questioned itself, we are left with a positive
use of analogy rather than a negative one. The use of analogy is then
restored to its original intention, a simple tool of historical
research. Pannenberg comments on the situation in this manner;
My criticism is not directed against the 
critical use of the principle of analogy, 
which is basic to the critical historical 
method. This use is merely restricted.
The instrument of analogy gains precision, 
if judgments about this historicity or 
nonhistoricity of events asserted in the
59Pannenberg, The Apostles* Creed, p, 110, Pannenberg makes 
an interesting point when he says that generally the physicists 
and scientists today do not hold to such a closed idea of the 
universe as we might think. He writes, "The natural sciences try 
to establish and describe laws from data. They do not decree what 
may be viewed as a datum in general, and what may not. At most 
they allow conclusions as to the events with which we can or must 
reckon. Science by no means determines the horizons of the future," 
(Ibid., p. 110),
^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol, I, p, 45.
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tradition are based only on positive 
analogies between the tradition and 
situations known elsewhere, but not 
on the lack of such analogies,
Positive use of analogy, according to Pannenberg, rather than just
showing the similarity of events reveals, more importantly, what is
new and transcendent. Again, his own words are clear and precise
at this point. He writes:
The cognitive power of analogy depends 
upon the fact that it teaches us to see 
contents of the same kind in nonhomogeneous 
things (das Gleichartige im Ungleichartigen)•
If the historian keeps his eye on the non­
exchangeable individuality and contingency 
of an event, then he will see that he is 
dealing with nonhomogeneous things, which 
cannot be contained without remainder in
any analogy,
It is Pannenberg's contention that if one adopts the more 
positive role of analogy (and no reasons exist which disallow 
such an interpretation of analogy) then a strong argument for 
the historicity of the resurrection can be made. Historical 
evidence can yield transcendent conclusions. As a matter of 
fact, Pannenberg goes further in saying historical evidence did 
yield such conclusions. He lists the following pertinent facts 
to be taken into consideration; (1) the list of appearances as 
listed by Paul in I Cor, Chapter 13, This is, with little doubt, 
to be dated around 36 A, D,, but the knowledge with which Paul 
speaks v/as gathered from his visit to Jerusalem (Gal, 1:18) 
shortly after his conversion. If his conversion was around 33 A. D,,
7/olf hart Pannenberg, 'Response to tlie Discussion' (Tlieology 
as History, Vol, III of New Frontiers in Theology, editors: James 
M. Robinson and John B, Cobb, Jr, (Harper & Row, New lork, I967),
pp, 221-276), pp, 264.-263,
^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol, I, p, 4-6,
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and Jesus* death around 30 A. D., then that speaks of a very 
reliable source of information. This would give credibility to 
the fact that the appearances were genuine and not an invention 
of the later church; (2) the faith of the disciples themselves.
There is no way, Pannenberg reasons, that the shock that unquestion­
ably happened to the faith of the disciples, in the face of the 
crucifixion, could have been overcome, other than through the 
happening of the resurrection. The disciples were certainly not 
living in the expectation that the resurrection was to happen in 
a proleptio sense; they could not have invented it in the light of 
the apocalyptic tradition. This event was new with respect to that 
tradition; (3) the number and temporal differences of the appearances. 
There was no change here of a psychological pyramid as the appearances 
were in different places. The sheer number of those who saw the 
appearances is also strong evidence that it was not just an invention 
of the disciples; (4) the empty tomb, Pannenberg makes much of this 
argument, "How could Jesus' disciples in Jerusalem have proclaimed 
his resurrection if they could be constantly refuted merely by viewing 
the grave in which his body was interred?"^^ No body was produced 
by the Jewish authorities to refute the claims made by the disciples. 
The empty tomb, very likely, was an independent tradition from the 
appearances. This suggests that the appearances were not fabrications 
based on an empty tomb. On the contrary, if the disciples returned 
to Galilee immediately after the crucifixion, then the tomb was 
discovered apart from them. This has extreme probability from the 
support of the biblical documents themselves, Pannenberg writes
^^Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, p. 100,
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about the Independence of the two traditions this way: "If the 
appearance tradition and the grave tradition came into existence 
independently, then by their mutually complementing each other 
they let the assertion of the reality of Jesus* resurrection, 
in the sense explained above, appear as historically very probable, 
and that always means in historical inquiry that it is to be pre-
64supposed until contrary evidence appears," The conclusion, thus, 
that one reaches with Pannenberg, excluding the premise that *the 
dead do not rise* based on the wrong use of analogy, is that the 
resurrection is a reasonable candidate for belief.
One may also reason that the resurrection acquires rationality
65in meeting the demands of truth suggested by Pannenberg, Throu^- 
out, we have suggested that the credibility of an event or statement 
depends on the presence within of a unifying factor which, at the 
same time, gives significance to the multifarious of life. The 
resurrection is actually a model of these standards of truth, and 
thus the personal.
It is (as stated) the presence of the eschatological Future,
It is thus the unity which determines the meaning of all events 
past and present. The meaning of events, we argued, is determined 
retrospectively from the Future,. Hie Resurrection is the presence 
of this Future, It determined the meaning of the past event Jesus,
At the same time, there is not a determinism implied here, which would 
destroy the contingent in its significance. The events and traditions 
of past and present also participate in determining the meaning of
p. 105.
Refer back to p, 99 of this thesis.
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th.Q eschatological Future; they, in a sense, are acts which make 
up the Future. The meaning of the resurrection, it was suggested, 
could only he understood in the light of the past and present events. 
Thus, in the resurrection we have a model of truth. It is a model 
of the structure of *meaning* for which we are arguing in this work. 
It is a model of the world's relationship to God, of the relation­
ship of creation to the Creator,
(C) Jesus From Above
Let us now turn our attention to Brunner,
Our argument with respect to his concept of God was that God 
'exists* and does so *a-temporally', Brunner throughout his vrritinga 
denies any semblance of thou^t with Plato,^ ^whioh one mi^t suspect 
in the light of our argument. He writes at one point, "The Living 
God does not, like the divinity of Plato, stand above the changing 
temporal process, but He enters into it, indeed He even steps into 
H i s t o r y , I n  spite of statements such as this, that show a deter­
mination to differ from any Platonic notion, Brunner does not possess 
the conceptual tools that allow him to escape Plato completely. This
^%ee chapter five of this thesis for a fuller treatment of the 
structure of 'meaning* suggested in the writings of Pannenberg,
Pilce quotes Plato with the words, ",,,'was* and *v/ill be* are 
created species of time which we in our carelessness mistakenly apply 
to eternal being. For we say that it was, is, and will be; but, in 
truth, 'is* applies to it, while 'was' and 'will be’ are properly said 
of becoming in time. They are motions, but that which is immovably the 
same for ever cannot become older or younger in time," (pike, God and 
Timelessness, p, 15). Compare this with Brunner, The Christian Doctrine 
of God, Dogmatics, Vol, I, p, 270),
680runner. The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I, p, 271.
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can bo shown if we look critically, at his Christology, He is in
69the position of others of his day, “^who would have God and time 
related, in a certain sense, but fail to provide the concepts that 
allow for such correlation. This problem arises for Brunner with 
respect to his thinking on the life of Jesus Christ,
In analysing Brunner's christology, let us keep the shortcomings 
of his position, as we analysed them, before us. Neither individuation 
nor participation were given relevant meaning in historical reality, 
due to the fact that God v/as said to 'exist' and exist 'a-teraporally* ,
An attempt will be made now to show how this understanding derives directly 
from his views on christology. In this attempt, there is perhaps no 
better place to begin than in the area in which the nature of God's own 
being is contemplated, namely the Trinity, As stated, Brunner finds much 
social relevance in this area of theological expression and, thus, makes 
an effort to define it clearly, especially the Son's relationship with 
the Father,"If we take this,,,,idea seriously, we find that this
69I refer to Barth, Bultmann, Thielicke and others. By analysing 
Brunner's position, the criticisms directed toward him could, to a large 
degree, be applied to a major portion of Protestant thought in the 20th 
century. In fact, one may say it is a Protestant problem with which we 
are dealing. As yet it has received no clear answers,
70The social relevance of the Trinity has been recently discussed 
at much length in a book by Jurgen Moltmann entitled, The Crucified 
God, trails, R, A. Wilson and John Bowden (SCM Press Ltd,, London, 1973),
In this book Moltmann re-affirras much of the understanding we claimed 
for Pannenberg. Jesus in his death on the cross is taken up into the 
Godhead in a manner that relates God essentially to the world, Moltmann 
sees God in the crucified Jesus, "God is not greater than he is in this 
humiliation,,,.God is not more powerful than he is in this helplessness,
God is not more divine than he is in this humanity,,,.the God event takes 
place on the cross of the risen Christ," (p. 205)* "...the theological
dimension of the death of Jesus on the cross is what happens between Jesus 
and his Father in the Spirit of abandonment and surrender. In these relation­
ships the person of Jesus comes to the fore in its totality as the Son, 
and the relationship of the Godhead and the manhood in his person fall into 
the background," (p. 207). Moltmann does not speak of the death of God but 
death in God, The similarity with Pannenberg is to be noted in the view 
that action takes place in God, in this respect, and not outside Him or 
to Him.
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leads to conclusions which are of the greatest practical signi-
71finance, even for our attitude towards social and ethical questions,"
It is in the area of the Trinity that much of the social relevance of 
Pannenherg's thought is found. But, we shall have more to say on this 
later,
Pannenberg's conception of God as Future was defended in christo­
logical terms by seeing a temporal difference between the Son and the 
Father, God separated Himself temporally from Himself in His Son 
and thus became Future to Himself, Brunner also focuses much attention 
on the difference that exists between the Son and the Father in the 
Trinity, He writes of that difference in this way;
Jesus Christ does say, it is true: "I and 
the Father are one", "He that hath seen 
Me hath seen the Father"; but the Scriptures 
never say: "The Father is the Son and the 
Son is the Father,"72
Brunner feels that it is vitally important that this distinction be
drawn in any theology. Thus it could be said, Pannenberg and Brunner
are united in the degree of importance focused on this aspect of our
faith,
Notwithstanding this similarity, they remain apart in one very 
important matter. For Pannenberg, the difference between the Son 
and the Father is a temporal difference. In Brunner, there is no 
suggestion of temporality whatsoever. One sees in him a purely 
metaphysical separation of Son and Father, V/hat I mean is that 
there is no notion of time. Both persons have a particular function 
to perform within the Trinity and one is not Future in relation to 
the other.
71Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol, I, p, 22$,
p. 229.
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Another way of expressing Brunner's thought on this point
would he to say that in the Son, God's activity is loving, while
in the Father, a 'strange work' is performed. The latter is the
experience of God's wrath in life, Brunner's own words confira
this interpretation:
Thus God acts in a twofold sphere: the 
sphere where God is as He reveals Him­
self in Jesus Christ, as Salvation,
Light, and Life; and the sphere where 
He is not present in Jesus Christ, 
namely, as consuming wrath, which des­
troys, annihilates, and works in dark­
ness, These two spheres .are reality; 
the one is the reality in Christ in 
which we are set hy the saving Vford and 
saving faith; the other is the reality 
outside of Christ, the world of doom and 
darloiess, out of which we are rescued hy 
Christ, in so far as we believe in Him,'3
If there is no future in God, in relation to the Son, it is 
logical to say that God then 'exists' in the Son; that is, in His 
essence He 'is' (complete) in the Son, There is no sense in which 
one might say God 'does not exist' in the Son, In terms of God as 
Love, God is fully and completely revealed. The Wrath of God does 
not really belong to the essential will of God,^^^ God, as He is 
in Himself apart from man and his sin, is not a God of wrath but only 
a God of Love fully expressed in the Son,
I find this a strange and difficult expression on Brunner’s part, 
At times one is given the impression that the Father, in his wrath, 
is just the perspective of man on God because of his sin, let one 
cannot only say this as Brunner sometimes speaks as if the Wrath of 
God were an active thing in God (one hesitates to call it personal
p. 230.
p. 169.
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as personal implies Love and thus the Son), At any rate, God 
'outside of Christ' expresses the encounter man has with God in 
the natural sphere. "They (Brunner is referring to ideas of God 
outside of Christ) are also one in the fact that in their effect 
upon us they are all negative, destructive. Hence they correspond 
to the wrath of God, under which man stands, so long as he has not 
entered into the sphere of grace of Jesus Christ through revelation 
and faith,""^^
How all of this relates to the timelessness of God is an 
argument which was pursued earlier. In God's essential nature 
there is nothing of the natural world, nothing of historical existence 
as we know it, for Brunner equates this essential nature only with 
Christ, the Son, as Love, As stated, the Son as Love is not in nature 
and history. In this way, it can be maintained that there is a timeless 
element within the Godhead. And this leaves no room for an extension 
or location of God, in his Love or essential will, in the world.
Let us concentrate on this briefly. First of all, we want to 
establish further evidence that in Christ, God 'exists'. Whether 
he exists ^  or out of time is another question, which will be seen 
shortly. Perhaps we can start by looking at the situation from the 
standpoint of God's manner of revelation. Here, Brunner may be 
classified as an incarnationalist; that is, one who sees the divinity 
of Christ from the standpoint of his birth and not his resurrection 
or fate, as with Pannenberg, There is, of course, nothing strange in 
this concept as it is the traditional perspective of the Christian 
faith. The implication of this approach to the christological question, 
however, is that the Subject of the divine-human attributes in Jesus
^^Ibid,, p, 173,
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is the Eternal Son of God and not, as with Pannenherg, the man Jesus 
himself,
It is not difficult to find support for this in Brunner's own 
writings. In his Dogmatics, for example, in which one must admit 
to a difference of approach in his study, he still writes, "He Him­
self, Jesus, is "from above",,,.The mystery of the divine Nature and 
the divine Will becomes evident in all that Jesus speaks, does, and 
i s " As is evident from this quotation, the divine nature 
becomes the focal point around which all attention is directed. It 
is the subject from which everything else proceeds and the pre­
supposition underlying all statements of Jesus* work, function and 
purpose. As stated, Brunner is not alone in this. In fact, since 
the Council of Ghalcedon, it has received the stamp of orthodoxy 
which has been carried through to the twentieth century. All that 
was accomplished by Jesus on earth must be seen as the work of the 
divine nature that was within him.
Whenever the incarnational approach to Christology is stressed, 
one must think of God's communication to man as direct. In the 
God-Man event, one is standing under the full impact of the content, 
as there is no differentiation made between God and the event, God 
can be said to 'exist' in the event. This is not the case in an 
indirect communication of God to the world; in this instance the 
content is different from the event itself.
^^runner. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol, II, p, 336". Brunner is re-echoing his earlier state­
ments about Christ made in The Mediator when he speaks of Christ as 
having historical personality but no human person (p. 319). We 
shall question Brunner's understanding of the person implied in 
this christological thought (see chapter V, p, 229 of this thesis).
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The objection could be raised, at this point, that Brunner
in fact proclaims an indirectness of revelation in the person of 
77the Mediator, Jesus is the Mediator of God to man and thus is 
not a direct revelation, I think Pannenberg's comment on this 
expression in protestant thought is pertinent for an understanding 
of Brunner, and helpful in meeting the above objection. He writes, 
"Whether the communication is transmitted by means of a third party 
or is directly delivered to the recipient is inconsequential for the 
distinction between direct and indirect communication."^^ He goes 
on to write, "It is not a question of mediateness of immediateness 
in the act of communication, but whether the content of a communi­
cation can be linked in a direct or indirect way with its intention, 
Since the intention and the content are the same in Brunner, one must 
say there is a directness of revelation. This much is evident at the 
beginning of his Christological study when he writes, "Through God 
alone can God be k n o w n , T h e  final impression one is left with 
is that God is both the medium and the subject of revelation. All 
indirectness Brunner argued for in the appearance of the Mediator is 
removed. In this respect, the conclusion that John McIntyre draws 
in his book. The Shape of Christology seems proper, that if the 
medium and the subject of revelation are identical and thus known 
directly, there is no occasion for revelation at all,^  ^ One must
^^See The Mediator, pp, 334ff*
"^ P^annenberg, 'Introduction* in Revelation as History, p, 14, 
"^ I^bid., p. 13.
^%runner, The Mediator, p. 21,
8lJohn McIntyre, The Shape of Christology (SCM Press Ltd., London,
1966), p, 169.
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say, at least, in the light of the above, that God 'exists* in his
essence in the Son, In other words, there is no sense in which one
might say, with Pannenberg, that God's essence has a history in 
82time. What Brunner means by indirectness is not that revelation 
takes place in something different from God, but that it takes place 
unhistorically.^^
If time is to be taken seriously; that is, if the benefits of 
Christ's salvation are to be extended to time and humanity, then some 
provision must be made for the extension of the divine in the human.
If we turn to the early Church Fathers, we can see how this logic 
was part of their whole theological expression, I realize one cannot 
lump together the theologies of the men of the early church in one 
neat pattern of thought. They each had their own individual expressions 
which defies such a procedure. At any rate, there was a tendency and 
a general thrust to their theology which can be said to be common to 
all. Their theology, particularly their christology, was expressed 
with high awareness of the dilemma that faced man in life, Man in 
falling away from God corrupted himself. The consequences of man's 
sin extended to the whole man; they were concrete, physical effects, 
culminating in the fact that man must die. For the early Fathers, 
what God accomplished in Christ was extended to cover not only sin, 
but the consequences of sin as well. By taking on our flesh, Christ 
effected salvation for the whole of man, not away from the body but.
82Pannenberg, 'Dogmatic Theses On The Concept Of Revelation* 
(Revelation as History), p, 134*
^^8ee The Mediator, pp. 337f*, where Brunner speaks of the 
indirectness of Christ in terms of his 'incognito'. Later he 
refers to Christ's 'mask', that which history alone can see#
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most importantly, with the body, Tliat is to say, the main interest
of christology for them was its soteriological benefits worked out
with and through the humanity of Jesus Christ, As Athanasius put it:
,.,,And thus, taking a body like to ours, 
because all men were liable to the corrup­
tion of death he surrendered it to death 
instead of all, and offered it to the 
Father;,,.that by all dying in him the law 
touching the corruption of mankind mi^t 
be abolished (inasmuch as its power was 
fulfilled in the Lord's body, and no longer 
has capacity against men who are like him), 
and that he might turn back to incorruption 
men who had reverted to corruption, and
quicken them from death by the appropriation
of his body and by the grace of his resurr­
ection.,..^ 4
For Athanasius, as with his contemporaries, God had become a man that 
man might become divine,
What is significant in such theological expression, is the close 
association asserted between the body, or rather the concrete nature 
of Jesus Christ, and our own physical existence. In this way, their 
expression is close to what we argue to be the centre of the gospel 
message itself: God in Christ has come to man in the totality of man's 
existence; salvation is the grace of God which restores man as a whole 
being; in Jesus Christ the divine has become human.
The emphasis they made, however, important as it was to the
Christian faith, was clothed in a conceptual framework peculiar to the 
philosophical climate of the day. However, it cannot be accepted as 
meaningful in the present. Their thinking must always be seen 
against the background of the Greek philosophical system of their 
time, a background in which, as Tillich writes, "....philosophy had
^Athanasium, 'Salvation By Restoration', De incarnations (c, 318) 
(Documents of the Christian Church, ed, H. Bettenson (Oxford University
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88become religion, and religion had become mystical philosophy.”
To the Greek theological mind, God was the theological counterpart 
of the Realm of Ideas, the Transcendent above the actual, the Idea 
above its expression, in whom all universal essences had their dwelling 
place and in whom all potentialities of being were seen. Awareness 
of this element of Platonic realism is necessary for us to grasp 
the expression which the early Church Fathers made of Christ and to 
understand the full significance the incarnation of God had in their 
theology. When God became man it was not the humanity of a single 
individual he assumed; it was humanity in general. Or to put it 
another way, in the incarnation, God as an individual man assumed 
universal manhood; an ontological relationship was thus effected 
with all manlcind*
It must be pointed out that for the early Church Fathers all 
redemptive power of the incarnation was attributed to the Logos, The 
flesh, in and of itself, had no power unto salvation, but only as it 
was taken up and used by the Logos, Aloys Grillraeier in his book 
Christ in Christian Tradition, writing on the thought of Athanasius, 
says, "The Flesh becomes an agent moved directly and physically by 
the Logos, It is in this sense that we should understand the 
summary sentence: 'He became man; for this cause also he needed 
the body as a human i n s t r u m e n t O n l y  someone who was divine, 
only the Logos, could possess qualities and properties such as 
immortality and incorruptibility. At the same time, only if he
^^Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (SCM Press, 
London, I968), p, 30,
^^Aloys Grillmeier, S. J., Christ in Christian Tradition, 
trans, John Bowden (A. R, Mowbray & CoV, Ltd,, London7 19§577 P* 206,
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were associated with us in our humanity could these same properties 
be a redemptive occasion for us. It was this conviction the Council 
of Chalcedon stamped with orthodoxy when it set out to formulate its 
definition.
From our standpoint there is much in the christological position 
of the early church which we would want to criticise. For one thing, 
much of their language suggests a very mechanical, almost magical, 
bestowal of salvation, a salvation in which we, individually, are, 
almost non-involved. This impression is not helped by the little 
attention that is paid to the historical work and activity of Jesus* 
life. In fact, little attention is given to any specific human 
element of Jesus* life. As Grillmeier points out, Athanasius himself 
displayed a general tendency to weaken any human characteristics that 
Christ may have had. He allowed no basis at all for a human psycho­
logy in Christ. By saying, for example, that Christ's anguish was 
only 'feigned', and not real anguish, that his ignorance was no real 
ignorance, but only an ignorantia de jure, identification with man 
on the human level was almost non-existent,^^ This becomes under­
standable when the decisiveness of God's act was seen for them in 
the union of two natures and not primarily in any psychological benefit 
or personal communion that may be established.
In spite of the legitimate criticisms v/e may have, however, the 
general conviction left with us by the early Fathers is a good one.
The underscoring of the soteriological significance of God's act in 
Christ, the stress which is placed on the saving power of Jesus' 
humanity, even though only as an instrument of the divine principle 
in him, the concern for the physical transformation of human existence.
^^Ibid., p. 202.
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are inalienable features of the gospel. They are features which, in 
the light of the gospel, must remain in any christological presentation 
made. If the conceptual framework in which they made their emphasis 
is unacceptable to modern thought, then a more suitable and acceptable 
form of expression must be found. The task before theology now is 
to retain the intrinsic gospel but clmnge the expression.
The two nature concept of the early Fathers held its importance 
and meaningfulness because of the metaphysical and philosophical 
staging which upheld it, Christ, as true God and true man, at least 
had a rational basis and logical security, Platonic realism made 
this possible. It is highly questionable, however, without such 
philosophical support, whether the incarnational approach to christo­
logy can be given any reasonableness. With it, however, it is doubt­
ful whether it can serve anymore as a workable and adequate expression 
of what God has done for us in Jesus Christ, With incamational christo­
logy, that is, christology 'from above*, the juxtaposition of the 
words God and Man convey the idea of a metaphysical happening, a 
synthesis of divine and human natures. The early Fathers supported 
this, as we said, but not without the loss of the particularity of 
Jesus* human existence. Thus, consequentially, not without the loss 
of the contingent nature of our temporal existence. Using the incar- 
national approach to christology, with any degree of reason, it is 
difficult to escape the metaphysical conclusions of the early Fathers, 
The criticisms made of them with respect to the particularity and con­
tingency of human existence would also apply,
Brunner would not accept these conclusions. He retains the 
incamational christology and the tv;o nature concept. He writes,
"The Incarnation is the great miracle: it is absolutely objective;
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it is utterly impossible to divert it into any subjectivistio
88directions at all," So the central fact of the Christian faith
and of theology, is seen in the fact that the Eternal Son of God
89took upon himself our humanity. Brunner wants to make it clear,
however, that he is not saying God became man or that the divine
90swallowed up the human, Jesus retains what Brunner calls his 
91human nature. There is to be no denial of the human character­
istic, the particularity of his humanity as with the early Church 
Fathers. He wants to be known as a theologian who supports the 
'true men' in Christ, and in The Mediator he makes a deliberate 
attempt to express this humanness. He v/rites, "What does the pic­
ture of the humanity of Jesus show us? Even as a human being,
Jesus, as a man like ourselves, is subject to the Law; since, 
according to the view which Luther so often and so emphatically 
stated. He was a "weak" human being like ourselves, who had to eat
and drinlc, who got tired, so also He was a man who had to submit to
92the will of God, and who had to struggle,,,.."
But, as we stated with the Church Fathers, it is very difficult 
to reason from the standpoint of the incarnation and escape the meta­
physical implications that deny Christ the particularity of his 
existence. I believe Brunner realizes this himself for it is the
88Brunner, The Mediator, p. 322, 
® r^bid,, p. 516.
5°rbid., p. 333.
p. 316.
^^Ibid., p. 363.
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application of reason to the incarnation that he forbids. For
him, the two nature doctrine is riglit but it is not right when one
tries to reason it through, or understand it; one must merely accept
it as the truth about Jesus Christ, in faith. And one must accept
in faith, as well, that the divine and the human in Jesus do not
penetrate each other, or at least, the divine does not extend itself
to the human nature of Jesus. Two successive quotations from Brunner,
one from his Dogmatics and the other from The Mediator, will support
us in the above interpretation. He writes:
'Che Jesus Christ shown to us in the Scriptures 
accredits Himself to us as the God-Man. One 
who meets Him with that openness to truth which 
the Bible calls "faith", meets in Him One who, 
in the unity of His Person, is both true God 
and true Man. It would be good for the Church 
to be content with this, and not wish to loiow 
more than we can know, or more than we need, if
we are to trust Him and obey Him as we should,94
,,,,in so far as Jesus Christ can be known his­
torically, in so far as He belongs to the human 
sphere. He is Man, His Deity is the secret of 
His Person, which as such does not enter into 
the sphere of history at all.^d
The timeless element we have been claiming as part of Brunner's 
theological position is becoming clear.at this point. The divine is
allowed no extension or location in reality. More importantly, there
is no correlation with the contingent facts of that reality, which 
time in God would logically entail. In this sense one could say that 
both the early Church Fathers and Brunner were presenting positions of
p, 343.
9ABrunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, pV3^#
^%runner. The Mediator, p. 343 (note 1),
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timeiessness with respect to God, We remember the argument pre-
96sented by Nelson Pike that God in time logically involves him in
the 'particular* quality of that time. Brunner, by holding to the
two nature doctrine,,cannot rationally protect this particularity
and thus succumbs, logically, to a timeless God.
This timeless impression continues in other statements of
Brunner. In the place of the human person, for example, Brunner
proclaims a divine Person and, at this point, all matters related to
historical personality or humanity in Christ end. Brunner suggests
that the humanity of Christ is only the mask behind which the Divine
Person is hidden. In turn, the mask is necessary so that we might
take the risk of faith, as there is nothing visibly that would give
any reasonableness to our decision, "Real decision does not exist
on the plane of history. For that is the sphere in which men wear
masks. For the sake of our "masquerade," that is, for the sake of
our sinful mendacity, Christ also, if I may put it like this, has to
97wear a mask; this is His incognito." From this, one can see that 
Christ's manhood is given little place in the whole scheme of salvation, 
There are many questions that come to our mind in the light of 
the above. We ask what is the nature of this mysterious 'Person* 
behind the mask? What kind of person is it? Presumably, is is 
not the willing deciding center of the personality, since Christ 
in his humanity retains the capacity to decide, Brunner finds 
Luther's understanding of the humanity of Jesus as a willing,
98thinking being in keeping with his own thoughts on the matter.
^^Refer back to chapter two of this thesis, pp. 7Qff* 
irunne
98,
^ B^ r. The Mediator, p, 346,
Ibid., p. 329,
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Without these characteristics that belong to our understanding of
the person one wonders what Brunner has in mind. It is indeed a
'mystery* and no doubt this completely mysterious person has a
connection, for Brunner, with the apparent irrationability of faith
itself, I shall return to this criticism in the next chapter when
we discuss, at further length, Brunner's understanding of the human
person. Our main point here is to establish Chat Brunner, in his
christology, holds to a timelessness in God which, as argued, is
crucial to the insignificance he gives to the community of man in
the 'meaning' of life.
The impression of timelessness continues in his Dogmatics even
though Brunner has changed his expression a great deal. He admits,
at one point, "The way to the knowledge of Jesus leads from the
human Jesus to the Son of God and to the Godliead. "The Scripture
beginneth very gently and leadeth us to Christ as to a man, and
after that to a Lord of all Creation, and after that to a God, Thus
I come into it gently, and thus I learn to Icnow God.,.,Y/e must begin
at the bottom, and afterwards rise to the h e i g h t s . T h e  word
'bottom* in this statement would appear to be a reference to what
100Jesus was as a man 'after the flesh*. It seems to be an assertion 
that what Jesus was as a man, what he said and did, the kind of life
99Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, p. 322r^^Brunner is quoting LuthirJ7 I have 
dealt with the change in Brunner's thought in an appendix at the 
end of the thesis,
 ^ runner makes a distinction in The Mediator between Christ 
* in the flesh* and Christ 'after the flesh' (of, p, 346), 'In the 
flesh* is for him the most appropriate and biblical as it refers to 
the Divine behind the human, 'After the flesh' suggests too much 
importance to the humanity of Jesus,
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he lived, are in the final analysis important to the recognition 
of his divinity.
Hopeful as this language appears, one must be cautious in 
attributing a radical shift of method and position to it, Brunner, 
at the end of the day, continues to separate faith from history,
With reference to the apocalyptic context of Jesus' preaching, he 
is not prepared to grant any significance in the understanding of 
Jesus* life, or the meaning of Jesus as the Son of God, Jesus as 
the Christ stands alone, for Brunner, above all biblical images and 
contextual concerns. He writes, "In Eschatology once again we see 
that the decisive question is whether faith is faith in Jesus Christ 
or faith in the word of the Bible, Jesus Christ Himself,,,.stands 
above all the discussions of scholars about time-bound apocalyptic.
He Himself, not any doctrine about Him, is the ground of faith, as 
He is also the ground of hope,"^^ Thus, Brunner is suggesting that 
all that matters is faith or unbelief.
In conclusion, one can mention briefly two other areas of 
Brunner's thought which endorse our interpretation of him to this 
point. We refer to the doctrine of Salvation and the Resurrection, 
With the former, similarity can be seen in Brunner with the early 
Fathers, Salvation is an event that involves little of man's par­
ticipation, Rather it is something that took place without him and 
outside him. With the Church Fathers, such an event was filled with 
time in the sense that the human was taken up into the divine. With 
Brunner, not even this association with temporality is maintained. 
Salvation is pictured as an event above the historical process, Man, 
he says, is subject in this world to forces of evil, to higher powers
1 01Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith, and the 
Consummation, Dogmatics Vol. Ill, trans. David Cairns (LutteiWforth 
Press, London, I962), p. 3Z|.3,
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that lie above and beyond him. Taking over the dramatic imagery
of the gospel writers themselves, he writes of the struggle for
power that is going on between God and the hostile powers, God
in Christ on the cross defeated these powers. The forces, as ha
pictures them, are supra-mundane powers; they are spiritual Satanic
forces not to be suppressed by any other force than one with equal
and superior spiritual strength. Presumably, this spiritual force
1 02was the divine person existing in the humanity of Christ, To
what extent Brunner was actually committed to the imagery of this
account is difficult to say. It does help to show the position of
his christology as that 'from above'. He writes;
The background of demonic evil is a 
necessary part of the Christian 
picture of history. For what is the 
Crucifixion but the manifestation of 
the demonic opposition to the Son of 
God? Thus also as early as the Apostles'
Greed we find this dark side of human
history expressed and characterized in . 
the words "suffered under Pontius Pilate,,"
The last area, that of the resurrection, is another case in 
point. For Brunner, it is not an event within the historical 
continuum. It is something that is beyond historical sight, for 
faith alone to see. Thus the argument that one encountered with 
reference to Pannenberg has no place for Brunner. He writes;
^or a full description of the event of Salvation in the 
language to which we are referring see The Christian Doctrine of 
Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics Vol. II, pp. 133-147. Brunner 
is most separated from Pannenberg at this point. The cross is 
something accomplished by Jesus rather than an event that happened 
to him (cfTT:irrSrDogmatics Vol. III).
 ^ runner. The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith, and 
the Consummation, Dogmatics Vol. Ill, p. 373.
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It is not wrong, but it is at least 
liable to misunderstanding to desig­
nate the event of Easter simply as 
an "historical event"; for it is not 
historical in the same way as other 
events, because the historical event, 
in the usual sense, is something which, 
in principle, everyone can perceive.
But Easter is not an event of this kind. 
Historically it is for believers only.
It is not part of the historical con­
tinuum, but at this point the Beyond 
"breaks into" history.104
Brunner offers us no explanation as to how it is possible 
for an event to break into history and yet have no extension or 
location in the same.
1 Ou.Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, p. 328,
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(a) The Questions of Appearance
In the light of our examination of Pannenberg'a concept of 
God as Future and the Christological basis that supports it, let 
us go on to define more precisely the position it suggests with 
respect to man's place in community. Specifically, we ask: How
does meaning arise for the individual in Pannenberg's system of 
thought? From him, suggestions have come as to new and exciting 
interpretations of our temporal existence and our nature as man, 
suggestions which offer a convincing alternative to the protestant 
position as represented in the expression of Emil Brunner, Our 
intention in this chapter is to elaborate on these suggestions 
and to offer support for them from other fields of study, I find 
that the originality and excitement of Pannenberg*s position and 
expression rests in the fact that for the first time we have a 
theological perspective on temporality and existence that harmonizes 
with the basic experiences of life itself. Any expression that 
guarantees the recognition of both contingency and unity (the indi­
vidual and the community) deserves our utmost attention*
One must use the word suggest in the above, as Pannenberg has 
not gone on to develop a new understanding of being from his theo­
logical method. He has left this task to subsequent philosophers 
and scholars with whom he is in constant association and communi­
cation, He has presented us with a new and unorthodox reflection 
on the nature of God and His revelation in Jesus of Nazareth, The 
relationship that he sees between the Son and the Father, and indeed
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the Spirit, has much significance for the manner in which we see
our world and our lives within it, Pannenberg has not proceeded,
however, to give a detailed picture of the correlation he is making.
He admits, himself, that what he is doing is presenting a model or
method from which implications can be drawn. In his christology, he
expresses the situation with these words, ",,,,the Christological
discussions in this book point at every stop to ontological and
eplstemological implications that need their own comprehensive dis-
CUSSion," He warns against the sheer extrapolation of general
concepts from specific theological thought. His caution is expressed
in the following words:
.,..little would be gained if without further 
ado we tried to abstract a general concept of 
appearance from the way in which God came to 
appearance in Jesus of Nazareth, In so pro­
ceeding one would merely arrive at theological 
postulates for which he could, at most, try 
to claim general validity, V/e would rather 
ask whether our theological example throws 
light on certain, perhaps otherwise hidden, 
sides of the general philosophical problem of 
appearance,^
It shall not be our task in this chapter to draw up an 
elaborate metaphysical system based on Pannenberg*s thought. This 
is the work for another major thesis beyond the writer's capability. 
What we wish to do is simply dwell on the implications within his 
theology for an understanding of the individual and his relationship 
with the community. His theological understanding, as we said, la 
commensurate with our basic experiences in life, for which no rational 
system of support has yet been developed, Whitehead's system was a
A^
 TT 1 _ A  ^  .u .A. an m » ^  f  ^  n* ^  * V
Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, p. 12, 
pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p, 135#
135#
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bold and very exciting attempt at such rational support but he has 
been found wanting in the areas important to personal experience#
We questioned whether contingency essential to the freedom of man 
was sufficiently guarded by Whitehead's thought. In any case,
Pannenberg contends that whatever support is developed or expressed 
for man's experience, it cannot be unrelated to the manner in which 
we conceive the relationship between the Father and the Son and, in 
turn, the relationship of the Father and Son with the Spirit. This 
is our prime consideration.
The whole question of where and how the individual seeks meaning 
for his existence is largely dependent on the manner in which man 
conceives his temporal existence. Does such meaning involve him in 
the actuality of his existence or is it to be found apart from it? 
Pannenberg'8 contribution to this question is directly related to the 
interpretation of temporality implied in the concept of God as Future.
V/hen Pannenberg speaks of temporality he uses the word 'appearance*. 
It is a word that has had a long history in philosophical tliought and 
it is clear that he claims no originality with the word itself,^ The 
originality of Pannenberg's contribution rests in the different 
concept of appearance suggested in Jesus of Nazareth.
He begins his discussion on the nature of appearance with an 
analysis of its history from Plato to modem times. The one thing 
that has characterised its history to this point, he says, is the 
non-essentiality of appearance itself with the being it represents.
Such characteristic of thought he sums up with the following words;
"...it becomes understandable that the separation of true being from
%ee Pannenberg's article, 'Appearance as the Arrival of the Future*
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its appearance, the precedence of self-sufficient ideas or substances 
reposing in themselves over the phenomenal reality of sense experience, 
remained a dominant motif in the history of thought whenever the notion 
of appearance became thematic,"^ Such thought of appearance, although 
he did not devote any time to its discussion, is reminiscent of Brunner's 
notion of being and existence. We shall see how this is so in subsequent 
pages,
Pannenberg wants to present something different from this age­
long concept. He wants to retain the idea of appearance but, at the 
same time, present the relationship between appearance and being, 
or appearance and that which appears, as an essential one* He enter­
tains a reciprocity between essence and appearance and does so by 
means of his concept of the Trinity, It may be added that in doing 
this Pannenberg is offering a theological viewpoint that has immense 
social and ethical relevance, God appeared in Jesus, As indicated 
earlier, he maintains this by viewing Jesus as one with the Father 
and yet different from him. There is not just the normal idea of 
appearance here, in the sense that behind and beyond the appearance 
the true being exists. He makes the appearance essential by saying 
it is just as the one different from the Father that Jesus is one 
with Him; that is, the appearance is of the essence of the Father,
The other way of expressing tliis thought is to say that God is 
Future in relation to the Son, or in Jesus God is present as the 
Future, Jesus is the appearance of God and that which appears in
Ibid,, p, 129, Pannenberg says a distinction between what 
appears and appearance itself is already implied in the word 'appears*. 
There has been, to this tiiie, no adequate account of how this is so 
or how the two sides of the word's meaning are to be united.
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Jesus does so in the mode of futurity.
The question Pannenberg asks now is this; Does this inter­
pretation of appearance in Jesus have anything to contribute to 
the general notion of appearance? Does it offer any insist that may 
correct the problems that have been connected with the history of 
this concept? In what follows I hope to give an affirmative response 
on his behalf and show, at the same time, how his interpretation of 
appearance has formative power in an expression of the individual's 
relationship with community.
Part of the problem in the history of the appearance concept 
was the lack of significance attributed to temporality. Essence, 
or for our purposes meaning, was seen as existing beyond reality.
The latter was treated as a matter of indifference. It did not 
affect the essence of what 'is' in its self-sufficiency. This can 
be seen in the thought of Plato and Aristotle, In the Republic, 
for example, Plato was concerned to express an ideal of the state; 
his state was a type or model for all states. He was not concerned 
about the actual existing state; whether or not it actually matched 
the requirements of the ideal state was a matter of indifference to 
him. All questions of practicability, which is to say, all matters 
of temporal actuality, were looked upon as unimportant. His concern 
was to show what a state must be and if the facts did not match it 
then that was not really of great consequence. There was an ideal 
apart from the appearance and the two had no essential connection. 
Although Aristotle tried harder to relate the two, he still was 
dominated by the ideal over the appearance; they were never essentially 
related, George Sabine writing in reference to Aristotle says this:
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In so far 8.3 the object is to formulate an 
ideal state, this is not an insuperable 
objection. For such a state would be dom­
inated by the highest possible kind of life, 
and Plato, at least, had supposed that an 
understanding of the idea of the good would 
show what this is, But to arrive at the 
idea of the good first and then to use this 
as a standard for criticising and evaluating 
actual lives and actual states, was just what 
made Aristotle despair.5
One can understand how meaning or essence, without the essential 
association with appearance, took on a timeless quality for Plato 
and Aristotle. Indeed, it is safe to say that the general problem 
with the concept of appearance throughout histoiy has been that of 
the timelessness connected with it. Even in Hegel, time is not taken 
seriously, because appearance, which is an essential part of his 
system of thouglat, turns out in the end to be non-essential as the 
concept of the 'Notion* precedes it; the particularities of history 
in the end have no real contribution to make,
(B) The Self Beyond Appearance - Brunner
^ * ------- I ■ III riiim  ir iM ir'iir  ■m i  rim  m  i# # m  i# m ■ i mu w mi ■ mi 11 wim i r im i a
The understanding that something 'exists* or 'is', in the sense 
of being unessential to its appearance, is reminiscent of Brunner's 
understanding of the self. In his book on man, Brunner describes 
him in terms of the formal and material image, and although he feels 
he is liable to misunderstanding here he continues to use the dis­
tinction in his second volume of the Dogmatics.^ The impression
^George Sabine, A History of Political Theory (Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, New YorkTTBTJTTTTooT” ”---
^Sea Man in Revolt, pp. 499-515 and The Christian Doctrine of
Creationand Redemption, Dogmatics Vol. II, pp. 35ff,
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Brunner wants to convey by this is that there is a part of man (the 
formal) which is not totally ruined by sin.^  At the same time, the 
formal, for Brunner, includes the thinking, reasoning and willing
Q
aspects of life. These aspects, however, do not constitute the 
truly human or personal in man. Rather, the truly personal and
Q
human is the material image. It was this image that was totally 
destroyed by sin. In his opinion, one can continue to exist humanly 
in the formal sense but the personal center of existence (material 
image), that centre in which the meaning or essence of personality 
resides (related to the Word of God), has no fundamental relation 
to the formal.
The 'mask* Brunner speaks of in The Mediator behind which lies 
the mystery of the person, could be equated with the formal image.
The formal image of man's existence could also correspond to the 
orders of creation in which man is placed in society. They, as argued 
earlier, have no essential connection with the meaning of the self 
(material image). Rather, the individual finds his meaning apart 
from his community involvement. The roles which the individual plays 
in society via his placement in society are not, in any way, to be 
identified with his persona. If one may say so, they merely set the 
stage for man's personal life. Birunner's own words in The Mediator
^Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, p, 3of* He widtes, "...this formal,..means some­
thing which man can never lose; even when he sins he cannot lose
it." (p. 37).
^See Brunner, Man in Revolt, p. 502,
^See Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, p. 56 *^
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about the nature of personality will help us to understand his 
intentions*
Everyone possesses a mystery of personality, 
which is in no wise identical with his his­
torical personality, with the individual human 
character which is visible to the historian 
or to the biographer, and can be grasped by 
him. This mystery of personality lies behind 
all historical and psychological perception*
It lies even behind all self-perception. As 
human beings we all wear masks, and we see 
each other and ourselves through masks, We 
are mysteries to others and to ourselves,10
Brunner can thus say that our personality is an object of
faith, not an historical form, "...as persons", he writes, "we
11cannot be known, only believed," It is this conception of person 
that helps us understand the christological position Brunner devel­
oped, If we remember, Brunner separated Jesus as the Son of God, in 
essence, from his physical attributes. He was a Son of God without 
qualities, I say 'Son of God without qualities' not to convey the 
idea that Jesus as the Christ was not a man; this is something 
Brunner would strongly deny, I mean, however, that the qualities 
of his human existence played no part in the essence of his Sonship. 
In the same way, the human self or person is without qualities for 
Brunner,
Jurgen Moltmann uses the expression, 'man without qualities' 
to define the understanding of man set forth by sociology. Each 
individual has a role or several roles to play in society. They
^%runner. The Mediator, p, 318,
11Ibid., p, 319. Apparently, it is here in this mysterious person 
which is not connected with the deciding, willing aspect of historical 
personality that the absolute decision of faith is to be made. But 
again one asks; What is a decision that has no relation to reason, 
which for Brunner is excluded from faith?
-230-
are roles which have laws, habits and customs. Some are fixed and
some are flexible, but whichever, they are not to be identified with
the man himself. Moltmann writes, "The reality of society and of
politics becomes a little theatre of the world, upon which each man
plays his role, until he departs, and others take him over. The
12man himself does not appear in them." The self, Moltmann implies, 
for homo sociologicus is an. ideal apart from or behind the image or 
appearance that is visible in its historical form. One is compelled 
to say there seems little difference in this from Brunner's state­
ments about the self.
When Brunner turns to the personalism of Ebner and Buber he 
does not fare much better. Certainly, as Brunner points out in 
his Dogmatics, person is not to be understood as substance, that is,
a static element existing in itself. Person, he says, is a relational 
13concept. As with all personalistic thought, so with Brunner, per­
son is something that arises in the meeting of the I with the Thou,
This personalism allows Brunner to escape a static impression of 
substance. It does not remove him, however, from the criticism we 
have been making with regard to the traditional understanding of 
appearance as something non-essential to that which 'is*. The I-Thou 
relationship itself becomes, in Brunner, an ideal apart from and beyond 
all appearances of man in his social and historical existence. It 
has been given, by Brunner and the other personalistic thinkers, no 
essential connection with man in his historical form. The center of 
personality, the I-Thou relationship, becomes something which exists 
again in faith, as it cannot be discerned from any position within
12 ••Jurgen Moltmann, Man, trans, John Strudy (Fortress Press, 
Philadelphia, 1974), p* 91»
 ^Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
'  I iiTi I ~ i 1 1 11 II !■ Ill in H w i H i. ir ii on !■! IIII inaii m iKiiipiM 11 — u pai— n ail Ti HI ■■ — mi m ii* ^
Dogmatics Vol. II, p. bO»
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historical existence. It becomes possible thus to talk about a 
self without the objective particularity of our humanity. Brunner 
writes;
The encounter between two human beings is 
ordinarily not personal at all but more 
or less impersonal, I see "someone." To 
see someone is not essentially different 
from seeing something. This someone says 
something to me. Someone saying "some­
thing" to myself - that is, thinking. But 
now let us put the case that this someone 
does not say "something" but "says" himself, 
discloses himself to me, and that I, while 
he "says" himself to me, "hear himself"; and 
more, that while he discloses himself to me, 
and so surrenders himself to me, I disclose 
myself to him and receive him, while I surr­
ender myself to him. In this moment he ceases 
to be for me a "someone-something" and be­
comes a "Thou." In that moment in which he 
becomes a "Thou" he ceases to be an object 
of my thinking and transforms the object- 
subject relation into a relation of personal., 
correspondence: we have fellowship together.
In Platonic fashion, Brunner has made an ideal out of the I- 
Thou concept; the facts of human existence, the qualities that make 
up man's humanness, are inconsequential as far as truly personal 
existence is concerned. He does apeak, at certain stages of his 
thought, in terms of the influence the Christian, that is, the one 
who finds his personality in the "Thou" of God, can have in his social 
behaviour. But the influence of which he speaks seems residual, some­
thing that rubs off the individual in the process of finding his true
1 8meaning apart from such behaviour. The final position of such 
residual influence is expressed by Brunner in these words; "But
^Brunner, Truth as Encounter, p. 113.
1 8See Chapter XXV of Brunner's The Divine Imperative,
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important as all this action inspired by faith is, yet in faith it 
is still more important to know that "all our doings are nothing 
worth," even in the best life."^^
Brunner proclaims an immediacy of relationship of man with man 
in his concept of I-Thou, just as he proclaims an immediacy of relation­
ship of man with God in the "Thou" of God, In reference to the latter 
he writes, "Here there is nothing between God and man, between the 
person who is being created and the One who creates, nor is there any­
thing above them. Hero man is face to face with his God, in the most 
intimate personal relation. Here alone does the "individual" exist.
We saw this same kind of thinking in connection with his conception 
of the absolute 'subjectivity* of God. It seems that he is treating 
the person in the same fashion. Man at the center of his personality 
is pure subject and all objective reference becomes, if not inconse­
quential, veiy secondary. In the quotation above, Brunner's talk of 
a "Thou" apart from the "something" of a person confirms this impression.
To be fair to Brunner, one must understand his objective. He is 
trying to overcome a perpetual problem of our society, that of the 
relationship between the individual and the community. He rightly 
sees, as we pointed out, that the problem can never be solved as long 
as the individual is treated in its own right as a phenomenon over 
against the community, or each claims its own separate sphere of 
operation and justice. They must each, according to Brunner, be seen 
in their essential togetherness. While agreeing with this thought, 
we find that Brunner has not provided the necessary concepts that
p. 274. 
‘'Abid., p. 301.
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allow this to happen. Rather, he has led us in a direction that 
magnifies man's social problem. His concept of God with its time­
lessness does not create the necessary perspective to solve the 
problem rationally.
One should be aware that Brunner, in adopting so much of the 
personalistic philosophy of Buber and Ebner, was not able to escape 
the separation of the I-Thou and I-It that dominated their thought, 
Buber, in hia writings, refers to the essential difference between 
the 'I-Thou* world of the personal and the *I-It* world of the im­
personal, The 'It' world is placed in the context of space, time 
and causality and is the world that includes man's institutions where 
he works, organizes and does things. This world, however, is impersonal; 
it is not related essentially to that which is truly human and personal. 
"Institutions", writes Buber, "are a complicated market-place, feelings 
a boudoir rich in ever-changing interests,These aspects of reality
lack soul and personality for him. He continues to write, "...institu-
1 9ions know only the specimen, feelings only the "object"..," ^
Although both of these spheres are necessary, Buber does not regard
them as essential in the creation of human life, "...this is done by
20the third, the central presence of the Thou," The individual with 
its consciousness of experience, race and culture must search in 
another place for personal value.
That Buber is right in making a distinction between individuality
^^Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. R, G. Smith (T, & T, Clark, 
Edinburgïi, 1937), p. 43.
"*^ Ibid., p. 2,4.
p. 46-
—23^™
and personality will not be disputed. The two are certainly not
synonymous. In fact, what we are arguing for in this thesis is
the personalization of the individual through a proper placement
and position in the world. We do not share, however, the sepaj>
ation suggested in Buber between the personal and the qualities
of the individual*s life. As with the homo sociologicus, to
which Moltmarm referred, so here with Buber (and Brunner), the
qualities of man’s life that make up his roles and really comprise
the historical community of his existence, acquire little value.
They become the ’mask* of the real person.
Many have criticised Buber and his personalism for this very 
21reason, H, D, Lewis thinks there is validity in Buber’s dis­
tinction between the I-Thou and the I-It* He says that what Buber
is trying to point to is the distinctiveness and particularity of 
22entities. However, he goes on to say that Buber thinlcs of the 
moment of standing in relation as too detached from the varied 
content of all the experience we have with one another. He writes 
the following words which pinpoint the weakness of Buber and, for 
us, Brunner,
21I refer the reader to the following authors whose writings 
have been critical of Buber in the manner suggested above; H, D, 
Lewis, "The Elusive Self and the I-Thou Relation* (Tallc of God, 
pp, 169-18^), and Paul Pfuetze, Self , Society, Ijkistence, This 
author, although very sympathetic to Buber, finds fault with the 
way he minimizes reason in appealing to intuition. This, he feels, 
makes Buber too subjective in his theory (of, pp, 273ff,j, See 
also Michael Theunissen, Per Andere (Walter de Cruyter & Col, Berlin, 
1965), especially pp, 27Sff, and pp. 330ff, and Jurgen Moltmann,
Ma^ , pp, 7&ff,
^^ewis, "The Elusive Self and the I-Thou Relation* (Talk of 
GM), p. 175. — ---
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It is not that he denies such experience; 
he acknowledges, on the contrary, that wo 
have it and need it,.,But he is apt to 
treat it as altogether inferior, almost 
an encumbrance, and not very different in 
merit and importance from the knowledge 
of natural objects we require in order to 
manipulate them. I-It is thus on an al­
together different plane, even in the case 
of persons, from the I-Thou, and the ideal 
must be always to pass beyond the world of 
I-It, although for regrettable practical 
reasons we cannot disregard it, to the more 
rarefied and truly significant world of 
I-Thou,23
Lewis concludes;
This is indeed a veiy grave mistake. It 
takes away all that gives point and direc­
tion to our aspirations and our dealings 
with each other. It renders negligible 
the judgement, the discernment, the sym­
pathy, the forbearance, which we should 
cultivate in seeking to know one another, 
and supply one another's needs, the need 
for fellowship above all,24
As Lewis indicates in the last quotation, there is a destructive­
ness to historical community contained in too sharp a division be­
tween the I-Thou and the I-It, It devalues the wider circle of 
relationships in which the person assumes a role, works and enters 
into institutions, that is, those areas that are materially deter  ^
mined. The temporality of our existence is underplayed and thus 
the significance of community with it.
It is questionable, notwithstanding the insignificance of 
community that is involved at this point, whether a direct, imme­
diate relation can be said to exist between man in the fashion that 
Buber and Brunner would have us believe. Perhaps there may be room
p. 182.
pp. 182-183.
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for such a claim in the encounter two people might have as they
look each other in the eye and experience a common understanding.
Who is to deny that this kind of immediate understanding happens?
But is this, at the same time, to deny lesser and more indirect
personal relationships? Is it not possible to think of situations
that improve and facilitate the human enterprise as being personal?
Cannot new procedures, new institutions and programmes make human
life more human? Moltmann gives an example of such an arrangement
in his book Man which might be worthwhile quoting for it illustrates
the point we are making;
....for some time now bank positions have had 
a notice giving the name of the employee, for 
instance. Miss A, M, Jones, The completely 
impersonal performance of purchases and pay­
ments is thereby supposed to acquire a per­
sonal note. In oases of doubt it is indeed 
good to know the name of the other person.
But normally it is not used. To complete 
business without friction, only two functions 
can be found at the counters, the customer 
paying in and the official placing it to his 
account. If everyone wanted to develop an 
"I-Thou* relationship at the counter with 
Miss Jones, business would come to a stop, 
those in the queue would get indignant, and 
Miss Jones would become impatient. No one 
denies that he himself can be an "I" and 
the bank clerk a "Thou", but in the game of 
business transactions everyone has to know 
what he has to do. This is the rule of the 
game. And if it is a rule of the game, then 
the personal element no doubt lies in not 
taking it too seriously, in using it but 
not becoming subject to it. All "I-Thou* 
relationships exist within the medium of 
common material circumstances, of common 
tasks and interests and of a measure of 
division of labour,25
The indirectness of personal experience to which Moltmann 
is alluding in his illustration points to a different understanding
^ M^oltmann, Man, p, 8$,
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of appearance than that which is associated with Platonic thought 
and also that which is present in Buher and Brunner, It is not 
denjring the reality of a transcendental Self that is different 
from the reality of our common experience. On the other hand, it 
is suggesting that there is an immanent Self, objectified in the 
temporal arrangements of life. The two are necessary for the devel­
opment of the person; one cannot he emphasised to the exclusion of 
the other, Moltmann, in his earlier theological expression, failed 
at times to provide the necessary concepts that called for this kind 
of reciprocation in personality. But in his later writings a much
26more positiveTcase can be made in this respect.
Don Olive, in his book Wolfhark Pannenberg (Wordsbook Pub,
Waco, Texas, 1973), speaks of the difference between Moltmann 
and Pannenberg in a way that is relevant to our thesis. He says 
the not-yet in Pannenberg's thought is a function and characteristic 
of historical reality; it is not, however, that reality itself. He 
points out that \d_th Pannenberg the not-yet is not completely future 
as it is in Moltmann*s theology. With Pannenberg it has appeared 
in Jesus and consequently the Christian community can affirm the 
reality which is already in Jesus* fate. In Pannenberg*3 method, 
he says, the future, by being included within the historical process, 
has been rescued from unreality, Moltmann, on the other hand, by 
making the tendency of the present toward that which is yet to come, 
the real, makes the future an abstraction (see p. 81), Langdon 
Gilkey makes the same kind of criticism of Moltmann’s radical escha- 
tology or future in his book. The Renewal of God-Language, p. 34-6,
I believe Moltmann has overcome this criticism to a large extent 
in his later writings. In his book for example, he writes,
"For Christians, however, this * infinite* is both a promise and a 
demand, a present grace and a future still to be attained, Christians 
therefore live in a tension between faith and hope. If they were to 
fail to hear the demand made by Cod’s future, faith would lead to an 
assimilated religious contentment with the present. If, however, 
they were to despise the present reality of grace nov/ given, hope 
would turn into a moral system of endless accusations and unending 
claims," (p, 58)• The same emphasis is present throughout The Crucified 
God, where Moltmann stresses that our participation in Cod is through 
our participation in history.
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(C) The Self In Appearance; Polanyx and Mead
The idea suggested by Moltmann that personhood is not so much
an immediate experience, or one of directness, but rather an exper­
ience to be found in the objective aspects of existence, finds 
support in other scholarship. We shall deal with it briefly for 
it will lend support to Pannenberg's viewpoint defended throughout 
this thesis.
If attention is directed to Michael Polanyi, a theory of per­
sonal knowledge will be found which is very much in line with
27Pannenberg, For this reason it is important to us. In Polanyi
there is presented a notion of appearance, as personal knowledge,
that has about it both the aspects of transcendence and factioity,
A brief examination of his thought will confirm this,
Marjorie G-rene, writing about Polanyi *s theory of personal
Imowledge or 'tacit knowledge', interprets him this way:
Unlike the traditional ideal of a wholly 
explicit, self-guaranteeing truth, from- 
to knowledge cannot be instantanious; it 
is a stretch, not only of attention, but 
of effort, effort must be lived, and living 
takes time. Knowledge, therefore, is im­
bedded both in living process (as Piaget, 
too, has argued in Biologie et Connaissance, 
and as Suzanne Langer is arguing in her study 
of Mind) and in the uniquely human form of 
living process: in history.28
As Miss Grene points out, Polanyi sees no direct route, or immediacy.
See Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, 1958), for a full treatment of his theory. His series 
of essays in Knowing and Being, ed. Marjorie G-rene (Routledge Æ Kegan 
Paul, London, 1go^yj^ire very helpful in understanding his position.
It is from the latter which I have drawn for the thesis. Miss Grene*s 
introduction is also very helpful in pointing out the relevance of 
Polanyi's thought for our time.
owing and Being, ed, Marjorie Grene, p, zi,
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to personal knowledge. Personal knowledge is always tacit; that
is, it is inferred from the facts and situation of life that
surrounds us. It is described by Polanyi himself as *from-to*
knowledge. Man gathers from facts around him (subsidiary facts),
29which Polanyi calls the 'proximal term', to a focal point or the
'distal term', "In the case of perception we are attending to an
object separated from the most of the clues which we integrate
into its a p p e a r a n c e , A s  Polanyi makes clear here, essence
appears; there is essence in the facts and circumstances of life,
so one may say that personal knowledge is appearance. This is
not to deny the existence of a transcendent pole. It is to say
however, that such a transcendence is understood and perceived only
through the factioity of our temporal existence, "We have seen that
by attending from the proximal to the distal, we cause a transform
mation in the appearance of both; they acquire an integrated 
31
appearance,"
This form of the act of personal Imowledge embodies at the same
32time an ontological claim. This is the nature of reality itself 
says Polanyi, All knowledge is 'appearing' knowledge, Polanyi 
refers to it at one point as anticipatory knowledge; he means that 
the content toward which we are directed never appears in an explicit 
form for we acquire only anticipations of it.
p. 140. 
p. 140.
^‘'ibid., p. 141. 
^^Ibid., p. 141.
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My definition of reality, as that which may 
yet inexhaustibly manifest itself, implies 
the presence of an indeterminate range of 
anticipations in any knowledge bearing on 
reality. But besides this indeterminacy 
of its prospects, tacit knowing may contain 
also an actual knowledge that is indetermin­
ate, in the sense that its content cannot 
be explicitly stated,33
In the light of the above, meaning is something that is acquired 
by looking at tlie world, which points to, and is involved in, the 
transcendent reality beyond. Meaning, which is the focal point 
toward which the proximal is directing us, is anticipated and thus 
present in the facts of life. In this way, the self's search for 
meaning is necessarily involved with the events of life which serve 
the focus of meaning. Facts acquire value in Polanyi*s theory of 
knowledge, but at the same time, they do not possess absolute value. 
Rather, they point beyond themselves to something that is yet to be. 
Meaning is destroyed, he says, when one dwells on the proximal alone. 
Alienation takes place by looking ^  a thing instead of from it 
If a pianist, for example, were to concentrate on his fingers while • 
playing the piano, he would destroy the sense of music that is being 
performed. He would be paralysed by such concentration at something. 
Perhaps it would not be unfair to say that Brunner's treatment of 
temporal reality in tlie fashion of nineteenth century historiography, 
that is, as 'bare fact', is the result of looking at the facts instead 
of from the facts.
55Ibid,, p, 141. Polanyi is re-echoing Pannenberg's thought 
on anticipatory knowledge which is a very important concept in the 
latter's writings,
^Ibid,, p, 1460
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If one were looking for further support of Polanyi, and thus
of Pannenberg, consideration could be given to George Mead, In his
book, Mind, Self and Society, Mead offers an understanding of the
self in its search for meaning which implicates man in the social
structures of his existence, in much the same way as Pannenberg
would have the self involved in life. For Mead, the self receives
its meaning, basically, from the community in which it dwells, by
taking upon itself the attitudes and roles of the community. The
community becomes the place of meaning and the self in its search
for meaning does not arise over and beyond the community but within
it. Mead speaks, at the same time, of the separateness of the *1*
from the community, that is, the critical distance the self can
exercise in relation to the community,^^ The *1* may receive its
identification and meaning from the community, but at the same time,
it can change the institutions and roles in which it dwells and bring
in a novel element, Paul Pfuetze expresses this mutual dependency in
Mead's thought very well,
,,,he does reject the classical formulation of 
both sociological realism and nominalism. His 
own answer of the "social individual" suggests 
that self and society are laid down together; 
correlative aspects of the same natural expeiv 
iencc. Selves develop only in a social context, 
and society exists only in and through and for 
individuals. Self and society are mutually 
interdependent and reciprocally conditioned.
The universal is nothing if the particular is 
nothing: but the particular comes to self-aware­
ness and effective freedom only within a complex 
and responsive universal. Necessity and freedom 
are harmonized, teleology and mechanism are 
reconciled,,,,36
^^ Mead, Mind, Self and Society, pp. I68ff, Pfuetze thinJca 
Mead does not grant the 'I' enough importance in his thought. He 
says Mead recognizes the existing subject over and beyond the comm­
unity, but he does not treat it with any seriousness(Self. Society, 
Existence, pp. 253-254).
^^Pfuetze, Self. Society, Existence, p, 247.
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Mead's problem (and here Pfuetze has helped us in his analysis 
of him), is that the social process appears mostly as part of the 
creative advance of the earth. He does not relate the generalized 
other, or the community from which the individual receives his 
meaning, to anything beyond itself. He does not give it any objec­
tive basis. The problem develops then, that one is left without a 
means to judge the moral value of something, Pfuetze writes,
",,,.questions of right and wrong are not questions of ends and 
values to be judged by some ultimate standard; they are simply
questions of the best means of solving the problem under prevailing
57conditions, or of getting an inhibited system to working again."
Without an objective standard (which comes from seeing no relevance 
in the concept of God or truth as such) then there remains no basis 
by which to criticise one's action, or worse still, to judge the 
authority and power of society over the individual. Mead fails to 
account for the transcendence the individual feels in the face of 
his community and it is doubtful whether these feelings of separate­
ness, by which the new comes, can be accounted for in purely biological 
and social terms,
(D) The Individual and the Community - Pannenberg
In turning to Pannenberg, we could say that he christianises 
the living process of meaning implied in both Polanyi and Mead, He 
thinks of God in a manner that implies similar social existence,
God appears in Jesus as ’the Future, or that which appears in Jesus 
does 30 in the mode of futurity. This, it can be shown, has the 
desired effect of throwing the individual back into the community
^ I^bid,, p, 260,
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for his meaning while, at the same time, making the community 
dependent on the individual for its renewal.
It was suggested, from our analysis of human existence, that 
'meaning* is something that escapes man at every stage of his life. 
There is, in other words, a perpetual dissatisfaction in our living 
that keeps us reaching out to an end in which the final truth will 
he made Icnown, If this 'end' is conceptualized, as in Marxism with 
its view of the total man,^^as the final configuration of social 
existence brought on by a revolutionary act or acts, or even by a 
more gradual process as in evolutionary thought, then the individuals 
who have gone before suffer from not having entered into that meaning, 
Brunner, we argued, sought to escape this problem by understanding 
man's final meaning aWye history. The individual found meaning in 
some immediate encounter, apart from the facts of history. But this 
had the undesirable effect of rendering the community of historical 
existence non-essential,
Pannenberg has counteracted these conflicting aspects by con­
ceiving appearance, in Jesus, as the arrival of the future. By this 
means, the future, the final meaning of human existence, is seen not 
as a stage at the end of a social process, or a stage above the social 
process, but as an aspect of the social process itself. Meaning, thus, 
is not held as a prospect for a fortunate few at the end, nor is it 
simpJy an individual happening apart from the rest of the community.
58Russell Norris in his book, God, Mar:c and the Future gives 
a very good critique of Marxist thought, as seen through the eyes 
of Roger Garaudy, One of the things he criticises is the total 
man concept which exists at the end of historical process. He 
questions how the individual can be seen to be of worth in this 
concept (pp, 197f,),
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Rathei*, meaning is viewed from the standpoint of the community Itself 
in which the individual finds himself and in which his own efforts 
will make a contribution.
Just as those who came in contact with the earthly Jesus, 
experienced in his presence an anticipation of the wholeness of exis­
tence (the end of all things), so wherever his spirit is, there the 
future is present in anticipated wholeness. In saying this we are 
stressing a very important point in Pannenberg*s thinking. He never 
finds one's social existence unrelated to the way God is related to
God in the plurality of persons of the Trinity, Just as he does
not make the Son something different than the man Jesus in his tem­
poral existence, so he does not think of the Spirit apart from its 
existence in the people. The Spirit of God becomes the anticipatory 
wholeness of life experienced by the people in their historical 
existence, "Because Jesus Christ, as the revelation of God, is one 
with the essence of God himself, the Spirit of Christ dwelling in 
Christians and going out from Jesus is the Spirit of God himself,
Thus, in a real and important sense one may say that the community^ 
in the perspective of anticipated wholeness, or in the spirit of 
openness, is the Spirit of God Himself, Pannenberg does this without, 
at the same time, equating the Holy Spirit and the people absolutely 
foi' the person of the Spirit is not received from the people but vice
versa. This important point is made clear in the following:
The confession that the Holy Spirit is "person" 
thus expresses primarily the experience that the 
Christian is not his ovm lord. Insofar as he lives 
out of faith in Christ, the center of his person 
that determines his behavior lies outside himself.
The personal center of Christian action is the 
Holy Spirit,40
39-Pannenberg, Jesus God and Man, p, 174. 
p. 177.
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Pannenberg, in this way, saves himself from Mead's predicament 
of not allowing for any objective reality by which to hold the 
power of community in check. He relates the community directly 
to G-od Himself, while distancing its reality from Him at the same 
time. Community is only the anticipation of God's Future, but as 
such is the place where the individual must place himself to find 
his meaning. The likeness between Polanyi's interpretation of 
reality as anticipation and Pannenberg's theological perspective 
of reality as anticipated wholeness is striking.
The person, for Pannenberg, has two aspects integrated into 
a single appearance, Man is a person in the roles and institutions 
to which he belongs, or at least one must say that person is relevant 
to the formation of these aspects of human existence. However, 
person is also a concept that refers beyond these things to that 
which the institution or the community structure points and of 
which they are anticipations. In this sense contingency and free­
dom, essential to personal existence, are guaranteed.
When Brunner wrote of these two poles of human existence he 
did so in a negative fashion. They were aspects of the person that 
could not be reconciled. He endeavored to transcend them for the 
sake of meaning. He wrote, "This process of balancing claims is, 
as I said at the beginning, the hopeless attempt to solve the ethical 
p r o b l e m W i t h  Pannenberg the tension existing between the 
individual and the community, in terms of personal existence, is 
seen as a natural tension, or better still, a divine tension that
Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p, 505.
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persists in the very life of God HimselfThus, rather than 
being destructive of meaning, as Brunner would have it, the tension 
becomes, in Pannenberg*s method, part of the process of meaning 
itself. This is also, one might add, in marked contrast to Marxist 
thought in which the tension (alienation) at the center of life is 
regarded as human. In Marx, the idea of the separation from the 
Future, which makes room for the essential contribution of appear­
ance, is absent, Man does not emerge in his essence through the 
tension for Marx, but by a radical elimination of it. In this sense 
there is also a timeless element in Marxist thought as contingency 
plays no vital part.^^
Through his whole programme, Pannenberg is aware of the origin­
ality, and thus perhaps the abstractness, of his thought. Looking 
at appearance as the arrival of the Future instead of that which 
'is*, has hardly been considered before Pannenberg*s time. Yet, 
in the light of the above, one cannot but agree with the conclusion 
he reaches with respect to the relevance of the concept and the 
necessity by which we must pursue its clarification. He writes:
"One must admit that Pannenberg is not always clear at this 
point. At times, he pictures the tension at the center of life as 
the result of sin. In other places, it is the exciting process of 
living in God Himself (of. What is Man?, p. 94),
*  ■iiaiMiM ipimmiT-iM 1 1 1  in ra u B  * ^ f
45Alienation in Marx is not a factor essential to man but a 
product of the capitalist system which can be removed in history.
He writes, "Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism, 
and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the 
definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, 
and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict 
between existence and essence, between objectification and self- 
affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual 
and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and 
knows itself to be this solution," (Karl Marx. Early Writings, 
trans, and ed, T, B, Bottomore (London, 19^577^?• 195f. and p, 155),
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And yet, against this view is the truth 
that such a position, which sees what 
appears in the appearance only as a time­
less universal, will inevitably under­
estimate or totally fail to recognize the 
importance for our experience of reality, 
of the contingently new, of the individual, 
and of time. Accordingly, it seems more 
appropriate to consider the universal as a 
human construction, which indeed proves 
itself useful by its ability to grasp a 
reality that is probably of quite another 
character, since it is conditioned by 
contingency and time,44
If man's life is oriented toward the future, which la a common 
anthropological understanding in modern thought, and the individual 
is to be given seriousness, or meaning, within the realm of history 
itself, then Pannenberg*s concept of appearance as the arrival of 
the Future is the logical perspective of the facts. In Marxism, we 
can see that man's hope contains history and yet at the expense of 
the individual. In Brunner, we can see that the individual receives 
his meaning in God and yet at the expense of history and historical 
community. For one, the Future is seen as the conclusion of an his­
torical process; for the other, it is seen as a reality above history, 
In Pannenberg, history itself is appearance and the Future is with us, 
As stated, Pannenberg*s theological perspective contains within 
it an ontology that is new to man. We are familiar with the under­
standing of reality that sees the future ahead of us and toward which 
we are moving. This understanding is involved in almost everything 
we undertake in our daily lives. We plan toward some goal and are 
accustomed to sacrificing the things of the present to reach that 
goal. We are also accustomed to the ontological thought of seeing 
the Future as a reality beyond history. In this case the Future, or
^Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. I4I.
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the totality of all tliat is, is pictured as the Ideal by which we
judge all our standards on earth. As Pannenberg expresses it,
the concept of that which 'is* allows us, "...the possibility of
forming general concepts and of making general structural statements
that can be applied to the most diverse individuals and to changing 
45situationsThis understanding of reality is only too familiar 
by those ?ho want to preserve the status quo.
It must be admitted, however, that we are not accustomed to
thinking of the future as that in which we live in the reality of our
historical existence, so that historical contingency is essentially 
related to it, that is, contributive to its essence. Yet, as we 
examined Polanyi*s theory of the process of knowing, he reasoned 
that the transcendent (or for our purposes that which is Future 
in relation to us), is known only in a subsidiary fashion. We are 
participating as knowers in that which is beyond us, the known.
By interiorising the facts of life, we live in that toward which 
they point. This is suggesting that we live in a tension between 
what we are and what we seek and yet what we are is an aspect of 
what we seek. Polanyi, in other words, has shown us that the per­
spective on reality, which we have considered in Pannenberg, is not 
a foreign concept when one analyses the nature of knowledge itself*
As further support of this perspective, it is not an uncommon
experience in life to see the meaning and value of something only
from a future standpoint, Vdien I look back over ray life from the 
present, which is the future in relation to everything that has gone 
before, I can determine the significance of something much clearer.
p. 141.
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I might say, for example, the most significant event in my life, 
that which changed my life, happened on a certain date and in a 
certain place. At the particular time of happening this obser­
vation could not have been made, but it is proper from my vantage 
point now to say it was so. The Future, or the totality of all 
that is, was present if only in appearance then. Can one not say 
thus with Pannenberg that what is the case proves to have been true 
all along, and say it without implicating one in a position of deter­
minism? The Future was present in me not in the sense of a simple 
potential working itself out, like an oak tree in an acorn. Rather, 
it was actually present if only from a limited perspective. In the 
case of the acorn and the oak tree, the tree is not present; it is 
coming into being. The tree does not appear in the acorn as it is 
the product of something already determined and thus appears only 
at the end. In the case of my event, the future itself was present.
These are very simple suggestions which help us to erase some 
of the strangeness associated with Pannenberg*s ontological view­
point, If we are to grasp the insight he offers, perhaps more than 
anything, we must rid ourselves of the Greek conception of truth 
which has dominated the western mind for so long. This is a suggestion 
Pannenberg himself makes
The real test of the viewpoint, however, is that which Pannen­
berg set down for the concept of God Himself; does it meet the 
requirements of reality? When speaking of God, one speaks of an 
ontological viewpoint on reality at the same time, and thus the
^^See Pannenberg, *V/hat is Truth?* (Basic Questions in Theology. 
Vol. II, pp. 1-27).
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latter should have determinative significance for all reality. 
Appearance as the arrival of the Future meets this standard in 
the two essential requirements of personal existence. The comm­
unity from this viewpoint becomes the appearance of man's final 
destiny and, of course, as the appearance of such is that to which 
the individual must relate in order to find his meaning. Unity is 
preserved in personal existence, or to put it another way, the 
identity essential for human life is preserved,
III. will r m  *
At the same time, because it is only appearance, it allows 
for contingent reality and the freedom of the individual. The 
balance between the rights and claims of each is not something laid 
down in advance, nor is it something that is hopelessly irrational.
It requires continual dialogue and mutual relationship so that the 
most just system of balance may be found for a particular occasion. 
When the community thinks of itself in absolute terms, the individual 
is there to open it to new horizons, V/hen the individual struggles 
to free himself from the community, he realizes at the same time 
that he is essentially related to it and thus must show respect.
It is a process of living determinism and freedom in mutual action. 
This is the tension at the center of existence which belongs to the 
essence of man's life.
All of this, of course, would demand a sharp departure from 
Brunnerian social ethics outlines in his concept of the orders.
The orders of social ethics in Brunner's scheme would be seen, in 
the light of the above, as open and personal, Moltmann wrote of 
the orders in a way that is helpful in understanding our intention 
here: "The state,.,.would have to be seen as a 'process of the
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fomation of political intention* and no longer as a naturalistic 
order on the one hand, or as a decisionistic institution of power 
on the other. The 'process of the formation of political intention', 
however,.must he shaped in creative love by Christians co-operating, 
working and suffering t o g e t h e r . A s  this quotation indicates, 
creative love is not something, as with Brunner, over and beyond 
the judicial process, but the shaping and reshaping of justice 
itself, Pannenberg expresses it this way; "The activity of love 
will aim at actualizing an initially provisional configuration of 
corporate life in order subsequently to create better justice (Hecht) 
beyond that, and thus to strengthen community,"^ *'®
It is recognized by Pannenberg that in some situations justice 
may be more lasting than in others. Love, which seeks its expression 
within justice, may be equated more firmly with justice in those
49instances. He speaks, for example, of the concept of repetition.
By this expression, he means that the neii or the future which is to 
come, in relating itself to the community, repeats the meaning of 
the latter; the change that is effected is so slight as to give the 
impression of repetition. But this, he says, does not contradict 
the notion of appearance as the arrival of the Future, "The con­
tingently new becomes present event by taking up into itself, or by
repeating, the existing situation, insofar as it is not able to
50transform it into a new synthesis," At the same time, Pannenberg
* Moltmann, Hope and Planning, p, 125* 
‘^^ Pannenberg, What is Man?, p. Id,
5°Ibid., p. 142.
of God, p, 142,
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recognizès the ceaseless confrontation of the future with the present
so that no situation can claim absolute justice for all time. The
path of human behavior, politically, socially and economically, is
a continual reconciling process. It is a reconciliation which is
not only human, but at the same time, divine.
This does not make Pannenberg*s method very revolutionary in its
implication, in the sense that we have come to understand revolution
in modern times, that is, as a radical break with the past and the
51initiation of a new process. He has profound respect for tradition
in his theology, for tradition seen in its proper perspective is the
presence of one's destiny itself in history. Yet tradition, from his
method, can be seen as always open-ended, in search of new horizons
and new interpretation. In this case, says Pannenberg, revolution
52becomes superfluous.
By criticizing what has been transmitted, a 
man swings himself up to a new level. But 
he still pushes off from what has been trans­
mitted in order to make the leap beyond it.
In climbing higher, each person is indebted 
to the previous stage, without which ho would 
not be where he is. No one begins at the
beginning,33
Thus, in Pannenberg's mind, the extreme individuality that 
runs with revolutionary activity and the impersonaliam which it 
engenders is tempered by making personal value depend on a reciprocal 
relationship between the community, the traditions firom which one
51I refer here to the concept of revolution inspired by Regis 
Debray and Frantz Fanon in their respective books. Revolution in the 
Revolution, trans, Bobbye Ortiz (M, R, Press, New York, 19^ 75# and 
The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Boolcs, 1
^^ ■pannenberg. What is Man?, p, 136. 
^ I^bid., p. 126.
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has grown, and the new that continually appears on the scene.
(E) The Challenge of Pannenberg's Perspective
The promise in Pannenberg's thought for meeting the demands and 
requirements of human existence has been presented. Let us now 
conclude our study with some suggestion of the challenge of his 
perspective.
The church has always been puzzled as to its role and assoc­
iation with the political, social realities of the world. Some 
theologians have argued for separate spheres of operation: the 
church in one sphere and the world of politics in another. In 
Brunner, we saw the presence of this sort of perspective. The un­
fortunate result it produces is the bifurcation of existence into 
spiritual and material categories. For example, when Bishop 
Montifiore spoke out in criticism of the Concorde aircraft in Britain,
ho was told by the political sector that such matters were not his 
54concern,He should stay within his area of work. This is an 
exemplification of the division to which I have just referred.
This arrangement of life into separate systems of 'meaning* 
empties both, at the same time, of challenge. The political sector 
can escape into an area in which practicality and expediency alone 
are the basis of value judging. The ultimate dimension, for which 
the church stands, by having no association with it, renders the 
political situation void of moral intention. The church, on the 
other hand, can escape into an area in which its statements have 
no rational, practical application. Its credibility is thus at 
stake.
^^ee The Times (Times Newspapers Ltd., London, Tuesday, January 
10, 1976, No. 59,^), p. 1.
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Panneriberg's reasoning that ultimate meaning is to be seen, 
in a sense, in the event is a direct assault on the exclusiveness 
of both the church and politics. In Pannenberg, 'meaning* is made 
the same for both spheres. This means they are essentially related.
This is not to say there is no differentiation to be made between 
them. The church, for example, must not identify itself, in any 
complete sense, with a political cause. That is, it must never 
proclaim any situation Christian in an absolute sense. Its role 
would be more that of creating and expressing a perspective on 
reality in which political causes and effort may take place. It 
must always make politics aware, by this perspective, of its involve­
ment with the Good and its distance from it at the same time. Politics, 
on the other hand, can no longer operate with sheer expediency in mind. 
It must see itself as the creator and producer of 'meaning* in the 
world. Politics, that is, can never escape the moral, the imperative 
of the Good (the pull of the Future), 'Meaning* depends on its 
responsible expression.
The future of the Kingdom releases a dynamic 
in the present that again and again kindles 
the vision of man and gives meaning to his 
fervent quest for the political forms of 
justice and love. The new forms that are 
achieved will, in contrast with the ultimacy 
of God's Kingdom, turn out to be provisional 
and preliminary. They will in turn be called 
upon to give way to succeeding new forms.
Superficial minds might thinlc that the poli­
tical quest is therefore futile. They fall 
to recognize that the satisfaction is not in 
the perfection of that \7ith which we begin 
but in the glory of that toward which we tend.
Wo possess no perfect pi'ogram, but are possessed 
by an inspiration that will not be realized 
perfectly by us. It is realized provisionally 
in the ever-renewed emergence of our striving 
in devotion to history's destiny.35
•^^ Paanenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, pp, 80-81.
APPEI'TDIX TO CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER TWO
in Brunner's Thou^t
In chapter two we argued that Brunner's concept of God implied
a timelessness. The depreciation of historical reality was noted
as a consequence of this theological position. It may he countered
that a significant change took place in Brunner's later writings,
which we have not appreciated. This change, it may be argued,
refutes the interpretation we have made of him thus far. It can
be pointed out that Brunner, himself, referred to a departure from
his earlier expressions of time and histoiy. In the light of this,
some attempt should be made to deal with this matter if the argument
of our thesis is to remain fair to the theologian throughout.
In the beginning of his writings, Brunner used the term 
2Urgeschichte, Although he was sceptical of the use which Barth
initially made of the term,^he soon found that with some caution^ 
the term was well suited to his purposes. The notion of 'primal 
history* (Urgeschichte) appears to preserve histoiy essential to 
the Christian faith. The word, at the same time, indicates a re­
moval from ordinary history and its positivistio character.
In a sense, all this is true. However, if history's relation­
ship with faith is preserved by such a term, its essential quality
See Brunner's reply to Georges Plorovslqy in The Theology of 
Emil Brunner, ed, Charles Kegley, p, 344.
^his terai was first used by Franz Overbeck in Christentum und 
Kultur (Basel, 1919), P* 20,
^Cf, Emil Brunner, Erlebnia, Erkenntnis und Glaube (Veriog von 
J, C, B, Mohr, Tubingen, 1923j7p7"'^note 1,
^ n  his Philosophy of Religion, Brunner warns the reader of the 
ambiguity thaTE^^t'lEWlïïTt^zwi (p, 123).
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is not maintained. By separating G-od's histoiy essentially from 
ordinary (profane) history, the value of time is destroyed. Under 
the tern Urgeschichte, Brunner included such essentials of our faith 
as creation, fall and salvation. The reality of these events was 
put beyond the empirical, phenomenal reality of which we are a part 
These events are pictured more as archetypes which involve little of 
man's participation. As with Platonic thou^t, little of historical 
character remains. The dimension of the future is lost. Life takes 
on the pattern of conformity with the past, complicated by the fact 
that this particular past has no real location in 'profane* histor­
ical existence. The timelessness for which we argued is evident in 
Brunner at this point.
In his later writings, however, Brunner did use a different 
expression. As with Barth, he identified himself more with the 
school of Heilsgeschichte (Salvation History),^ By this means, it 
is thought, he attempted to modify his position and give more atten­
tion to historical ideality in discussions of the faith. We ask;
Is this a significant term for this purpose? Does it mark a sig­
nificant departure, for Brunner, from his earlier stance?
Heilsgeschichte, according to Otto Piper^was first used in
5
See the statements made by Brunner in Man in Revolt, pp, 142ff, 
and pp, 399ffo He writes, "The Creation and the Fall both lie behind 
the historical visible actuality, as their pre-suppositions which are 
always present, and are already being expressed in the historical 
sphere," (p. 142),
^See Brunner. The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics Vol. II, Chapter 7 «.nd also Revelation and Reason, pp, 193ff* 
and Chapter 26,
7
See an article on the subject of Heilsgeschichte by Otto A. Piper 
in A Handbook of Christian Theology, eds, Marvin Halverson and Arthur 
Cohen (Collins, London, 1 ÿSo), pp, 1 60163,
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in Swabian pietistic circles toward the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Its continued use was assured by Johann Christian Konrad 
von Hoffmann (1810-1877), a representative of what came to be known 
as the Erlangen School, In recent time, however, it has come to be 
associated chiefly with the German theologian, Oscar Cullmann, The 
term for both Cullmann and Brunner was one which enabled them to 
picture and emphasise the forward looking, futuristic aspect of 
the Kingdom of God,
We can appreciate this emphasis. It is questionable, however, 
whether the term serves to rid Brunner of the dualism and timeless­
ness for which we have criticised him in this thesis. It is doubt­
ful whether Cullmann himself, in spite of the linear interpretation 
he lent to the tem, escaped the dualism that has plagued protestant 
theology with its notion of supra-history.
That the expression in Brunner's writings is different with this
tem, cannot be denied. There is clearly an attempt to remove him­
self from the strict separation of God and history, or God and time,
which plagued his earlier thought. In his earlier writings, for
example, he could write;
Christian faith knows nothing of any history 
of the world in the sense of a unity. Its
unity is not historical, but that which be­
longs at once to "Urgeschichte" or primordial 
history, and "Sndgeschichte" or the consumma­
tion of history, i,e, history not as moved by 
forces within itself, but within its relation 
to a creative and redeeming God. This is a 
relation that cannot be fitted into the frame 
of profane history. It is not the course of
history as such that is of interest, not the
fact that it is controlled by an immanent 
system of law, whether causal or teleological.
Rather what is of interest is the li^itning- 
flash in history of what lies behind history, 
the effective self-assertion of a factor that
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by its very nature does away with history, 
viz. the reality of divine revelation.^
In 19M Brunner could write with a different expression;
Because the beginning, the middle, and the 
end are not the same revelation is history 
....The revelation to which the Holy Scrip­
tures bear witness is a "history" of the 
dealings of God with His creatures,..The 
religion of the Bible differs from the 
teaching of all other religions in the fact 
that it is a teaching based on a history.
It is therefore not essentially doctrine 
but record. It is not as though this his­
toricity of revelation were a nonessential, 
accidental element, something merely of 
interest to the historical spectator.•
Faith, indeed, is concerned with the fact 
that we have to do with the God of histoiy, 
with the G-od who not merely "is" and "exists" 
but who acts, who marches along a road with 
the human race.^
In the first quotation, it is not difficult to see the 
depreciation of historical reality that characterized his earlier 
writings. In the second, however, there seems to be a change and 
one is given the impression that God has significantly penetrated 
history. This impression is made even stronger by Brunner when he 
writes about the difference of the Religion of Zoraster from 
Christianity,
The difference from the Hebrew-Christian view 
of whole is that the historical event is not 
united with this eschatological one, that 
Ormuzd does not make himself Icnown, like Yahweh, 
through his prophets, and that present history 
is not the history of a covenant which continues 
down tlie generations, and therefore that not even 
the world of nations is regarded as the object of 
the divine saving action. Hence the religion of 
Zoraster, in spite of its eschatology, has re­
mained mythical.10
Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 126.
^  miMI HI I . UMi 11 p i,ir imjB|-nnTrrir~rim r  n i i i .É i i  i  niirimi7-U»T|-«am i, rr^
% runner. Revelation and Reason, p. 193»
^^Ibid., p. 405.
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îHiat are we to make of tlie different expressions of historical 
reality in the last two Brunnorian references? Obviously there is 
something here that should be noted. However, one must be cautious 
in attributing a significant departure to it. As with other theo­
logians of his time, Brunner’s early writings were higlily polemical 
in tone. He was writing in a situation of world crises. His theology, 
as with some of his contemporaries, reflected the Christian battle 
against the Godlessness of the world. As time moved away from this 
critical point, Brunner’s writings became less polemical. It is 
possible to argue that the difference in expression, noted above, is 
due more to this shift in time, rather than a shift in theological 
method and position. This can be substantiated by looking at his 
third volume of Dogmatics, particularly the chapter on Sanctification, 
Such a chapter should be encouraging for any discussion of man’s 
participation in salvation. Indeed this is the first time that 
Brunner devotes any attention to the topic as such. Our anticipa­
tion is dampened, however, with the concluding words of Brunner on 
tho subject: "....all our teaching on sanctification stands under 
the sign of eschatological reserve. Incompleteness is an essential 
mark of all earthly existence. What is complete is that which tran­
scends history, that which we never realize in time, which we can only
11hope for and in faith hope for with assurance," Brunner’s depreciation 
of human action, in the same chapter, derives from such conviction.
Let us also remember that for Brunner God is Absolute ’Subject*.
11Bnmner. The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith and the
Consummation, Dogmatics Vol. Ill, p. 304.
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He is beyond the subject-object tension of life; this classification
is no longer relevant when speaking of God, God as Absolute ’Subject*
12is a term Brunner uses in his Dogmatics and thus is a witness to the
continued separation of God and history, in his writing. To speak
of God as only ’Subject* and not ’Object’ is to disassociate God
essentially with time. At the same time, it is not possible to
proclaim the strict subjectivity of God (the timelessness of God),
and still talk of God’s creative purpose in history. Nelson Pike
has made this plain to us in the following;
In ordinary cases where the preservation 
relation is clearly identifiable, a temp­
oral relation between that which is pre­
served and that which does the preserving 
appears to be an essential part of the
relation, I can see no way of eliminating
the temporal elements in such cases with­
out eliminating anything that could be 
counted as a preservation relation,1-5
It would appear that no significant change has been made in 
Brunner’s writings. It could be suggested that he has been cau^t 
up in a theological bind. He senses that a change is needed in 
order for history to be taken more seriously, and yet he fails to 
provide the conceptual tools to accomplish this change. Mere 
mention of the fact that there is some association or correlation
of the world and the gospel is not enough. It does not satisfy
the needs and demands for verification or rational presentation. 
Questions that cry out for clarification are how and why and to 
what degree is there a correlation? Heilsgeschichte is not a 
concept that offers Brunner the possibility of advancing far be­
yond his earlier position. Perhaps this is the reason for the
12Cf. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics Vol. I, 
p. 140. Biunner writ^%~^God is only Subject, He is not also Object;.,"
(p. 140).
1 3"^ Pike, God and Timelessnes_^ p. 117.
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inconsistency that is found frequently in his thought. It could 
be argued that Brunner’s failure to depart from his former position 
is because Heilsgeschichte as a concept does not carry within it 
the seed for something essentially new. This is the thinking of 
Carl Braaten who remarks that Heilsgeschichte theology has failed 
ever since its conception to show how revelation and history are 
connected, "It foundered on a dualism:", he writes, "revelation 
being assigned to the sphere of faith, and history to the methods 
of historical research.
^^ Carl Braaten, History and Hermeneutics (New Directions in 
Theology Today, Vol. II (Lutterworth Press, London, 1968)),p. 27.
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